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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Problem 
In the last decade, new developments have emerged from volatile changes in 
the multirelated economies and thus research in the field of agricultural trade and 
policy has been directed to studies of (1) the effects of exchange rate changes on 
agricultural trade, and (2) the interdependence between financial and agricultural 
markets, hence the effects of monetary factors on agriculture. The first has been 
extensively studied; however, the importance of the exchange rate continues to be 
the subject of debate. The second was gradually given attention, especially, since the 
exchange rate regime switched from fixed to fiexible in 1973. However, quantitative 
studies in this development are few so far and the linkages between financial and 
agricultural markets are not well constructed yet so that conclusions obtained are 
still open to question. 
Investigation on the effects of exchange rate changes on agricultural trade began 
in the mid-1970s. Pertinent events in the real world that caught the attention of 
economists in this investigation were the agricultural commodity boom and the 
two concurrent devaluations of the U.S. dollar in the early 1970s.^ Some observers 
^The first dollar devaluation (by almost 10 percent vis-a-vis the special draw­
ing right, SDR) in 1971 was mainly because of the increasingly poor international 
payments (deficits) situation for the United States. This devaluation, however, was 
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and researchers explained the commodity boom with reasons such as the rise of 
incomes in developing countries, worldwide population growth, bad weather and 
the associated crop failures in many parts of the world (e.g., the Soviet Union), etc. 
In 1974, Schuh first suggested that the dollar devaluation was an omitted reason. 
Then, he directed attention to the link between exchange rate and agriculture, 
"pafAcuiMrggrimhu^^ • 
In the early 1980s, a farm crisis occurred. The primary problem was declin­
ing agricultural product prices, hence lower income received by farmers relative to 
increasing costs of agiicultural production. Similarly, many explanations were pro­
posed but arguments had crucially attributed the problem to the declining foreign 
demand for U.S. agricultural products. The U.S. dollar appreciation, therefore, was 
blamed as the primary reason for declining foreign demand (e.g., Schuh, 1984). Ap­
parently, along with the boom-and-bust of agricultural products exchange rate is 
always a focus of practical questions and of interest to economic researchers over 
time. Many trade theoreticians and empiricists question the effectiveness of ex­
change rate devaluation as a policy tool for agricultural trade: whether the effects 
of exchange rate changes on agricultural trade are significant or not? 
Unfortunately, assessments of the effects of exchange rate changes result in 
divergent and perhaps contrary conclusions. Some argue that the exchange rate 
is less important because (1) the demand for and supply of agricultural products 
are inelastic (e.g., Kost, 1976; Vellianitis-Fidas, 1976), and (2) price insulation 
followed by continuous and deteriorating deficits. Consequently, the United States 
announced to unilaterly devaluate the dollar again in 1973. From that time on, all 
major currencies in the world including the U.S. dollar started to float and the fixed 
exchange rate system was broken. 
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policies in importing countries and trade policies in other exporting countries might 
offset and dominate exchange rate effects (e.g., Johnson et al., 1977; Grennes et al., 
1980). However, another group of observers argue that (1) devaluation should raise 
the foreign demands for U.S. agricultural products because the cost of payments 
declines (e.g., Schuh, 1974), and (2) changes in exchange rate would cause all prices 
of traded goods to change, the cross-price effects coupled with the own-price effect 
should fluctuate exports and prices significantly (e.g.. Chambers and Just, 1979, 
1981, 1982), so that the role of exchange rate in trade is important. Divergence in 
the effectiveness of exchange rate, therefore, confuses the exchange rate as a policy 
tool in implementation. 
Prior to 1973 the exchange rate could be regarded as a monetary instrument; 
however, this is no longer true since the dollar started to float. Theoretically and 
ideally, exchange rates are determined by the foreign exchange market under the 
flexible system. Therefore, the focus of studies on effects of exchange rate changes 
has been gradually turning to the investigation of effects of exchange rate determi­
nants on agricultural trade. Among determinants of flexible exchange rate monetary 
factors have been strongly focused. Consequently, research is looking at the inter­
dependence between financial and agricultural markets, and to measure the effects 
of monetary policy on agricultural commodity markets (e.g.. Chambers, 1981, 1983, 
1984; Chambers and Just, 1982). This has become a hot topic in recent years. 
Not only the flexible exchange rate system but also the depressed agricultural 
sector and concurrent contractionary monetary policy in the 1980s enhanced the 
investigation of interdependence between financial and agricultural markets ( Batten 
and Luttrell, 1982; Denbaly, 1984; Devadoss, 1985; Devadoss et al., 1987b; Frankel, 
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1984; Schuh, 1981, 1983; Schuh et al., 1980; Starleaf, 1982). Most of the studies 
pointed out that the contractionary monetary policy since 1979 aimed at lower 
inflation had adversely affected the agricultural sector, because the appreciation of 
the dollar value caused the foreign demand for U.S. agricultural products to decline 
and the higher interest rates raised the cost of production and then crucially hurt 
the's'ÏÏppfylDÎ'agHcùltûràl 'prodtîctÈr; The-lowei' prices-due tcr-declining demand on 
the one hand and the higher cost due to higher interest payment on the other jointly 
caused the farm crisis to explode in the 1980s. 
Although the interdependence between financial and agricultural markets was 
emphasized, quantitative measurements of the impacts of monetary policy in empir­
ical studies are few so far. Devadoss (1985) and Devadoss et al. (1987b) measured 
the impacts in a farm-nonfarm macrolinkage, general equilibrium model. Impacts 
on specific agricultural markets had been studied by Chambers and Just (1981, 
1982) for wheat, corn, and soybeans, and by Denbaly for coarse grain markets. The 
adverse effects of a tight monetary policy on the agricultural sector was substan­
tiated by Devadoss and Devadoss et al. Chambers and Just concluded that wheat 
and corn exports, and wheat and soybean prices are dramatically sensitive, while 
soybean exports and corn priccs are less sensitive, to monetary policy. However, 
Denbaly's findings indicated that the effects of money supply changes on exports 
and prices of coarse grain market are small. 
Theoretically, effects of exchange rate changes or monetary policy on agricul­
ture can be substantiated with less doubt; however, the empirical assessment of 
these effects, as that obtained, seems divergent, inconsistent, and perhaps contrary. 
What factors may have caused such mixed results are numerous; however, the basic 
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theoretical framework might be the primary one, particularly when a specific com­
modity market is investigated. The common theoretical framework of all previous 
studies is the competitive framework, that is, the market is assumed competitive, 
so that the law of one price is implied and the market power of big exporters or im­
porters is neglected. Utilization of the competitive framework might be a big defect 
since, as several studies pointed out, many agricultural world markets (e.g., wheat) 
do not appear to follow the competitive market characteristics. Thus, for the the­
oretical assessment or empirical measurement of the effects of monetary policy the 
competitive framework might not be suitable, and by insisting on its use the biased 
results could be a priori expected if the market is actually imperfect competition. 
If the agricultural world market is evidenced imperfectly competitive, as Thomp­
son (1981) strongly suggested, it is very important and required to incorporate such 
behavior into a trade model. This will create an alternative way to investigate not 
only the trade theory but also the assessment of effects of exchange rate changes or 
monetary policy on agricultural commodity markets. 
1.2 Objective of this Study 
The objectives of this study are as follows: 
1. To theoretically develop a new U.S. wheat model containing trade in the 
imperfect competition world market and the competitive domestic market. 
This breaks away from the conventional competitive model. 
2. To connect the U.S. wheat model with the financial market via the linkages of 
exchange rate and interest rate determination, then to theoretically evaluate 
the impacts of U.S. tnonetary policy on wheat trade and domestic market. 
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3. To empirically estimate the theoretical new wheat model and examine the 
validation and stability of the model. 
4. To empirically measure the impacts of U.S. monetary policy on the wheat 
sector using the newly developed model. 
1.3 Organization of this Study 
The present study is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 reviews the previous relevant literature, discusses controversies and 
limitations in the previous studies, and indicates the direction of this study. 
Chapter 3 presents the duopoly world wheat trade model. The world wheat mar­
ket structure is discussed first, and a duopoly wheat export pricing behavior 
is performed next. 
Chapter 4 constructs a new U.S. wheat model, and connects this model with the 
financial market to theoretically assess the impacts of monetary policy. The 
U.S. wheat model consists of imperfect competition trade and a competitive 
domestic market. The connection is via the interest rate (the internal chan­
nel) and the exchange rate (the external channel) determination, where the 
portfolio equilibrium model is employed to determine these two rates in the 
financial market. 
Chapter 5 empirically estimates the theoretical model, reports and interprets the 
results, and examines the validation and stability of the model. 
Chapter 6 empirically analyzes the impacts of U.S. monetary policy on the wheat 
sector using dynamic simulation and multiplier analysis. 
Chapter 7 includes a summary of this study, conclusions, and suggestions for fur­
ther research. 
2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Schuh (1974) was the first to direct attention to the effects of exchange rate on 
U.S. agriculture. He pointed out that analysis of trade and development problems 
of U.S. agriculture in the past neglected, for the most part, the role of the exchange 
rate. By using the induced technical change model, he indicated that exchange 
rate plays an important role in agricultural trade, the adoption of new production 
technology, and the distribution of benefits of technical change. Moreover, for 
agricultural price changes, he argued that even the exchange rate was not the only 
contributing factor, the overvaluation of the U.S. dollar has had an important role 
in the secular decline of agricultural prices from the mid-1950s through the 1960s. 
The rise of agricultural prices in 1973 in large part was a result of dollar devaluation 
in the same period. 
Prom that time on, a series of studies on measuring the effects of exchange rate 
changes on agricultural trade followed. The new development of investigation is the 
impact of monetary policy on agriculture as described in the preceding chapter. 
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Q Q 
exporter trade importer 
Figure 2.1: The competitive framework of trade 
2.1 Effects of Exchange Rate Changes on Agricultural Trade 
2.1.1 Theoretical framework 
2.1.1.1 Graphical framework The effects of exchange rate changes on 
trade can be theoretically presented and perceived by a conventional one-commodity, 
two-country, partial equilibrium graph, Figure 2.1. However, one must bear in mind 
that there are two assumptions underpinning the use of Figure 2.1, (1) homogeneous 
traded good, and (2) free trade, so that the law of one price (LOP) holds. In other 
words, markets are assumed competitive and thus any trade participant is a market 
price taker. Change in the domestic price is, therefore, equal to change in the export 
price. 
To stress the role of exchange rate in U.S. agricultural trade, Schuh used the 
exporter's graph of Figure 2.1 to interpret the influence of dollar overvaluation. Pi 
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is the equilibrium price without overvaluation. Impacts of overvaluation are that 
domestic price declines from P\ to domestic demand increases from Qj to Qg, 
domestic supply declines from Q2 to Q4 (because mobile resources are forced out of 
industry), and foreign demand decreases from the amount Q\Q2 to Q3Ç4 (because 
U.S. products become more expensive as the dollar overvalued). Consequently, gross 
income to the agricultural sector is reduced and the sector becomes more dependent 
on the domestic market. 
This graphical framework can help in understanding the theoretical impacts of 
changes in exchange rate; however, the specific impacts on price and quantity for 
a particular commodity market should depend upon (1) the elasticities of demand 
and supply curves in both countries, then the elasticities of excess demand and 
excess supply curves, and (2) demand and supply shifters besides exchange rate. 
Apparently, they are unclear in the framework. 
Kost (1976) applied Figure 2.1 to assess the effects of changes in exchange rate. 
By carefully treating the scale changes in vertical axes to reflect the price in terms 
of a common currency as exchange rate changes, he demonstrated that the impacts 
of exchange rate changes on trade and price depend on (1) the magnitude of the 
exchange rate change and (2) the elasticities of the export supply and the import 
demand curves. For a devaluation by the exporting country, the maximum amount 
of change in price or quantity traded is the same in percentage as the amount 
of devaluation. The more inelastic the export supply curve, the more percentage 
change in price rather than in quantity. Therefore, for the inelastic demand and 
supply of U.S. agricultural products, he expected that the dollar devaluation would 
have a small impact on trade, and if it did "what effect there is will be primarily 
10 
on price rather than quantity." 
Kost incorporated the elasticities of demand and supply curves into consid­
eration. However, other demand and supply shifters besides exchange rate were 
neglected. Demand and supply are implicitly assumed as functions of own price 
only. Exchange rate change can shift the demand and supply curve through its 
effect on the own price since the LOP holds. 
2.1.1.2 Simple mathematical model The above simple two-country, one-
commodity, partial equilibrium graphical framework can be mathematically ex­
pressed (Chambers and Just, 1979) as follows: 
Di = fin)^ d f j d v ^  <  0  
Si = 9{Pi), dg/dpi > 0 (2.1) 
Di = Si = Qi 
n = Pi G 
where is the excess (import) demand for commodity i of the importing country 
and is a function of the market price in the importing country, is the excess 
(export) supply of commodity i of the exporting country and is a function of the 
market price in the exporting country, is the quantity of commodity i traded, 
e is the exchange rate evaluated in terms of the units of the importer's currency per 
unit of the exporter's currency. The LOP is assumed by the model to equilibrate 
prices. 
In equilibrium, effects of exchange rate changes on price and quantity traded 
11 
are (in terms of elasticities) 
= ,7^  < » 
where (> 0) is the elasticity of excess supply with respect to p^, and rj^ (< 0) 
is the elasticity of excess demand with respect to Vj. Clearly, a devaluation of the 
exporting country's currency (rfe < 0) would result in increases of exporter's price 
and quantity traded. However, is confined to the closed interval [0,-1] since r/^-
< 0 and > 0. may be greater than Cf in absolute value dependent upon the 
magnitude of e^-. 
Kost's conclusion, therefore, can be clearly seen from equations (2.2) and (2.3). 
If =0, perfectly inelastic excess supply, Cf = -^ and = 0, that is, the impacts 
of devaluation are fully on the export price and quantity traded is unchanged. If = 
oo, perfectly elastic, = 0 and the quantity traded will fully respond in percentage 
to the devaluation. In case of inelastic demand and supply of U.S. agricultural 
products, the percentage change in export price should exceed the percentage change 
in quantity in response to any percentage change in the dollar value. Thus, export 
price is more responsive to devaluation than the quantity traded. 
2.1.1.3 A more general mathematical model The lack of consideration 
of other demand and supply shifters was patched up by Chambers and Just (1979). 
They criticized the simple model as being too restrictive on the specification of 
(excess) demand equation, and then argued that from the standard neoclassical 
demand theory the (excess) demand should be specified as a function of all prices 
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and income. More strictly speaking, the cross-price effects as well as the own-price 
effect must be accounted for in the assessment of effects of exchange rate changes. 
By assuming that all goods are traded for simplification and no influence on 
qualitative results (Chambers and Just, 1979,1980), they extended the simple model 
as 
Di = f{v,M) 
Si = g{P,m) (2.4) 
Qi = Di = Si 
V = Pe 
where v is a vector containing all prices of n commodities in the importing country, 
M is the aggregate income of the importing country, P is a vector containing all 
prices of n commodities in the exporting country, m is the aggregate income of the 
exporting country. Similarly, in the absence of barriers to trade the LOP holds in 
equilibrium for all traded commodities. 
The effect of exchange rate change on the price of ith commodity (pj) can be 
derived by differentiating the equilibrium condition {dM = dm = 0) as 
(2.5) 
where is the partial exchange rate elasticity defined by equation (2.2), is the 
total exchange rate elasticity, 7/| is an n — 1 column vector of cross-price elasticities 
of demand, is an ra — 1 column vector of exchange rate elasticities of the cross 
prices, a is an n — 1 column vector of ones, and e* is an n — 1 column vector of cross-
price elasticities of supply. From equation (2.5), if, and only if, the term in bracket 
13 
is negative the absolute value of is greater than Cf- Therefore, Chambers and 
Just concluded that "there is no a priori reason to restrict to the closed interval 
[0,-1]." The percentage change in price may be greater than the percentage change 
of devaluation, as long as the cross-price effects are accounted for. 
Chambers and Just also criticized the simple model, (2.1), in that the specifi­
cation of excess demand function forces a price change to have the same effect as an 
exchange rate change. This could be true, using their more general model, only when 
the cross-price elasticities are zero between the traded commodity i and all other 
goods, but it is hardly realized. To support the view that exchange rate changes are 
differentiated from market price movements, they cited Orcutt's (1950) hypothesis 
that economic agents react more quickly to exchange rate fluctuations than to mar­
ket price changes in a world characterized by fixed exchange rate. Consequently, 
they argued that prior to any empirical investigation of effects of devaluation this 
hypothesis should be considered. 
Above are the basic conventional theoretical frameworks that underpinned 
models in the assessment of the effects of exchange rate changes on agricultural 
trade. Various extensions or modifications in modeling had been made in empirical 
studies. In general, they are changes in the number of country and commodity 
included and can be classified as 
A. two-country, one-commodity model. This is the simple graphical framework 
and the simple mathematical model. 
B. two-country, multicommodity model. This is the Chambers and Just proposed 
model with cross-price effects in consideration. 
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C. multicountry, one-commodity model. This is the spatial or nonspatial model.^ 
D. multicountry, multicommodity model. This is, perhaps, the most complete 
model (spatial or nonspatial). 
In addition to changes in the number of country or commodity included, various 
specifications and modifications had been made in empirical models such as (1) to 
have trade and/or domestic policies consideration or policy reaction functions, and 
(2) to formulate the price transmission equation instead of the price linkage between 
countries in model. Another simplified way which had been tried in several empirical 
studies is to simply estimate the import (excess) demand equations for, e.g., U.S. 
products. 
2.1.2 Empirical findings 
Since the theoretical evaluations are so controversial, effects of exchange rate 
changes have become an empirical rather than a theoretical issue. However, results 
of empirical measurements were also mixed. Rough groupings of those mixed results 
could be made up of "insignificant" and "significant" effects of exchange rate changes 
on trade. Various reasons have been proposed by proponents of each group to 
support their findings. 
^Multicountry models are basically simultaneous systems of equations specified 
to reflect the behavior of trading countries and their interrelationships through the 
world market. According to Thompson's (1981) reviews and classifications, there 
are three multicountry models: spatial price equilibrium models, nonspatial price 
equilibrium models, and trade flow or market share models. These models generally 
include more domestic market detail, but the interrelationships among countries are 
introduced by means of net trades of countries in the nonspatial models, and by 
means of trade flows and/or market shares in the spatial models and in the trade 
flow and market share models. 
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Proponents of the insignificant effects argued that the exchange rate devalu­
ation has relatively little impact on agricultural prices (domestic and export) and 
quantity traded. Kost (1976) and Vellianitis-Fidas (1976) based their findings for 
this stand on the inelastic demands and supplies of U.S. agricultural products, par­
ticularly in the short run. Vellianitis-Fidas also found that the long-term effects of 
exchange rate changes on exports are quite small and perhaps even zero. Kost's 
conclusion of insignificant effects was actually a theoretical assessment using Figure 
2.1. Vellianitis-Fidas empirically tested the equation of U.S. agricultural exports by 
OLS regression using cross-sectional (a stepwise procedure) and time-series data. 
Johnson et al. (1977) developed a short-run forecasting multicountry wheat 
model (a spatial equilibrium model with goods differentiated by country of origin) 
to examine the importance of exchange rate, tariffs, export taxes, and transport 
cost in the commodity boom of 1973. As a result, they argued that price insulation 
and trade policies by wheat importers and exporters had the largest impact on 
U.S. wheat prices, the dollar devaluation was of lesser important (a 10 percent 
devaluation of the dollar led to approximately a 7 percent increase in wheat domestic 
prices). Moreover, the U.S. shipping policy that raised transport cost almost offset 
the effect of devaluation on raising the wheat price. However, their conclusion was 
criticized by Chambers and Just (1979) who said, "the qualitative results of their 
analysis may well be correct, but the quantitative magnitudes are certainly open to 
question." This is because, as Chambers and Just pointed out, their multicountry 
export flows model is equivalent to the simple mathematical model without the 
cross-price effects, therefore, a priori restricts the exchange rate elasticity of export 
price to the closed interval [0,-1] and forces the exchange rate changes to have the 
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same effects as export price changes on the import demand. 
In contrast, proponents of significant effects of exchange rate changes argued 
that exchange rates had been an important determinant of agricultural exports and 
led to fluctuations of domestic price (Chambers and Just, 1979, 1981, 1982; Clark, 
1974; Devadoss, 1985; Devadoss et al., 1987b; Fletcher et al., 1982). Schuh (1974) 
theoretically indicated the important role of exchange rate on trade. Clark, per­
haps is the first one to empirically examine the effects of exchange rate changes, 
indicated that devaluations have a larger effect on agricultural goods than on man­
ufactured goods. By focusing on a particular agricultural commodity trade and 
striking out the role of exchange rate, Fletcher et al. estimated the U.S. wheat 
export demand equation with the exchange rate as separate regressor (based on the 
Orcutt hypothesis). The significant results were evidenced. 
To be more defensible for this stand. Chambers and Just (1979) developed a 
theoretical model, (2.4), and then made a critique to the argument of insignificant 
exchange rate effects. Their key proposition was that the cross-price effects due to 
exchange rate changes must be accounted for and thus the effects on exports and 
price might be significant. Their later studies (1981, 1982) supported the signiflcant 
argument. Such argument was also evidenced by Devadoss, and Devadoss, Meyers, 
and Starleaf in a farm-nonfarm, macrolinkage model. Both in the simultaneous 
estimation and dynamic simulation the exchange rates did have large impacts on 
U.S. crop exports and price. 
Not getting into groups, Collins et al. (1980) argued that exchange rate impacts 
on trade and prices are not being able to be announced as simply large or small. By 
decomposing the price changes into the divergence of inflation rates and changes in 
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exchange rate between trading countries, they concluded that effects of exchange 
rate changes on real U.S. commodity prices are smallest under free trade and real 
commodity price insulation policies, but as nominal price insulation policies become 
more prevalent the effects will substantially rise. 
2.2 Impacts of Monetary Policy on Agriculture 
Since exchange rates started to float in 1973 and the farm crisis occurred in the 
1980s, the attention of economists has been gradually directed to the investigation 
of impacts of monetary policy on agriculture. The associated change in modeling, 
primarily, is that exchange rate should be endogenized because it is no longer a 
policy instrument in the purest sense in implementation. 
Shei (1978), perhaps, was the first to attempt to link and study the effects of 
monetary phenomena on U.S. agriculture. He constructed a compact, empirical, 
general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy, and thereby simulated the impacts 
of money supply and exchange rate on the agricultural sector. His results indicated 
that agricultural prices tend to rise more than nonagricultural prices when money 
supply expands. On the other hand, money supply has more important effects on 
U.S. agriculture than the exchange rate. However, a shortcoming of his model is 
that the exchange rate was treated as predetermined, so that the causal linkage 
between money supply and exchange rate was ignored. 
In the 1980s, most studies on the effects of monetary policy on agriculture 
argued that the effects are substantive, a contractionary monetary policy tends 
to adversely affect the agricultural sector. However, the impact linkages between 
monetary factors and agricultural markets were diverse. It is likely that ei complete. 
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realistic, and generally acceptable model (theoretical or empirical) has not been 
constructed yet, especially for a specific agricultural commodity market, such as 
wheat. 
Since U.S. agriculture is heavily dependent upon trade, most studies focused 
on the impact of monetary policy through the channel of exchange rate. However, 
the interdependence between financial and agricultural markets is not only through 
exchange rate, but also through other channels. To summarize recent studies, mon­
etary factors can have impacts on agricultural commodity markets through the 
influence on (1) the exchange rate determination process (the external channel), 
hence impact on trade, and (2) the level of interest rate, inflation, and income 
(the internal channels), hence impacts on production and demands in the domestic 
market (e.g., Devadoss, 1985; Devadoss et al., 1987b; Starleaf, 1982). 
Exchange rate effects have been reviewed in the previous section. However, 
for purposes of examining the effects of monetary factors through this channel, two 
crucial points must be considered: (1) the exchange rate variable must be endoge-
nized, and (2) how the monetary factors influence the exchange rate determination 
under the flexible exchange rate system, that is, the formulation of exchange rate 
determination equation in model. 
To meet these two requirements, Chambers and Just (1982) built a three-block 
recursive empirical model to examine the effects of monetary factors on agricultural 
markets of wheat, corn, and soybean. Their effort was to account for the cross-
price effects, thus all goods were assumed tradeable (Chambers and Just, 1979). 
The results strongly suggested that effects are dramatically large. However, their 
formulation of exchange rate equation is ad hoc and, therefore, theoretically assail­
19 
able. To attain theoretical underpinning, Chambers (1984) adopted the portfolio 
balance approach to exchange rate determination, and developed a short-run the­
oretical model to conduct the interdependence between financial and agricultural 
markets. His empirical results implied that the short-run effects of monetary policy 
(e.g., open market operation) are not neutral since agricultural prices fall relative to 
nonagricultural prices. Thus, a contractionary monetary policy would depress the 
agricultural sector and lead to lower relative prices, income, and returns to factors 
specific to agriculture. 
Denbaly (1984) estimated the effects of money supply increase on the world 
coarse grain market. He adopted the simple monetary approach to exchange rate 
determination. As a result, he found that the excess supply of money created in 
the monetary sector tends to depreciate the value of the U.S. dollar; however, it 
leads to only a relative small increase in U.S. domestic price and exports. Thus, the 
contractionary monetary policy does not have dramatically adverse effects on U.S. 
coarse grain exports and domestic market. 
In a macroeconomic, general equilibrium framework, Devadoss (1985) and De-
vadoss et al. (1987b) also formulated the exchange rate equation by the simple 
monetary approach. The adverse impacts of contractionary monetary policy on the 
farm sector was substantiated by their empirical findings, thus a loose monetary 
policy was suggested in the policy implication. 
Turning to internal channels, the first to look at is the effect of monetary policy 
through the interest rate. The importance of changes in the domestic interest rate 
and its implications for the agricultural sector had been emphasized; however, there 
are only a few empirical studies that address the effect. In general, the interest rate 
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can affect the agricultural markets in two ways (1) through the cost of borrowing 
production loans which, in turn, affect the cost of production, hence the supply 
(cost effect), and (2) through the storage cost of carrying commodity reserves, 
hence demand for inventories (stock effect) (Chambers, 1981, 1983; Devadoss, 1985; 
Devadoss and Meyers, 1986; Devadoss et al., 1987b; Frankel, 1984; Schuh et al., 
1980). 
Chambers (1981) derived the cost effect (interest rate effect through produc­
tion) in a simple two-country, one-commodity trade model. His theoretical deriva­
tion indicated a negative interest rate effect on exports; whereas, the effect on price 
is ambiguous conditional on the combined effect of interest rate on exports of ex­
porter and on imports of importer. Frankel (1984) described the short-run stock 
effect (interest rate effect through carrying inventories) using the overshooting con­
cept. As the money supply change, demand for storable (agricultural) commodities 
will change associated with the short-run fluctuations of interest rate until the ad­
justments are long enough and sufficiently back toward the long-run equilibrium. 
Devadoss empirically estimated the interest rate effects on the agricultural sector in 
his dissertation, which appears to have been the first empirical study, and argued 
that the tight monetary policy and alarming budget deficit lend to higher interest 
rate, and hence "has an adverse effect on the farm sector since farmers pay higher 
interest on their production loan and other operating expenses." A consistent re­
sult was obtained by Devadoss and Meyers and Devadoss et al. when a sustained 
3 percent decrease in money supply growth was simulated in their sectoral general 
equilibrium model. 
The other internal channels through which monetary policy may have impact 
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on agriculture are inflation and income (Devadoss, 1985). For example, an expan­
sionary monetary policy might induce higher general price level and the growth of 
income. The higher general price level will increase the cost of nonfarm inputs, 
hence lead to a reduction in production (inflation, or cost, effect). On the other 
hand, increase in income may result in a higher demand for high-income-elasticity 
agricultural products (income, or demand, effect). 
The inflation effect on the farm sector was debated in empirical studies. For 
example, Tweeten (1980, 1983) found that a rise in the general price levels tends 
to result in a loss to farmers in real income, because inflation raised prices paid 
by farmers (inputs) more than that it raised prices received by them (output). 
However, a later study by Starleaf et al. (1985) argued that farmers were benefited 
by an acceleration in the rate of inflation because the farm-output price inflation 
reacts quicker and sharper than farm-input price inflation in short-run movements. 
The empirical simulation results of a contractionary monetary policy by Devadoss 
(1985) and Devadoss et al. (1987b) indicated that lower inflation might benefit the 
farm sector, but the increases in the value of the dollar (exchange rate effect) and 
the domestic interest rate (interest rate effect) and the fall in income (income effect) 
might overwhelm the inflation effect and tend to hurt the farm sector. The income 
effect due to monetary policy is positive. 
There is another area of study that has the same goal of examining the interre­
lationship between financial and agricultural sectors — using the Granger causality 
test (e.g., Barnett, 1980; Barnett et al. 1983; Chambers, 1981, 1984; and Devadoss 
et al., 1986). Some evidence has been detected on the causal relationship between 
financial and agricultural sectors. For example, the significant causal effect is found 
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(1) from money supply to agricultural exports and imports, food price, wheat price, 
and (2) from exchange rate to national trade deficits, hence to aggregate agricul­
tural price and wheat price. The causal effect from interest rate to agricultural 
exports and imports, however, had been detected insignificant. These tests draw 
important policy implications from financial sector to agriculture. 
2.3 Discussion of Controversy and Limitation 
2.3.1 Free trade and the law of one price (LOP) 
Agricultural commodities were conventionally and generally regarded as flex-
price goods or auction goods; that is, prices are free to respond to fluctuations 
in demand in the short run (Frankel, 1984; Hicks, 1974; Okun, 1975). Conse­
quently, most agricultural trade models were basically conceptualized and operated 
within the competitive (or free trade) framework, because this framework is tightly 
matched with the regardness.^ Within this framework, products are marketed com­
petitively, international commodity arbitrage is perfect and ensures that a product 
sold internationally will obey the law of one price (LOP) — in common currency 
units prices of a product sold in two markets will differ by no more than the trans­
port cost between the two markets. In other words, by ignoring the transport cost, 
export price of the exporting country, import price of the importing country, and 
domestic prices in both countries are all equal (see Figure 2.1). As already seen in 
the foregoing review, all previous analyses (effects of exchange rate changes and/or 
monetary policy on agriculture) followed the competitive framework, and the LOP 
was assumed if no trade barriers were considered. 
^For detailed survey of agricultural trade models see Thompson (1981). 
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Unfortunately, recent evidence suggests that the LOP did not hold during the 
1960s and 1970s (e.g., Isard, 1977; Richardson, 1978). This finding implies that 
commodity arbitrage is never perfect, thus the standard competitive framework in 
empirical study is questionable, and so is the conclusion. The commonly perceived 
reasons for the failure of LOP are (1) imperfectly competitive market, (2) differ­
entiated products, and (3) barriers to trade (Dunn, 1970; Isard, 1977; Richardson, 
1978). 
Regarding the world wheat market, first, most of individual country's markets 
are highly protected by exerting trade barriers in the importing side, such as variable 
levies in the European Community (EC), quotas in Japan. With little doubt, the 
LOP should not hold, at least on the importing side. Second, to use competitive 
framework is not realistic. While this framework was assumed and adopted by all 
previous studies, studies on the characteristic of the world wheat market pointed 
out that it is imperfectly rather than perfectly competitive (these studies will be 
reviewed and discussed in Chapter 3). Apparently, if the world wheat market is 
imperfectly competitive, the conventional competitive framework is incorrect, and 
hence the biased empirical results could be a priori expected. 
As the strongest recommendation by Thompson (1981) for future agricultural 
trade modeling work, if the market is evidenced imperfectly competitive it is very 
important and required to incorporate this behavior into the trade model. There­
fore, analysis for the world wheat market should be based on an imperfectly com­
petitive framework and the LOP should not be assumed. 
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2.3.2 Cross-price effects 
Chambers and Just (1979, 1981, 1982) emphasized the importance of cross-
price effects in the assessment of the effects of exchange rate changes on trade. 
Omission of cross-price effects tends to force the exchange rate changes to have 
same effects as price changes, then, the exchange rate elasticity of exporter's price is 
confined to the closed interval [0, -1]. In supporting their argument that exchange 
rate changes are different from market price movements, so is the importance of 
cross-price effects, they quoted Orcutt's hypothesis that economic agents react more 
quickly to exchange rate fluctuations than to market price changes when exchange 
rates are fixed. The reason is because consumers perceive an exchange rate change 
as being more permanent than short-run price changes. 
Theoretically, all prices and incomes should be incorporated for a more com­
plete trade model without doubt. However, Chambers and Just's model itself and 
the model in empirical application may have problems, and the significant exchange 
rate effects are also questionable. First of all, their model, (2.4), does not intrin­
sically differ from the simple model, (2.1), except for the inclusion of other prices 
and incomes. This is clear because the treatment of the exchange rate variable in 
both models is via the LOP assumption. Moreover, if cross-price effects exist at the 
initial moment when devaluation occurs, there is no difference between exchange 
rate change and exporter's price change (through the LOP) except that change in 
exchange rate will far-reach all individual commodity markets. In the long run, 
exchange rate variations and exporter's price variations of equal magnitude are 
equivalent. This is because after all adjustments have taken place, the impact of 
both variations is identical. What difference may have is the response lags under a 
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fixed exchange rate system (Reed, 1980). 
Second, Orcutt's hypothesis actually was not embodied in their model, (2.4), 
and did not help their conclusion in interpretation. Under the fixed exchange rate 
system, if price is elastic in response to exchange rate change, it is due to the cross-
price effects, not due to thé consumer's response to devaluation, which was proposed 
larger than the response to price change. On the other hand, the exchange rates 
were experienced to change much quicker than the price change under the flexible 
exchange rate system since 1973. Therefore, it could be plausibly expected, due 
to the spirit of Orcutt's hypothesis, that consumers should react less quickly to 
exchange rate changes than to the exporter's price changes. The price in response 
to devaluation in a short run, accordingly, tends to be inelastic rather than elastic 
under the flexible exchange rate system. 
The final problem in the empirical study is what prices (indices) should be 
included in order to account for the cross-price effects. Actually, there is no answer 
for this problem. The difficulty is the unavailability of data (Chambers and Just, 
1979, 1981). Reed's (1980) suggestion, "the inclusion of prices for commodities 
which are close substitutes (complements) to the good studied," is more sound in 
practice. 
Incorporation of possible cross-price effects to clarify the effects of all vari­
ables in the model is theoretically acceptable and should be attempted in empirical 
study. The exchange rate elasticity of the exporter's price may be theoretically 
elastic due to the cross-price effects, but the possibility in the real world is still 
open to question. Under the flexible exchange rate system and if the individual 
agricultural markets are highly protected, Orcutt's hypothesis and the exchange 
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rate pass through problem (Jabara and Schwartz, 1987) might reduce the exchange 
rate effects on trade. 
2.3.3 Trade and domestic policies 
Johnson et al. (1977) questioned Schuh's (1974) emphasis on the importance 
of exchange rate in U.S. agricultural price changes; therefore, they tested the im- \ 
portance to the boom of the U.S. wheat export price in 1973 and concluded that 
the dollar devaluation was of lesser importance than the trade policies exercised by 
other major importers and exporters. Their conclusion was criticized by Chambers 
and Just (1979) who claimed that their multicountry model a priori restricts the 
effect of devaluation (omitting cross-price effects), so that the quantitative measure 
are open to question. In a reply to Chambers and Just's critique, Grennes et al. 
(1980) argued that, first, there is a theoretical reason to expect U.S. domestic prices 
to rise by no more than the devaluation, and second, whether devaluation is im­
portant or not depends on what it is compared with. Apparently, there appears a 
question: are trade policies in other countries important enough to lessen or offset 
the effects of exchange rate changes? 
The importance of impacts of domestic and trade policies on price and quantity 
traded had been studied by a number of researches.^ Grennes et al. (1978a) argued 
that price insulation policies (the EC and Japan) and the export taxes (Canada, 
Australia, and Argentina) tend to destabilize the U.S. wheat price. When price in-
^Various policies in world agricultural markets can see, for example, Bredahl, 
Meyers, and Collins (1979), de Gorter and Meilke (1987), Devadoss et al. (1987a), 
Enders and Lapan (1987), Krishna and Chhibber (1983), Mahama (1985), Runge 
and von Witzke (1987), and Spriggs (1981). 
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sulation is perfect in an importing country, the domestic price is perfectly insulated 
and the effective import demand becomes perfectly inelastic. More specifically, 
Bredahl, Meyers, and Collins (1979) incorporated the insulation policies in estimat­
ing the elasticities of foreign demand for U.S. agricultural products. The insulation 
policy was expressed in terms of "price transmission elasticity" [EP^), which is usu­
ally bounded by zero and one. EP^ is one (perfect price transmission) only when 
a free trade with zero transport cost is undertaken or if the foreign price varies 
proportionally with the U.S. price. As a result of calculation, the price elasticity of 
foreign demand for U.S. wheat exports is zero if EPj^ is assumed zero, while it is 
-5.50 if a free trade is assumed. However, they pointed out that the strong evidence 
in the world wheat market is that EPj^, with respect to U.S. price, approaches zero 
because most major importing countries insulated their internal consumption prices 
from the world price. Furthermore, they (Collins et al., 1980) assessed the effects 
of exchange rate changes on the real U.S. agricultural prices, and concluded that 
effects are smaller under real commodity price insulation policies. To couple the 
domestic policies on production and consumption with the trade policy, de Gorter 
and Meilke (1987) found that both the (domestic) intervention price and (import) 
threshold price in the EC had influence on its wheat trade. 
It appears that the effects of the dollar devaluation should be in (large) part 
offset by price insulation policies exercised by other countries. If foreign domestic 
markets are perfectly insulated, the effects should be small, or even zero. Thus, 
in any of the assessment of exchange rate effects the omission of trade policy in 
modeling might result in upward biases. 
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2.3.4 Differentiation of commodity 
With few exceptions, most of the previous studies on the exchange rate effects, 
as well as those of conventional agricultural trade models, presumed homogeneous 
trade commodity (Thompson, 1981). Grennes et al. (1978b) is one of the few 
exceptions that questioned this presumption. For wheat, they point out that it is 
not a homogeneous good. In the study of effects of devaluation on trade, Johnson 
et al. (1977) differentiated wheat by country of origin. 
To differentiate commodity in trade model may be justified in two ways: (1) 
by physical characteristics of products, and (2) by country of origin (Johnson et al. 
1979). Wheat is used for human food (primarily), livestock feeding, and industrial 
usage. The considerable varieties of wheat in physical characteristics (e.g., protein 
content) lead to that different types of wheat are often destined for different end 
uses. Thus, it may not be valid to assume that wheat is a homogeneous commodity 
(Gilmour and Fawcett, 1986). On the other hand, wheats in international trade 
might also be differentiated by country of origin in the eyes of each importing 
country in regard to the reliability of suppliers, information cost, and such. In 
terms of price, differentiation of wheat should be reflected in price differentiations. 
If wheats are differentiated by country of origin, the different spatial prices could 
be explained largely by transfer cost, such as transport, marketing margins, and 
governmental trade barriers (Johnson et al., 1977). As wheats are differentiated by 
physical characteristics, the original (export) prices themselves should be essentially 
different to reflect their quality. 
As the LOP was evidenced being weakly supported and the fact that wheats 
in the world market are differentiated, the product differentiation should be pre­
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sumed in modeling and in empirical content for better qualitative results. A few 
studies have been attempted to differentiate wheats in the trade model by country 
of origin,^ the physical characteristics of wheat, however, are still assumed homoge­
neous. Further research which attempts for most realistic to see the price response 
to exogenous impact should also assume the differentiation in physical characteris­
tics. 
2.3.5 Financial market and the formulation of exchange rate equation 
While the interdependence between financial and agricultural markets was re­
cently emphasized and studied, the linkage via exchange rate determination is the 
most important one because U.S. agriculture is heavily dependent upon trade. Ef­
forts have been made to formulate the exchange rate equation for this purpose; 
however, it has not yet been done well. The main difficulty is that the formulation 
has to be theoretically underlined and empirically capable, but limitations on either 
request usually exist. This is because approaches of the exchange rate determina­
tion that have been developed are mostly theoretical, few of them can be easily 
applied in empirical study, for example, econometric estimation. 
Chambers (1981) theoretically formulated exchange rate as, the simplest asset 
approach to the exchange rate determination, a function of the relative domestic 
and foreign interest rate. The theoretical basis is that in a world where mone­
tary assets can move across countries, an increase in the domestic interest rate 
will attract investment capital to inflow, hence improve the country's payments 
position. However, such a simplified formulation might be sound only when the 
^For summaries of these studies see Johnson et al. (1979) and Thompson (1981). 
30 
interest rate instead of money supply is the policy instrument. Money supply as 
an instrument and then its role and effects are submerged with this formulation. 
Another misleading in specification is that this formulation ignores, for example, 
the speculative movements of capital across countries (hence the role of news in 
foreign exchange markets), and the influence of inflation on (spot) exchange rate 
determination (Frenkel, 1980, 1981b; Frenkel and Levich, 1975; Prenkel and Mussa, 
1980). 
The later effort by Chambers (1984) adopted the portfolio balance model to 
formulate the exchange rate equation. However, his model was essentially a short-
run framework, not suitable for a long-run analysis. What it improved is that 
the effects of monetary policy (e.g., open market operation) on agriculture can be 
theoretically evaluated, but the role of interest rate and its determination were 
ignored in modeling. 
Turing to the empirical application. Chambers and Just (1982) endogenized 
the exchange rate variable in their U.S. crops model. Nevertheless, formulation of 
the exchange rate equation is ad hoc, making it theoretically assailable. Their only 
rationale is that "the empirical model does not purport to be a 'monetarist' model 
of exchange rate determination. On the other hand, it should not be pictured as a 
'nonmonetarist' model, either. Rather, it is an attempt to capture the effect of some 
important monetary variables as well as nonmonetary variable (through the balance 
on current account) on the exchange rate determination process..." (p. 236). 
In fact of empirical application, among approaches of exchange rate determi­
nation the one that was widely adopted is the simple monetary approach (Frenkel, 
1976,1984). Denbaly (1984) and Devadoss (1985) successfully applied this approach 
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in their doctoral theses. The shortcoming of this approach is that it was evidenced 
to be hardly successful in interpreting the unprecedentedly volatile exchange rate 
movements in the 1970s. Frenkel (1976), the pioneer of this approach, demonstrated 
it in a hyperinflationary economy (e.g., Germany in the early 1920s), however, if 
inflation is moderate (e.g., in the 1970s) this approach fails (Frankel, 1979). The key 
point is the collapse of purchasing power parity (PPP), which primarily underpins 
this approach (see, e.g., Dornbusch, 1980; Frenkel, 1981a, 1981b). 
In addition to the exchange rate determination, as reviewed in the previous 
section interest rate is another important impact channel from the financial market 
on agricultural markets. Almost all previous studies neglected this impact channel. 
For those few studies that had interest rate incorporated in the model, the interest 
rate determination theory was either lacking or misspecified. The portfolio equi­
librium model (Branson et al. 1977; Kouri, 1976, 1980) will be used in this study. 
The advantage to use this model is that it simultaneously determines both exchange 
and interest rates. The theory of this model and the reduced form determination 
equations will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
2.4 Direction of the Present Study 
The U.S. wheat market has three properties, so is investigated in this study. 
First, the United States has been the biggest exporter in the world wheat market 
since the 1960s. Second, in value terms, wheat is the most important (the biggest) 
agricultural product exported by the United States. Third, in quantity terms, about 
half (55 percent on average) of domestic production is exported and the other half 
used domestically. As the biggest exporter in the world market (about 41 percent 
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on average from 1960 to 1985), the United States can exercise its market power 
to influence the world wheat price. Thus, the United States is hardly the market 
price taker. Instead, it can price wheat exports like an oligopolist. As the biggest 
export product, wheat can be regarded as representative of U.S. agricultural trade. 
Moreover, U.S. wheat is destined half to trade and half to domestic market, so 
these two markets are almost equally important. This property provides a relatively 
balanced evaluation of the effects of monetary policy. For example, if a commodity 
is produced almost totally for domestic (foreign) uses, the effect of monetary policy 
through exchange rate should be less (extremely)important. 
According to the foregoing review and discussion, construction of a theoretically 
sound model and assessment of the effects of monetary policy would require the 
incorporation of the following: 
1. an oligopolistic behavior of the world wheat market 
2. differentiation of wheat in the world market by country of origin and also by 
physical characteristics 
3. inclusion of prices of commodities that are close substitutes (complements) to 
wheat and wheat products to account for the cross-price effects 
4. implementation of trade and domestic agricultural policy 
5. determination of exchange rate and interest rate in the financial market 
A complete U.S. wheat model should consist of foreign trade and domestic 
market. A financial market could be independently constructed. Assessment of 
effects of monetary policy can be done by merging these three separate blocks 
together with the impact channels being linked and the commodity market cleared. 
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Note that the effects of monetary policy through inflation and income channels 
would not be incorporated into the study. This is because production of wheat 
is relatively capital-intensive, interest rate as a price of capital is more important 
than other nonfarm inputs. On the other hand, wheat products are staple foods in 
consumption, the price and income elasticities are small so they are less important. 
Certainly, if an aggregate model, for example, farm sector as a whole, is investigated, 
these two effects might be important and should be accounted for (e.g., Devadoss, 
1985; Devadoss et al., 1987b). Thus, the monetary policy impacts incorporated in 
this study are through the exchange rate (the external channel) on wheat trade, 
and through the interest rate (the internal channel) on domestic market. 
Since wheat trade and domestic market are just a small part relative to total 
trade or to the economy as a whole, it is justified to assume that both exchange and 
interest rates are determined in the financial market independent from changes in 
the wheat market. That is, there is no feedback impact from the wheat market to the 
financial market, hence to the determination of these two rates (Chambers, 1981). 
A schematic diagram in Figure 2.2 describes the impact channels of monetary policy 
on U.S. wheat trade and domestic market. This is the basic theoretical framework 
of this study. 
Financial markets Impact channel Complete U.S wheat model 
foreign exchange 
market 
monetary 
policy 
exchange rate 
(external) 
^domestic money-
market 
-•mterest rate 
(internal) 
A. world wheat market 
(imperfect competition) 
aggregate world wheat rmport demand 
world import demand for U.S. wheat 
-p- international price linkage 
export pricing decision 
B. domestic wheat market 
(perfect competition) • 
-• wheat production 
-•domestic demand for wheat 
-•ending stocks 
domestic market equilibrium 
Figure 2,2: Impact channels of monetary policy on U.S. wheat trade and domestic market 
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3 DUOPOLY WORLD WHEAT MARKET 
The main attempt of this chapter is to model an imperfect competition world 
wheat trade — a duopoly model. Such incorporation of imperfect competition 
behavior breaks away from the conventional competitive framework. 
Before going on to discuss the structure of world wheat market and the deter­
mination of world prices, it is essential to discuss the basic theory of demand for 
and supply of wheat in the importing countries. Note that the competitive behavior 
is assumed for all domestic markets of trade participating countries. For example, 
the United States is an oligopolist in the world market, but its domestic market is 
assumed competitive. The reason is because both wheat producers and consumers 
are numerous, none can have influence on domestic price determination. 
3.1 Demand for Wheat in the Importing Countries 
Chambers and Just (1979) suggested that, according to the neoclassical demand 
theory, (excess) demand should be specified as a function of all prices and income. 
Such specification would account for cross-price and income effects in addition to the 
own-price effect. In the theoretical derivation of such neoclassical demand function, 
they suggested to explicitly assume the separability of the utility function. 
However, an important characteristics of demand for wheat that was ignored 
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is that demand for wheat is a derived demand, not directly the consumer's choice. 
Consumers demand the final wheat products; whereas, demand for wheat is a factor 
demand by the producers of wheat products, such as cereal and bread. Consumer's 
choice among goods is to maximize his profit, factor demand by a producer, however, 
is to maximize his profit. They are intrinsically different. 
There are two main destinations of wheat: food use and feed use. Demand 
(derived demand) for wheat mainly results from these two uses. The theoretical 
procedure for obtaining the demand for wheat is, first, to obtain the consumer's 
demand for final wheat products, and second, according to the consumer's demand, 
to derive the demand for primary wheat, an input of production of final wheat 
products. 
3.1.1 Individual demand for final wheat products and meat 
Following the separability of utility function, a consumer can partition the 
set of n commodities available to him or her into S {S < n) mutually exclusive 
and collectively exhaustive groups, [Gj, G2, —Gg]. Each group I contains 
commodities and n = "/• The commodities within a group are assumed to 
possess some common characteristics. Therefore, the consumer can make his or 
her consumption decision in two stages: (1) to budget income into groups, and (2) 
to allocate income within group. The necessary and sufficient condition for such 
budgeting process to be consistent with the theoretical one stage process is that 
the utility function is weakly separable and each of the group aggregator functions 
is homothetic (Armington, 1969; Blackorby et al., 1978; Gorman, 1959; Johnson et 
al., 1984). 
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Now, consider that the individual is budgeting his or her income (per capita) y 
over S groups. In the first stage of the optimization process expenditure functions 
of the following type are obtained: 
yi = yiiPhP2^—iPs^y) for/ = 1...5 (3.1) 
where is the expenditure on group /; Pi, ..., Pg are price indices for each 
budget category of the form 
Pi = PliPlV-^Plni) ' = 1" "S" (3-2) 
where p^, are the prices of commodities, which constitute group I. This 
budgeting is made under the income constraint y  =  E f — j  V l  =  P l ^ l -
The second stage of the optimization process consists of the determination of 
the quantity demand of each item rel under the expenditure constraint Plr^lr ~ 
y^. These quantities are determined in the second-stage within group decision, 
9lr = 9lr{Plh-^Plni^yi)> (3-3) 
The demand equations in a such budgeting process are, hence, the two-stage demand 
equations, 
9lr = 9lr\PlV-^Plni'^yiiPl^"->Ps'^y)l (3-4) 
or a more general form, by substituting (3.1) into (3.4), 
9lr ~ 9lr\Pllf"'iPlni''Pl^P2^"'^Ps'^y^^ (3-5) 
Thus, individual demand for a particular commodity depends on income, price 
indices of all groups, and prices of commodities within groups. 
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For convenience, let group one (/ = 1) be grain and grain products and group 
two (/ = 2) be meat and related products. Then, the individual's demand for any 
wheat product is 
and demand for any meat and related products is 
t2j = n}lP21:P22' •••<P2n2l ^1' -I  
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
Note that the two-stage demand equations are not demands for wheat, they are 
demands for wheat products and meat and related products. 
3.1.2 Country's demand for final wheat products and meat 
For simplicity, assume that consumer preference is homogeneous in a country; 
therefore, the country's demand for each product can be obtained by a simple 
summation of all individuals' demands. 
Suppose there are w wheat products and m meat and related products available 
in the market, where to < nj and m < 712- The demand system can be written as 
'  Qii ^ 
Qi2 
Qwp = 
< Qlw / \  N • qi^ ! 
" • m  ^  
N 
•912 
= N • q iv (3.8) 
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QM = 
( yr \  
^ 921 
Q22 ^ 922 
< Q2m ) 1 ^ ' 92m / 
= N • q m (3.9) 
where Q\Yp and Qj^ are column vectors of the country's demands for final wheat 
products and for meat and related products, respectively; and q^ are column 
vectors of individual's demands for wheat products and for meat and related prod­
ucts, respectively; N is the population, and z = 1 • • • lo, and ggj, j = 1 • • • m, 
are defined by (3.6) and (3.7). 
3.1.3 The derived demand for wheat 
Suppose competitive markets exist for both final products and primary factors 
of production in a country. Wheat is the primary input of its final products. Supply 
of wheat is not fixed because of trade. The aggregate derived food (feed) use 
demand for wheat can be obtained from wheat product (meat and related products) 
industries through the profit-maximization behavior. 
Define the price and quantity vectors of the final wheat products as 
q""' = (911,912," ' ,qiw) 
Qi =  (Qi i ,  Q i2 ,  •  •  ' ,  Qiw)  
vector of individual's demands for wheat 
products 
vector of industry production of wheat 
products 
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= (pii,pi2, • • ',piw) vector of w prices of wheat products 
^1 = (vii,wi2i • • •j'Wife) vector of k prices of primary factors for 
producing w wheat products, let «n be the 
price of wheat 
= (aJii, a:i2, • • •,xik) vector of k primary factors for producing 
w wheat products 
0 = F(Qi,Xi) the implicitly joint production function 
Then, the aggregate Marshallian factor demand function can be obtained by 
the profit-maximization process as 
Max n = pf gi - Vix[ 
a.t.  0 = F(Qi,Xi) 
Forming the Lagrangian function. 
I((?1,Xi,Ai,A2) = Ff g'L - VIX[ - XIF(QI,XI) - X2{Q'I --WD 
where A2 = (^21, ^22» •••> ^2w)- The first-order conditions (FOC) of equilibrium 
are 
=  ^ - > 1 ^ - 4 = 0  
8Q1 '  '  SQi 
m = 
^ = fWi,Xi) = o 
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A set of implicit functions can be obtained from FOC as 
= Qi{vii,vi2, '-  •)«lJfc;Pll>Pl2»- • ,Plw,Plw+l," -«Plni! 
^1, 
Xi = •,pin^\Pi,P2,-",Ps]y',N) 
= ^l(«ll>vi2»---'«lA5iPll»Pl2>- • -'Plw'Plty+l'- ••>Plni! 
where Q-^ is a set of final wheat products market equilibrium functions; Xj is a set 
of derived demand functions for primary factors. 
Let in vector X\ be wheat, so the functional form of derived demand for 
wheat can be written as 
It is clear that variables to influence the demand for wheat are (1) population in the 
country, (2) income per capita, (3) price indices of all commodity groups, which will 
affect the income allocation into groups, (4) all prices of final grain products within 
group, and (5) all prices of primary factors used to produce final wheat products. 
The same procedure can be applied to group 2, meat and related products. A 
similar derived feed use demand function for wheat can be written as 
^11 = -^11(^11'""12»•• •»''ljfc;Pll'Pl2'* • •'Pliw'Pliy+l'" •-'PIni! 
Pi,- •,Ps'y'^^)- (3.10) 
^21 = ^2l(^21.^22'---»''2/i;P21>P22>*"'P2m»P2m+l'---'P2n2Î 
^1.- • (3.11) 
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where V2i is referred to as wheat price. Note that in equation (3.10) and «21 
in equation (3.11) are wheat price and must be equivalent; let vjj = «21 = 
The country's demand for wheat could be simply the summation of equation 
(3.10) and (3.11). A general functional form can be written as 
D = ^11+^21 
= •,t'/i+A;;Pll,---,Plu;.Plw+l,- ••»Plnii 
P21»* • *»P2m'P2Tre+l»' • •»P2n2Î^l'' " (3-12) 
where v\ is the wheat price. 
Chambers and Just (1979) emphasized that cross-price effects are important, 
one can more precisely find, (3.12), that cross-price effects may exist in three places: 
among all commodity groups, (Pj, ..., Pg)\ among all commodities within 
group, (pii, P12, -, Plni) (P21» P22» - ^ 2^2)' among all primary factors, 
(«1, ..., 
The major problem of this approach in empirical study is the unavailability of 
data. In fact, there are no such detailed and well-grouped price indices, especially 
when time-series data are applied. However, the own-price and some close substitute 
(or complement) prices should be included in empirical study (Reed, 1980). 
3.2 Production of Wheat in the Importing Country 
Many previous studies specified the production of wheat simply as a function 
of current or lagged price. Nevertheless, a recent and more realistic specification is 
that it is a product of yield per acre and the wheat area (Devadoss et al., 1987a; 
Gallagher et al., 1981; Mahama, 1985; Spriggs, 1978, 1981). The reasoning is that 
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the variability of wheat area is largely determined by economic factors, while yield 
variability is more subject to environmental factors and technology. 
What are economic factors affecting the wheat area? Under the assumption 
of competitive domestic market, the individual wheat producer is a market price 
taker, so that his or her production is determined at the equilibrium condition of 
market price equal to marginal cost (P = MC). The economic factors, therefore, are 
wheat price received by producer and prices of inputs. An increase in wheat price 
and/or a decrease in production cost (prices of inputs) would increase the quantity 
produced. 
However, most governments of the importing countries intervene in their do­
mestic wheat markets. Domestic wheat producers receive payments from govern­
ment. For example, the intervention prices in the EC, wheat support price in Japan, 
and so on. Prices received by wheat producers are always higher than the actual 
market price, where the difference is subsidized by governments. Therefore, price 
received by producers is relatively the most important economic factor that deter­
mines the area, other economic factors are relatively less important. In viewing 
the fact of government intervention, production of wheat in the importing country 
could be specified as 
St = Y At • AHt(FVt) (3.13) 
where is production of wheat, Yis wheat yield per acre, AH^ is wheat area, 
and FVf is the government support price received by farmers. 
In time horizon, the crop year (July 1 to June 30) was always used in agricul­
tural research and will be used in this study. However, one must bear in mind that 
production of wheat is almost finished at the beginning of the crop year. Harvest 
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takes place in June and July, so that supply of wheat can be regarded as fixed for 
the coming crop year. What can influence wheat supply is the area at planting 
time. It is a function of the government price and this price is always announced 
at the beginning of planting for the coming crop year production. 
Another property of wheat production is its rigidity in adjustment in response 
to the market information. Unlike the manufacturing sector, once wheat is seeded 
production is almost determined, weather conditions aside. Thus, wheat area for 
crop year t is determined at the beginning of planting, which is in year < — 1 in the 
time horizon. As the crop year starts, the supply of wheat is fixed. Clearly, current 
market price is mainly determined by market demand. 
3.3 Demand for and Supply of Wheat in the Centrally Planned 
Economy (CPE) 
The above specification of demand for and supply of wheat is primarily based 
on the price theory. However, it may not be applicable to the centrally planned 
economy (CPE), such as the USSR and China. 
Distribution of wheat in the CPE is basically via two marketing systems: 
government-owned sale agencies and the free market. Wheat producers are re­
quested by government to deliver and sell a fixed proportion of production to pub­
lic agencies. This wheat is sold by the government sale agencies to demanders at 
the government price. The producers' self-left portion of production is for their 
self-consumption, seed use, and supply to the free market. The demanders of those 
nonproducers can buy wheat at government agencies at government price and/or 
at the free market at the market price. Most wheat is distributed through the 
45 
government marketing system. The free market is relatively small and acts as a 
supplement in the national distribution system. 
Under these two marketing systems, the actual demand for wheat of the pro­
ducers is equal to their self-left wheat minus supply to the free market. On the 
other hand, the actual demand of nonproducers is the summation of demands in 
government and free marketing systems. The aggregate demand for wheat at crop 
year t, therefore, is the summation of demands of producers and nonproducers, and 
can be specified as 
Dp =  y f ,  N f ,  Sf ) (3.14) 
where is the free market price, and is the government price. Since wheat 
area in the CPE is usually centrally planned by government, production of wheat 
(S^ = Y- AHp) is considered exogenously determined. 
3.4 Structure of World Wheat Market 
The world wheat market behavior had been hypothesized as perfect compe­
tition and imperfect competition. The model of perfect competition, that is, the 
competitive framework, had been widely applied in the agricultural trade model, 
especially in studies of exchange rate effects on trade. However, if the market is im­
perfect competition, analysis based on the competitive framework should be biased, 
so the conclusion is meaningless and disappointed (Thompson, 1981). 
3.4.1 Regularities of the world wheat market 
Some regularities of the world wheat market are observed as follows: 
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Table 3.1: Supply shares of major exporting counties (average, %)° 
Year Total U.S. Canada Australia Argentina EC Others 
1960- 64 100.00 41.38 23.19 12.76 5.59 6.15 10.93 
1965 - 69 100.00 36.89 21.39 12.57 6.38 8.79 13.99 
1970 - 74 100.00 42.25 21.45 12.84 3.22 8.52 11.73 
1975 - 79 100.00 44.18 19.46 13.81 5.51 9.26 7.79 
1980 - 85 100.00 40.95 20.94 12.98 5.56 9.81 9.76 
1960 - 85 100.00 40.95 20.94 12.98 5.56 9.81 9.76 
"International Wheat Council. Various issues. World Wheat Statistics. 
1. Wheat was supplied by five major exporting regions; the United States, 
Canada, Australia, Argentina, and the EC. These five regions supplied about 
90 percent, where the United States and Canada shared more than 60 percent, 
of the world supply (Table 3.1). 
2. There are more than 100 importing countries in the demand side. The rel­
atively more important regions are the EC, Japan, and India in the free 
economies, and the USSR and China in the centrally planned economies. 
These five regions shared about 45 percent of the world wheat demand (Table 
3.2). 
3. The Canadian export prices were always higher than export prices of other 
exporting countries. Movements of all export prices were almost at the same 
steps except for the short-run, small adjustments in each country (Figures 3.1 
and 3.2) 
4. Export prices were relatively stable in the fixed exchange rates period (1960 
- 72), while under the flexible exchange rate system (1973 - 85) fluctuant and 
unstable export prices were observed (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). 
From the market shares in the supply and demand sides, it is apparent that the 
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Table 3.2: Demand shares of major importing countries (average, %Y 
Vear Total EC Japan India USSR China Others 
1960 - 64 100.00 19.62 6.66 9.20 4.62 9.17 50.74 
1965 - 69 100.00 14.96 8.04 10.03 4.99 9.22 52.76 
1970 - 74 100.00 11.40 8.68 4.86 8.38 7.65 59.04 
1975 - 79 100.00 7.37 8.07 3.17 10.40 8.34 62.65 
1980 - 85 100.00 3.56 6.00 1.68 20.71 11.09 56.96 
1960 - 85 100.00 11.08 7.43 5.63 10.24 9.17 56.45 
'International Wheat Council. Various issues. World Wheat Statistics. 
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Figure 3.1: Export prices of Canada and the United States 
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Figure 3.2: Export prices of Canada, Australia, and Argentina 
world wheat market is hardly competitive. A trade theory and hence the empirical 
model should be able to capture and interpret the outcomes in price and quantity 
changes over time. 
3.4.2 Previous studies on the world wheat market structure 
Mendulson (1957) was among the earliest to study the world wheat market 
conduct. He argued that to consider international pricing in the framework of 
competitive trade theory for wheat is inappropriate, the world price was directly 
affected by monopolistic and monopsonistic forces exercised through the Interna­
tional Wheat Agreement (IWA).^ As it followed, oligopolistic nature of pricing and 
UWA was replaced by the International Grains Arrangement (IGA) in July 1968. 
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structure of world wheat market were postulated. 
McCalla (1966) conceptualized the world wheat market in a circumstance of 
stable prices as a model of cooperative duopoly between Canada and the United 
States. 
A duopoly approach rather than an oligopolistic approach is appropriate 
for two reason. First, Canada and the United States supply 60 percent 
of the market. Second, only these two countries have storage facilities in 
sufficient volume to permit holding, and ability essential to duopolistic 
or oligopolistic pricing. This storage capacity and the willingness of 
these countries to hold stocks support the duopoly concept (p. 713). 
Other reasons contributing to the duopoly model are that Canada and the United 
States have lower production costs and huge volumes of production relative to other 
suppliers. The behavior of other smaller exporters, such as Australia and Argentina, 
was postulated more akin to follow the duopolists' price to clear their current crop. 
The demand side of the market was characterized as competitive because of the 
absence of market power. 
Note that McCalla's postulation of a duopoly model was narrowly confined to 
the free world wheat market with sales to USSR and China excluded. In a broader 
world market including the centrally planned countries, he abandoned the duopoly 
model and argued that the market was an oligopoly on the exporting side and an 
oligopsony on the importing side (McCalla, 1970). 
McCalla's cooperative duopoly model was followed by Taplin (1969) except for 
the specification in the wheat pricing behavior. Alaouze et al. (1978) extended 
McCalla's duopoly to a triopoly model with Australia as the third triopolist. They 
argued that a market-share triopoly model was appropriate after the price war 
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in the 1968 season. Australia no longer pursued a policy of pricing to sell its 
exportable surplus. Evidence of the vast increase in carryover stocks in 1968 and 
increase in the storage capacity in the next season (1969) indicated that Australia 
was prepared to exercise restraint in its wheat marketing. This model was proposed 
to be appropriate until thé 1972 season when the market was characterized by high, 
unstable prices and low carryover stocks. Instead, the market was postulated as 
competitive from that season on, but after the mid-1970s they further suggested 
that market was returning to some form of stable, oligopolistic structure because 
price had begun to fall and stocks were increasing. 
In 1979, Carter and Schmitz refused the thus far generally accepted notion 
that world wheat prices were largely determined by major exporters (market of 
oligopoly). Instead, they evidenced that the market power on the part of major 
importers was perhaps greater than the power of major exporters (maker of oligop­
sony). A rather naive graphical "optimal tariff" model was performed to empirically 
examine the world wheat price formation. Their result showed that Japan and the 
EC, particularly Japan, were more likely the world price leader, because the world 
price (1966 to 1972, 1976) was approximately determined at the level Japan and the 
EC set an optimal or nearly optimal tariff (quota equivalent). The market power 
may temporarily revert from the major importers to exporters and the market is 
effectively an oligopolistic pricing only at the time of commodity booms from 1973 
to 1975. 
An implication about the market structure was drawn by Spriggs et al. (1982) 
from their results of test on leadership between Canadian and U.S. wheat prices. 
The oligopoly model suggested by Carter and Schmitz for the 1974 - 1975 period 
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was supported because the U.S. acted as the price leader (price leadership will be 
discussed in the next section). The competitive market asserted by G rennes and 
Johnson (1979, 1980) to against either oligopoly or oligopsony model was evidenced 
inappropriate. The market may have been temporarily competitive at the time of 
1972 to 1973, but that is not likely the case for all time. 
Following the sequence of arguments but lack of agreement on the world wheat 
market structure, Kolstad and Burris (1986) formally tested the hypotheses: Canada-
U.S. duopoly, Canada-U.S.-Australia triopoly, Japan-EC duopsouy, and perfect 
competition. A spatial equilibria world wheat trade model was applied to the 1972 
season, and they concluded "Nasy duopsony conduct assumption is a very poor ex­
plainer of trade. The duopoly and triopoly models performed considerably better, 
with the duopoly model forecasts being slightly closer to the actual values than 
the tripoloy model" (p. 36). Since they were the first to conduct a formal test, the 
finding provides a very important direction for the previous mixture on world wheat 
market structure. Table 3.3 summarizes all previous market structure hypotheses 
associated with the noticeable market outcomes and events of the dollar. 
3.4.3 World wheat market of duopoly 
Prom the regularities and previous studies, the world wheat market is, at least 
most of the time, more realistically imperfect rather than perfect competition. 
But should the duopoly arrangement disintegrate, it is certain that it 
will be replaced by another imperfectly competitive market structure 
.... It will not be replaced by an international market approaching pure 
competition ... (McCalla, 1966, p.727). 
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Table 3.3: The hypothesized world wheat market structures 
Crop year Hypothesis (proponents) Outcomes and the dollar events 
1. 1960 - 63 Duopoly (McCalla, Taplin) Stable price 
2. 1964 - 65 Triopoly or U.S. dominant 
(McCalla) 
Price war (J. 17% in 1964, 
historical low in 1965) 
3. 1966 - 67 Duopoly (Taplin) 
Duopsony (Carter and 
Schmitz) 
Price recovery and stable 
4. 1968 - 71 Triopoly (Alaouze et al.) 
Duopsony (Carter and 
Schmitz) 
Price war (^12% in 1968, 
historical low in 1969) 
Gold window closed in 1971 
First dollar devaluation 
(about 7%) at Dec. 1971 
5. 1972 Duopoly (or triopoly) 
(Kolstad and Burris) 
Duopsony (Carter and 
Schmitz) 
Competitive(Alaouze et al.) 
High and increasing price 
(T41%) 
Second dollar devaluation 
in the early 1973 (flexible 
system started) 
6. 1973 Oligopoly (Carter and 
Schmitz) 
Competitive (Alaouze et al.) 
High and increasing price 
(historical high) 
7. 1974 - 75 Oligopoly (Carter and 
Schmitz; Spriggs et al.) 
Competitive (Alaouze et al.) 
High but decreasing price 
(114%) 
8. 1976 Duopsony (Carter and 
Schmitz) 
01igopoly(Alaouze et al.) 
Price drop down (J.29%) 
9. 1977 - 01igopoly(Alaouze et al.) Stable price 
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Whereas, what structure can the market be best fitted? None of the previous find­
ings can provide a firm direction. A general recognition is that there are structure 
changes, and that the changing structure creates major difficulties in modeling world 
wheat trade (Alaouze et al., 1978; Spriggs et al., 1982). Thus, it is not surprising 
that studies on exchange rate effects, as well as on trade and policy, were always 
undertaken with the competitive framework. However, the previous studies have al­
ready pictured the world wheat market. Even though it is not strongly underpinned 
unless a formal test is done, a duopoly model might be the best characterization 
of the world wheat market. This model has been recently applied by Gilmour and 
Fawcett (1986) and Schwartz (1986). 
From Table 3.3, disregarding the more complicated postulation that market 
is oligopoly in the supply side and oligopsony in the importing side. Carter and 
Schmitz's postulation is the only one to characterize the world wheat market as 
duopsony. Oligopoly (triopoly or duopoly) is most often postulated in the past. 
This is conceivable from the regularities of the world wheat market. 
Carter and Schmitz's rather naive graphical analysis is the conventional analysis 
of commercial policy in trade theory, which assumes firms are perfectly competitive 
in the world market. The optimal tariff argument they applied in analysis is simply 
a restatement for a country the monopoly or monopsony argument for firms. An 
importing country whose import is large enough to influence the world price can 
exert a tariff to improve its terms of trade and, hence, to increase its domestic 
welfare. The tariff that increases domestic welfare the most is called the optimal 
tariff (Enders and Lapan, 1987). However, there are two things that must be noticed 
in the optimal tariff argument. First, the market is a priori assumed competitive. 
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Second, the country to exert an optimal tariff should be large enough in import (or 
export) to influence the world price. 
Regarding the market structure, Carter and Schmitz's analysis, like the con­
ventional analysis, a priori assumed a competitive world wheat market. That is, the 
world price is determined by the equilibrium of world (excess) demand and supply 
even if the large (importing) country exerts its market power. A lower world price is 
because of a lower demand due to the exercise of tariff, but the competitive frame­
work containing demand and supply schedules is unchanged. However, according 
to the firm theory in the microeconomic theory (see, e.g., Henderson and Quant, 
1980), there is no supply schedule for a monopolist (or oligopolist). The monopolist 
decides the market price (or quantity) to maximize its profit (MR = MC), given the 
market demand facing it. Similarly, there is no demand schedule for a monopsonist 
(or oligopsonist). The market price (or quantity) is decided by profit-maximization 
behavior given the supply schedule. Thus, the optimal tariff analysis per se is an 
argument about a country's welfare from trade rather than market structure. It 
appears that if a country has market power to infiuence world price determination, 
market should easily be imperfectly competitive and result in a market failure. The 
presumption of competitive character is infeasible. This is, perhaps, a shortcom­
ing of the conventional trade theory, so that "very recent research has refocused 
attention on the role of commercial policy in the presence of imperfect competi­
tion" (Enders and Lapan, 1987, p. 177). Carter and Schmitz's finding, therefore, is 
hardly an implication of duopsony structure for the world wheat market. Indeed, 
market is characterized as competitive. 
The second important necessity of the optimal tariff argument is that an im­
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porting country that can exert optimal tariff should be large enough in import to 
influence the world price. Carter and Schmitz argued that "one of the major im­
porters of wheat (e.g., Japan or the EC) acts as a price leader in setting an optimal 
or nearly optimal tariff." Their optimal import tariff solution (1966 to 1972, 1975) 
of the estimated and actual price per ton are (p. 519) 
Estimated Actual 
Export price $70 $72 (average) 
Price in the importing countries $198 $193 (Japan) 
$113 (EC) 
As they pointed out, relative to Japan the EC "is not taking full advantage of 
its position as major wheat importer." Actually, one fact was neglected in their 
paper that the EC is also a major wheat exporter and is a net exporter since 1974. 
Therefore, in the optimal tariff argument the EC is hardly to be identified as a 
major importer to exert optimal tariff. Indeed, their results already entirely deny 
the position of the EC as a major importer to exert optimal tariff, because the 
actual price in the EC ($113) is closer to the estimated export price ($70) rather 
than the estimated price in importing countries ($198). The country that seems 
likely to exert optimal tariff is Japan, because the actual price in Japan ($193) is 
very close to the estimated price in the importing countries ($198). However, in the 
period of their optimal tariff solution, Japan shared only 8 percent (Table 3.2) of 
the world wheat imports. It is hardly believable that Japan in that period acted as 
a world price leader in setting an optimal or nearly optimal tariff with, for example, 
the United States or Canalda kept tacit (the United States shared about 40 percent 
and Canada shared about 21 percent of the world supply). While the optimal tariff 
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argument requires a country should be large enough to exert optimal tariff, Japan 
seems not likely the one in the world wheat market to do so. 
Neither market is characterized as imperfectly competitive nor Japan is big 
enough in imports to influence the world wheat price, Carter and Schmitz's duop-
sony (or oligopsony) argument, therefore, is weakly supportable. The only pos­
sibility their conclusion is plausible is that all major importing countries (they 
mentioned Japan, the EC, the USSR, and China) explicitly worked together (a 
collusive arrangement). They conceived this only possibility, so argued that "the 
major importers of wheat could be acting in a fashion similar to tacit collusive be­
havior and that they are effectively imposing close to an optimal import tariff on 
wheat" (p. 519). However, first, the EC is already evidenced by their result not 
to exert an optimal tariff, and second, even if the EC cooperated with other major 
importing countries these four major importers only shared about 35 percent of the 
world wheat demand. Neither the possibility nor the effectiveness of collusion is 
acceptable according to their evidence. 
A direct, strong rejection to Carter and Schmitz's conclusion was Kolstad and 
Burris' (1986) test result. Carter and Schmitz argued a structure of duopsony for 
the 1972 season, but it was examined to be a very poor explainer compared with 
any other market structure hypothesis. Rather, duopoly appeared to be the best 
characterization of the world wheat market. 
As the duopsony fails to be plausible, postulations left are the conventional 
oligopoly structure except the one of perfect competition for the period 1973 -
75. Note that the competitive character in the demand side thus far is uniformly 
accepted. Among oligopoly postulations, duopoly and triopoly are the two that 
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were more often postulated to characterize the market. 
Alaouze et al. (1978) evidenced a triopoly structure for the 1968 - 71 period. 
Australia was asserted the third triopolist associated with the United States and 
Canada. The primary reasons are the outcome of a price war started in 1968, 
and the associated increases in carryover stocks and production in Australia. The 
price war in 1968 was argued to be a result of the emergence of triopoly, where the 
increase in carryover stocks in Australia implies its ability and willingness to exert 
market power in preserving market shares. 
However, a statement about those outcomes by Gilmour and Fawcett (1986) 
sounds like a disagreement. 
The last few years have seen the American building up large stocks of 
wheat .... Theoretically the Americans could 'dump' all of their present 
wheat stocks on the world wheat market at prices sufficiently low .... 
Luckily for other exporting market participants, the Americans have 
seldom seen fit to carry over this threat out to the extreme until re­
cently. However, there have been occasions in the past when the Ameri­
cans have exercised some market muscle by deliberately decreasing their 
traditional wheat stocks position until the smaller wheat exporters fell 
in line with American desires. For example, in the late sixties when 
Australian wheat production almost doubled, the Australian initially 
refused to increase their wheat stocks as well. An international wheat 
price war started - largely by the Americans 'dumping' stocks - and 
continued until the Australians greatly expanded their stock holding 
capacity and willingly held stocks when the Americans and Canadians 
held stocks (pp. 36 - 37). 
What have been stressed in the above statement are that the price war in 1968 
was started by the U.S. dumping, and increase in Australian carryover stocks was 
resulted from the pressure of the United States and the lower world price. Regard­
ing the oligopoly market structure, the United States was implied to be the most 
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powerful supplier and Australia was forced to fall in line with its desire. If Gilmour 
and Fawcett's statement is more realistic, the world wheat market should be more 
plausibly characterized as duopoly. 
MaCalla defines market power as the capacity and wilHngness to hold stocks, 
an ability essential to oligopolistic pricing. This definition was adopted by Alaouze 
et al. to justify the Australia position in the world wheat market as the third 
triopolist. The fact that Australia increased its storage capacity in 1968 - 71 is true; 
however, the key point is whether or not the increases in carryover stocks indicates 
the willingness of Australia to act as the third triopolist? Australian production 
in 1968 and 1969 were almost double the level in 1967. However, production in 
1970 fell back to the level in 1967, that is, almost the original level before increases. 
For the ending stocks, there were vast increases in 1968 and 1969, but they sharply 
fell down in 1970. The sharp fall in both production and stocks in 1970 make the 
willingness of Australia to hold stocks questionable. 
According to the postulation made by researchers and the real world evidence, 
the market structure for the 1968 - 71 period might be more realistically described 
as follows. At the outset in 1968, Australia may have intented to act as the third 
triopolist in the world market. Its intent resulted in increases in production and 
exports, so was its market share in the world market. However, after the United 
States detected the emergence of Australia and the loss of its market share in the 
world market, it deliberately dumped the market when Australia refused to hold 
more stocks and to export less. Consequently, the price war started. A formal and 
special meeting, therefore, was arranged in July 1969 (the beginning of the 1969 
season) at Washington, D.C. to avoid the further deterioration of the world wheat 
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market (Alaouze et al., 1978). An agreement was made to increase the market share 
for Australia but Australia also have to hold the surplus of production (so increased 
its silo system in 1969). Eventually, Australia reduced its production, hence the 
ending stocks, in 1970 and returned to its original position from that season on. 
Apparently, even if Australia had intent to be the third triopoly, it failed. The 
increase in carryover stocks in 1968 - 69 was not due to Australian willingness; 
otherwise, it is not necessary to reduce production and stocks holding in 1970 and 
beyond. This implies that the world wheat market was actually dominated by the 
United States. The triopoly postulation is thus inappropriate. 
Turning to the market structure for the 1973 - 75 period, both oligopoly (Carter 
and Schmitz, 1979; Spriggs et al., 1982) and competitive (Alaouze et al., 1978) were 
postulated. It is necessary to discuss the plausibility of a duopoly assumption for 
the period. The primary reason Alaouze et al. postulated the competitive structure 
is the outcome of high and unstable prices, which is very straightforward a depar­
ture from imperfect competition. However, no evidence was provided to support 
this postulation, so it is hardly plausible. Indeed, their competitive postulation 
entirely ignored the events in the international financial market, that is, the dollar 
devaluation (see Table 3.3). Instead, Carter and Schmitz's optimal tariff analy­
sis, although it is weak as a market structure argument, indicated that the major 
wheat exporters rather than major importers owned the market power in this pe­
riod. Moreover, Spriggs et al.'s causality test showed that the United States was 
leading the world price in 1974 - 75. These more precisely statistical examinations 
imply an oligopoly rather than a competitive structure for these three seasons. 
From the above discussion, a duopoly structure is assumed for the world wheat 
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market in this study. The United States is the most powerful exporting country 
and Canada is the second largest exporting country. These two countries are the 
duopolists with other relatively smaller exporting countries acting as their followers. 
The demand side of the market is assumed competitive because of the absence of 
market power. 
3.5 A Model of Duopoly Pricing 
The standard trade theory is conventionally based on the competitive frame­
work. There is no general trade model of oligopoly. The difficulties in developing a 
general oligopoly trade model are, for example, how to predict the action of small 
numbers of firms (e.g., explicit or tacit collusion, or noncollusive action), outcome 
of competition (prices or outputs), the nature of conjectures about other firms' re­
sponses, and so on. So, it is not possible to provide any sort of general analysis of 
oligopoly trade (Helpman and Krugman, 1986). Therefore, some specific structural 
and behavioral assumptions are needed for the following duopoly pricing analysis. 
3.5.1 Two basic assumptions 
1. Each world wheat trade participating country is assumed an appropriate mar­
ket unit. 
2. Wheats are differentiated in the world market, but the elasticity of substitu­
tion is high. 
The first assumption validates the standard microeconomic duopoly theory 
in application by replacing a country for a firm. In the world wheat market, this 
assumption coincides very closely with the real world situation because on the supply 
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side the ability to set price (or quantity exported) in the five major exporting regions 
is directly or indirectly vested in one government or quasi-government agency, so 
are the wheat imports on the demand side.^ 
The second assumption breaks away from the general one of homogeneous 
products. Differentiation of wheat can be justified by country of origin and by 
physical characteristics (see Chapter 2). 
3.5.2 Structural assumptions 
1. The supply side of the world wheat market is dominated by two large exporters 
(the United States and Canada) and a fringe of smaller exporters (Australia, 
Argentina, the EC, and others). 
2. The demand side of the world wheat market is characterized as competitive. 
Under these two basic and two structural assumptions, the standard duopoly 
theory with differentiated products could be utilized as long as the small exporters' 
behavior is accounted for. The United States and Canada are the two duopolists in 
the world wheat market. 
3.5.3 Behavioral assumptions 
1. ProRt-maximization behavior. 
2. Canada is the price leader with the United States acting as the price follower. 
^For example, Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), Australia Wheat Board (AWB), Argentina Grain Board (AGB), Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the EC, Food Agency (FA) in Japan. 
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3. Other smaller exporters are either to sell what they can at the duopolists' 
price or to cut price to sell their predetermined quantities of wheat to the 
world market. 
There are three maximization behaviors had been assumed in the previous 
studies : sales-maximization (McCalla, 1966), revenue-maximization (Alaouze et 
al., 1978; Taplin, 1969), and profit-maximization (Kolstad and Burris, 1986). Mc­
Calla assumed the sales-maximization for Canada, the price leader, because he 
argued that the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) as a sales agency operating at cost 
has no incentive to maximize profit. The CWB might shift from sales- to profit-
maximization policy only in years of short supply. This postulation was criticized 
by Taplin. Because the incomes of Canadian wheat farmers are determined largely 
by export prices, the Canadian export policy must principally concern the returns 
of wheat farmers. Instead, Taplin postulated that Canada generally acts as a pure 
monoplist and sets export prices to maximize farmers' revenue. Since the United 
States was assumed to be a price follower, both duopolists eventually maximize their 
revenue from exports. The revenue-maximization was also assumed by Alaouze et 
al. for Canada. Kolstad and Burris adopted the standard profit-maximization 
assumption ir testing hypotheses of the world wheat market structure. 
Indeed, revenue-maximization and profit-maximization are equivalent with re­
spect to a crop-year pricing behavior. Recall the fact mentioned before that wheat 
production is almost finished at the beginning of the crop year, therefore, at the 
point in time when the sales decision is made in a crop year, the total cost is already 
spent and could be considered fixed. Theoretically, this implies that the marginal 
cost cannot be adjusted by changing the quantity to produce. Thus, the two be­
havior assumptions of revenue- and profit-maximization would be simultaneously 
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reached at the condition of marginal revenue equals zero. In other words, once the 
revenue is maximized, the profit is also maximized. 
Profit- (or revenue-) maximization behavior is assumed in this study. In ad­
dition to Taplin's postulation, the main reason is because more than 50 percent of 
production is exported in the United States and Canada, it is hardly believable that 
these two countries just tend to maximize sales without attempting to make earn­
ings from exports over time. The sales-maximization assumption may be plausible 
only in years when domestic production much exceeds the aggregate demand and 
the storage facilities. 
The price leadership between Canada and the United States in the world market 
was much debated in the past. Conventionally, Canada was taken as the price leader 
with the United States (and Australia in a triopoly model) s its follower(s) (Alaouze 
et al., 1978; McCalla, 1966; Taplin, 1969). In recent years, this leadership was more 
specifically examined (Gilmour and Fawcett, 1986; Spriggs et al., 1982). 
The representative assertion of the Canadian price leadership was made by Mc­
Calla (1966), "Canadian price leadership arises primarily because the United States 
is willing to let Canada lead." His assertion is basically in regard to U.S. domestic 
and foreign agricultural policies. The U.S. domestic wheat policy of support price, 
which is usually higher than the world price, necessitates the payment of export sub­
sidies. Since the CWB has direct control over export price and USDA's control is 
indirect, the United States can simplify its position by taking Canadian export price 
as a reference and determining the export subsidy. On the aspect of foreign policy, 
the United states has attempted to avoid serious disruption in the world wheat 
trade; for example, the implementation of Public Law (P.L.) 480, which aimed to 
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dispose the worrisome supplies without breaking the market. Such attempt cur­
tails U.S. behavior in the world wheat market. In addition, the United States may 
prefer not to dominate the world market overtly because of the undesirable image 
of a large country dominating small countries. Other explanation that had been 
proposed and quoted by McCalla for the Canadian price leadership are (1) Canada 
had been the largest exporter from the 1920s to the late 1950s, (2) Canadian wheat 
in quality is superior to U.S. wheat, and (3) barometric price leadership exists for 
Canada because Canada has greater ability to react to changing world condition. 
Taplin argued that because the U.S. farm incomes had little relationship to 
export revenue, the U.S. export policy could be regarded as being much more flexible 
than that of Canada; therefore, Canada generally acted as a pure monopolist to set 
export price with the United States as its follower. Alaouze et al. argued that 
Canadian price leadership is primarily because of its attempts to maximize revenue 
from exports. 
Spriggs et ai. appear to have been the first to formally test the price leadership 
between Canadian and U.S. price. The Granger causality test was conducted on 
the daily data, CWB quotations for wheat delivered to Thunder Bay and U.S. Min­
neapolis cash closing price,^ for sixteen crop years (1964 - 78). The leadership was 
presented in terms of the significant nonzero-lag cross-correlation coefficient. Their 
test result shows (1) price leadership by Canada in no years, (2) price leadership by 
the United States in 1974 and 1975, and (3) instantaneous causality in eight out of 
the sixteen years. 
®The weak point is the use of U.S. domestic price not export price (usually the 
Gulf Port price), which is mostly concerned by this study. 
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Gilmour and Fawcett conducted the regression analysis (quarterly data) to 
more completely investigate the relationship between American and Canadian wheat 
prices. The tested regression equations included the price linkages between (1) the 
CWB asking price for Canadian Western Red Spring (CWRS) and the USDA cal­
culated farm price, and (2) Canadian unit value export price and the U.S. Gulf 
Port price. Either reaction function of Canadian price to U.S. price or the inverse 
was examined (so there are four sorts of reaction function). Alternative (linear and 
logarithmic) specifications and fittings were presented for any sort of reaction func­
tion, and formal and rigorous model selection procedures (parsimony and simplicity 
principle) were made to choose the relatively best equation. 
Regarding price leadership in the world wheat market, their chosen overall 
best specifications of export price reaction functions indicated that (1) neither in 
linear nor in logarithmic specification did the Canadian unit value export price 
respond to the U.S. Gulf Port price in terms of the Canadian dollar, and (2) both 
in linear and in logarithmic specifications the U.S. Gulf Port price did significantly 
and instantaneously respond to the Canadian unit value export price in terms of 
the U.S. dollar. Their findings imply that the CWB does take domestic supply 
condition into consideration to determine the export price. On the other hand, 
market information is generally disseminated quickly in the American market and 
since the American wheat is less preponderant in the premium quality wheat market, 
some adjustment on the U.S. price is made in response to the CWB price. Thus, 
the Canadian price leadership and the product heterogeniety assumption sound 
realistic. 
The third behavioral assumption addresses the behavior of other smaller ex­
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porting countries in the world market. This assumption was made by McCalla 
(1966) and is accepted in this study. The price movements (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2) 
appear to be evidence to support this assumption. Once this assumption is made 
the standard duopoly solution, thereafter, can be directly utilized to analyze the 
world wheat trade under imperfect competition. 
3.5.4 World demand facing duopolists 
By adopting the duopoly characterization for the world wheat market, the 
world price, therefore, is not determined by the equilibrium of excess supply and 
demand schedules as under the competitive framework. Instead, world prices are 
decided by duopolists pricing decisions. 
According to the above assumptions, the leader-follower relationship (because 
of the price leadership assumption) with differentiated products (because of the 
product heterogeniety assumption) Stackelberg solution (see, e.g., Henderson and 
Quandt, 1980) appears to be the best fitted one to solve the duopoly world wheat 
market. This the so-called Stackelberg determinate equilibrium solution. Note that 
the decision variable in the Stackelberg solution could be either price or quantity. 
Duopolists can decide price and let the market demand schedule determine the 
quantity, or vice versa. Price is taken as the decision variable in this study because 
the world wheat market seems more price competitive from the regularities. 
Canada is taken as the price leader and the United States is the price follower. 
Since wheats are assumed differentiated, each duopolist would face its own distinct 
demand curve and thereby to maximize profit. However, the demand facing any 
duopolist should be affected by the other's price decision because wheats are close 
67 
substitutes. In pricing decision, the follower would obey its reaction function in 
response to the leader's price. The leader would act as a pure monopolist in max­
imizing its profit and deciding the price level, given the follower's price reaction 
function (i.e., the leader is aware of the follower's price reaction function). 
The first step to go for the following analysis is to derive the demand schedule 
facing duopolists, and the second is to link the price of exporter's price and the 
domestic price in the importing country. The exchange rate variable, therefore, is 
incorporated into the model through the international price linkage. 
Since the demand side of the world wheat market and also all domestic mar­
kets are assumed competitive, import demand for wheat of any importing country 
is defined, like that in the competitive framework, as the excess demand of its do­
mestic market. Countries on the demand side of world market is divided into "free 
economies" and "centrally planned economies." This is because, as mentioned ear­
lier, the specification of demand and supply functions for the free economies is based 
on the price theory, but it is hardly applicable to the centrally planned economies. 
In addition, since the inventories in the importing countries are relatively small and 
stable, stock demand is not specified and not considered in modeling for simplicity 
(Mahama, 1985). 
Import demand of a free economy i at crop year t can be simply obtained by 
subtracting equations (3.13) from (3.12), 
= ED[v^i,FVii,yti,Nn,Zii] (3.15) 
where is a vector containing and all prices (indices) except wheat price, 
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02%. The aggregate import demand of free economies at crop year t  i s  the summation 
of equation (3.15) for all participants, 
of = EEDu 
i  
= F{vt,FVi,v(,N{,Zt) (3.16) 
where all arguments in equation (3.16) are defined in a manner of integration of all 
free economies. Similarly, aggregate import demand of centrally planned economies 
at crop year from equation (3.14) and the exogenous wheat production, is 
Q? = EiDfj-sf j)  
j  
= a{vfy/,yi,Nl.Sl) (3.17) 
The aggregate world demand {Q^) can be defined as aggregate import demand 
of free economies plus aggregate import demand of centrally planned economies. 
QV = Qt +Qi (3.18) 
The world demand facing duopolists, therefore, is the aggregate world demand 
minus aggregate export supply of other smaller exporters, 
Q? = QY - Q! (3.19) 
where is the world demand facing duopolists, and is the aggregate export 
supply of smaller exporters. According to the behavioral assumption, is con­
sidered as exogenously determined by the smaller exporters. Equation (3.19) is 
actually the residual demand facing duopolists as defined by Alaouze et al. (1978), 
McCalla (1966), and Taplin (1969). 
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3.5.5 International price linkage 
The law of one price (LOP) was usually assumed for the linkage, for example, 
model (2.1) and (2.4). However, it had been evidenced not to hold in the real 
world (see Chapter 2). In this study, the duopolists' export prices and the domestic 
market price of the importing countries are linked as 
+'•()+M (3.20) 
"P = + + M (3.21) 
where Pf''^ and Pf^^ are Canada and U.S. export prices in terms of the U.S. 
dollar,^ respectively; is exchange rate evaluated in terms of the units of im­
porters' currencies per unit of the U.S. dollar; and are transport cost in 
terms of the U.S. dollar per unit (e.g., metric ton) of wheat delivered from Canada 
and the United States, respectively; Tf is tariff exercised by importing countries and 
assumed the same against Canada and the United States; M is the market margn 
in the importing country. 
The price linkages explicitly embody the assumption that Canadian and Amer­
ican wheats are differentiated by country of origin and by physical characteristics. 
Pp'^ is not necessarily equal to P^^ (always higher) presenting the differentiation 
by physical characteristics, where is not necessarily equal to presenting 
the differentiation by country of origin (Gilmour and Fawcett, 1986; Johnson et al., 
1977, 1979). By means of the price linkage, the exchange rate is incorporated into 
the model. A decrease in means a devaluation of the U.S. dollar. 
^The price quotation of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) is in both the Cana­
dian dollar and the U.S. dollar. Importers can pay for trade in either currency. 
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3.5.6 Duopoly pricing - the Stackelberg determinate equilibrium solu-
Since Canadian and American wheats are assumed differentiated, any importer, 
therefore, can buy wheat in the world market with a choice between price and 
quality. Accordingly, each duopolist will face its own distinct demand curve (see, 
e.g., Henderson and Quandt, 1980). The quantity each duopolist can sell would 
depend upon not only the world demand facing duopolists, but also upon the other 
duopolist's price decision. The world demand facing duopolists in the world market 
then is decomposed into two distinct demand functions, 
tion 
(3.22) 
and in general forms ^ and could be written as 
df 
^ n 
d f  
> 0  
Q?^ = 9[{P?^ + + .Qt] (3.24) 
dg 
n d g  <0 
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quantity 
Figure 3.3: Demand schedules in the world wheat market 
where ^{Q^is world import demand for U.S. (Canada) wheat, and {P^'^ -f 
and 3^re import prices {c.i.f.) in terms of the U.S. dollar result­
ing from imports from Canada and U.S., respectively. The demand schedules can 
be presented graphically as Figure 3.3, where represents the aggregate world 
demand schedule, is the aggregate export supply schedule of other smaller ex­
porters, and is the world demand schedule facing duopolists. 
From equations (3.23) and (3.24), it is noticeable that an increase in Canada 
(U.S.) price with U.S. (Canada) price unchanged would result in a reduction of 
demand for Canada (U.S.) export. Because classes of wheat are close substitutes 
change in the relative price will affect the sources of purchases, some customers 
of Canada (U.S.) would turn to U.S. (Canada). In Figure 3.3, the relative price 
change will rotate schedule to left (right) or right (left). Thus, export 
quantity change due to a price change is not only along the demand schedule but 
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also dependent upon the rotation of schedules. Any shift of the schedule will 
shift the schedule of world demand facing;; duopolists (Q^), hence the schedules 
QCA Qus • 
For simplicity and without loss of generality, linear form demand equations are 
assumed for (3.23) and (3.24). The two distinct import demand equations facing 
the United States and Canada at crop year t could be rewritten as 
= OQ- + tY^)  + (3.25)  
+ (3.26) 
where > 0, h j  >0,  z j  = 1,  . . . ,  4 .  
According to the Stackelberg leader-follower determinate equilibrium solution, 
the United States (price follower) will price its wheat by obeying the price reaction 
function, given Canadian export price. Canada (price leader) will act as a pure 
monopolist in pricing its wheat export to maximize profit, given U.S. price reaction 
function. The U.S. price reaction function is obtained by maximizing its profit 
function. 
nf = P t ^ Q t ^  -
The first-order condition of optimization with respect to Pj^^ is 
where is given by equation (3.25). Note that because total cost of production, 
as mentioned earlier, is already spent and fixed at the point in time of decision 
making, the first-order condition of profit maximization shows that the marginal 
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quantity 
Figure 3.4: U.S. wheat export price and quantity decision 
revenue equals zero (MR = MC = 0). This condition is also true for revenue-
maximization behavioral assumption, so that these two behavioral assumptions are 
actually equivalent. The U.S. export price reaction function, therefore, is 
- 2^ (^0 + ~ -r - 04^?^) (3.27) 
Graphically,, the U.S. export price and quantity decision can be presented as Figure 
3.4, given the schedule and Canadian export price is decided 
at point E and the demand schedule will determine the quantity at which MR 
= 0. 
Given the U.S. price reaction function, Canada (price leader) will act as a 
monopolist and price its wheat export to maximize profit 
Substituting equations (3.26) and (3.27) into profit function, the first-order condi­
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tion gives the Canada export price decision as 
= CQ + -  nQt (3.28) 
where (assume 262&1 — 6%«2 ^ 0) 
" 2ai(262ai-6ia2) ^ ® <=2 = 2^ > 0 
26301+6103 26401+6104 ^ -
'3 = 2<.i(262ai-4l"2) ^ " 
Prom the price equations (3.27) and (3.28), it is clear that both Canada and the 
United States in pricing their wheat exports respond to the aggregate world de­
mand and the action of other smaller exporters. Canada acts as a monopolist in 
pricing, while the United States adjusts its price in response to the Canadian price. 
The transport cost (freight rate) can also influence the duopolist's price because it 
changes the import price of the importing countries. 
The world wheat trade, therefore, can be described as follows. The importing 
countries' import demands are originated from the excess demands of their domes­
tic markets. These excess demands sum to the aggregate world demand into the 
international market. Most of the world demand is supplied by the United States 
and Canada. These two duopolists are able to price their exports to maximize 
earnings according to the demand facing them. Other relatively smaller exporters 
tend to follow the duopolists' prices. However, actions of these smaller exporters in 
the international market can shift the world demand facing duopolists, hence their 
pricing decision. 
Impacts of the exchange rate changes can be seen from the price linkages. A 
devaluation of the U.S. dollar will lower the domestic price in the importing countries 
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if import tariffs are fixed. The lower prices tend to increase the import demands of 
the importing countries, hence the aggregate world demand. Duopolists, therefore, 
can price their exports higher due to the strong world demand. However, if tariffs 
are variable in response to the exchange rate changes to insulate the domestic price 
changes, the excess demands will not change, so the aggregate world demand and 
the duopolists exports are unchanged. 
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4 U.S. WHEAT MODEL AND IMPACTS OF MONETARY POLICY 
In keeping with the objective of this study to assess the impacts of monetary 
policy on U.S. wheat trade and domestic market, this chapter would first construct 
the complete U.S. wheat model and then connect this model with the financial 
market. The connection, the impact channels, is via the exchange rate (the external 
channel) and the interest rate (the internal channel) determination. Finally, the 
theoretical impacts of monetary policy will be graphically evaluated. 
4.1 U.S. Wheat Model 
The complete U.S. wheat model contains the U.S. domestic market and foreign 
trade. Regarding wheat demands, the domestic and world markets are almost 
equally important because the domestic production is almost equally absorbed by 
domestic and foreign demands. However, the characteristics of domestic and foreign 
markets is much different. As already seen in Chapter 3, the world wheat market 
more realistically is characterized as duopoly, the United States acts as a duopolist 
to price its wheat exports according to the world demand facing it. On the domestic 
side, the market is more realistically characterized as competitive because both 
wheat producers and demanders are numerous, and none can influence the domestic 
price determination. The domestic price, therefore, is determined by the equilibrium 
77 
of aggregate domestic demand and supply available to the domestic market. 
4.1.1 Foreign demand for U.S. wheat and U.S. export pricing 
The foreign demand for U.S. wheat is originated from the world wheat market. 
For modeling this demand, parts of the world wheat trade model developed in 
the preceding chapter are carried over here to construct the structural U.S. wheat 
model. They are the aggregate world import demand, world import demand facing 
the United States, international price linkage, and the U.S. export pricing equation. 
of = (4.1) 
"f® = (pP + (f ^ )eP(l + T,) (4.2) 
US us 
~ ®0 ~ ®1 pCA ^CA ~ "'SQt (4-3) 
= ûQ + aiPf^ -  oi2tY^ + ^3^?^ + ~ (4-4) 
Note that the import demand for U.S. wheat is respecified as a function of the 
relative import price of the importing country. 
4.1.2 Domestic wheat use demands 
The domestic wheat use demands are partitioned into three components: food 
use, feed use, and seed use. Note that the price affecting the demand for wheat 
more realistically should be the price prevailing in the domestic market. Under 
the competitive framework, the domestic price is inferred to equal to the export 
price due to the LOP. However, the LOP had been evidenced not to hold and the 
competitive framework can not characterize the world wheat market. The domestic 
price, therefore, is not necessarily equal to the export price. 
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4.1.2.1 Food use and feed use demands for wheat The specification 
of food use and feed use demands for wheat, equations (3.10) and (3.11), in the 
importing country is also applicable for the United States. With changed notations 
and expressed in linear forms, the domestic food and feed use demand equations 
are 
£)f = do - diPf + <i2»f ^  + d^PWp't (4.5) 
Cf = *0 - hPF + l'2Vt^ + - *'4<( + hPMp't (4.6) 
where rfj > 0 k j  > H,  i  j  — 1,...,4; is food use demand; vf" is feed use 
demand; is the U.S. domestic wlieat price; is income (per capita); 
is population; is the interest rate; PWPf is a row vector containing prices (in­
dices) of wheat substitutes (complements) in producing final wheat products, all 
grain products, and all commodity groups; and PWPf is a row vector containing 
prices (indices) of wheat substitutes (complements) in livestock feeding, meat, and 
all commodity groups. Note that the interest rate is here explicitly expressed in 
equations because it is the cost of capital (investment) in the industries of final 
wheat products and livestock. 
4.1.2.2 Seed use demand Seed use demand for wheat is specified as a 
function of wheat area for the next season and the time trend. 
nf = rQ + riAHt^l+r2T (4.7) 
where rj > 0. The time trend variable is included to capture the variability in, for 
example, technology over time. 
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4.1.3 Wheat ending stocks 
Unlike that the importing countries do not hold significant levels of wheat 
stocks and the levels are relatively stable, wheat ending stocks in the United States 
absorbs a noticeable percentage of production and the stocks levels fluctuate over 
time associated with market fluctuations. Thus, to model the stock equation for 
the U.S. wheat model is necessitated. The U.S. wheat stocks {If) are partitioned 
into government (public) stocks {I^) and commercial (free) stocks (//^). 
4.1.3.1 Government stocks The government stock holding is regarded as 
a device for price stabilization and food security ( G rennes et al., 1978a). The level • 
of this stock is specified as a function of government production loan rate, domestic 
price, current production, and the export. 
where g.^  >0, i = 1,...,4, and GLf  is the government production loan rate. In the 
real world, the government ending stocks could be regarded as the market residual. 
Quantity exported reflects foreign demand, while domestic price reflects demand 
in the domestic market. A depressed market or an overproduction will result in 
increase in the government stocks. A government program participant can sell 
wheat to the government at the loan rate. The higher the loan rate, the more the 
stocks tend to be. 
4.1.3.2 Commercial stocks The commercial stocks are held by wheat 
producers (or the equivalents) and the intent of this holding is assumed to make 
I t==l f  +  l f  (4.8) 
f0 + 9\GLI  -  g2PP + ~ (4.9) 
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more future earnings, that is, a motivation of commodity speculation. For simplicity, 
a two-periods case is specified to see the possible explanatory variables and their 
effects on commercial stock holdings. A wheat producer might simply arrange an 
expected earnings equation for this stocks holding decision as 
-  ^t )  h  -  Pt  h  H = h[^Pt+\  -  PiO-  + H ) ]  
where EEf^i is the expected extra earnings from stock holdings, EPf^i is the 
expected future price, Pf is the current price (domestic price, export price, or gov­
ernment support price), if is interest rate, and If is level of stocks to hold. The 
stock holder can make extra earnings if he or she expects EPf^i > Pf, but , on the 
other hand, he or she also burdens the opportunity cost evaluated by the interest 
loss  (Pf l f i f ) .  The s tock  hold ing  dec is ion  can  be  seen  f rom the  der iva t ives  of  EEf^ i  
with respect to If, that is, the expected extra earnings per additional stocks holding 
^  = -BPl+l -n( l+Ù)  I  0 
or 
^ H 
where EPf^i = (EPf^i/Pf) — 1, the expected inflation rate of wheat. Apparently, 
if EPf^i < if, the wheat producer should tend to sell all his or her current crop 
and deplete previous stocks. The producer can sell wheat to either government 
stock holding agents at loan rate or wheat markets at market prices. Inversely, if 
EPf^l > he or she should tend to hold inventories as much as possible limited by 
the current capacity of silo system to hold inventories. Thus, the commercial stock 
demand for wheat could be specified as a function of expected price (positive), 
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current market prices (negative), government price (negative), capacity of stock 
holdings (positive), and interest rate (negative). By employing a linear form, the 
commercial stocks equation (if^) at year t can be written as 
= ^ 0~ ~  ^ 2^^^  - + agf - <86®/ (4.10) 
where GP^ is government price (target price or loan rate), EMP^_^i is the expected 
market price, îp is the capacity of stock holdings, and > 0,i = 1,..., 6. Both P^ 
and P^^ are included because wheat producers can sell wheat to either domestic 
or foreign market. 
4.1.4 Wheat production 
As defined in Chapter 3, wheat production is the product of yield and wheat 
area. Since the domestic wheat market is assumed competitive, the wheat area is 
determined by price received by farmers and the costs of production, that is, the 
marginal equilibrium condition P = MC. Note that because of the properties of 
wheat production, all factors except climate and technology affecting the wheat 
planting area should be considered by farmers in decisions at planting time. These 
factors are, for example, (1) prices to be received in the coming crop year, (2) costs, 
and (3) kind of crops to plant. However, these factors in the real world are much 
related to government programs. 
Indeed, the acreage planted has been widely investigated in agricultural eco­
nomics, which is the so-call acreage response function. The particular interest of 
such investigation is to see how the acreage planted responds to the government 
agricultural programs (see, e.g., Garst and Miller, 1975; Langley, 1983; Lidman and 
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Bawden, 1974; Morzuch et al., 1980). Because agricultural production can not be 
adjusted instantaneously in response to market information, acreage planted actu­
ally determines the production. However, since what the market price will be in the 
coming crop year is unknown at planting time, the government announced support 
prices tend to provide an important reference for the planting decision. Almost all 
empirical findings indicate that government programs historically exert significant 
influence on the wheat area. 
The main purpose of government wheat programs is to raise income of wheat 
farmers, and two instruments are employed — the direct price support and acreage 
control (Heid, 1979). The direct price support program is to guarantee the minimum 
price received by farmers, while the acreage control program is designed to restrict 
the acreage planted for wheat, thereby to control the wheat production. In the real 
world, these two programs are exercised by manner of "the nonrecourse loan or the 
guaranteed target price" and "the land diversion payments." A wheat grower who 
participates in government programs can obtain diversion payments if he or she 
takes land out of wheat production, and, on the other hand, he or she can receive 
the guaranteed price if the market price is lower than this price. 
The price support program has been exercised since the 1930s. Prior to 1974, 
the nonrecourse loan to farmers was exercised. The loan rates were regarded as 
the price at which the government stands ready to purchase the output of program 
participators, or to loan funds to the farmer with his or her output as collateral. 
The target price was zero prior to 1974, but always exceeds the loan rate since 
it was exercised at the time. The acreage control programs, relative to the price 
support programs, changed frequently over time. Since the 1960s programs can be 
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separated into quota years (1960 to 1964) and land diversion years (1965 to 1985) 
(Garst and Miller, 1975; Morzuch et al., 1980). In the quota years, the programs 
was referred to as an allotment system and the program participation was nearly 
mandatory with penalties if violations occurred. After wheat farmers rejected the 
wheat allotment system for supply control in 1963, acreage set-aside and the land 
diversion programs had tended more towards a voluntary paid diversion approach. 
Apparently, the effects of government programs could be perceived as (1) for the 
price support programs, the higher the loan rate or the guarantee target price, 
the larger the acreage planted, (2) for the acreage control program, the larger the 
allotment in the quota years and the lower the rates of diversion payments in the 
land diversion years, the larger the acreage planted will be. 
In addition to government programs, a rational wheat farmer may also tend to 
question what the market price will be and if the market price is lower or higher 
than the government support price? The aggregate acreage response equation is 
conceptualized in a linear form as,^ 
AHF = HQHIEMP^^ — H2EMPQ^ + H^GPF — H^DPF 
+h^WALt - hQFCt (4.11) 
where > 0, i  — 1, . . . , 6 ,  EMPyj f  is the expected wheat market price received 
by farmers, EMPqI is the expected market price received by farmers of other 
^Because government programs changed almost every three to five years and each 
change exerted a significant influence on the acreage response, to conceptualize all 
alternative program changes in one equation might result in approximate rather 
than strict measurements of the responses. For example, degree of freedom is a 
problem in estimation, and relevant variables and structural parameters may change 
over time. 
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Figure 4.1: U.S. wheat supply curve 
competing crops, DPi is the diversion payments per acre, WAL^ is the wheat 
acreage allotment, and FCi is factor prices. Note that if the expected market prices 
are lower than the government announced support price (GPt) due to a depressed 
market, the government price will dominate the wheat area decision. 
Following the definition, wheat production at crop year t  is 
where YAf is yield per acre. The wheat supply curve, therefore, can be graphically 
presented as Figure 4.1. If there is no government support price, the wheat supply 
curve will be along SS curve where supply of wheat is a function of the expected 
market price, ceteris paribus. The government support price will kink the supply 
curve at point H, where the supply curve becomes vertical because this price is 
announced and fixed. Changes in other variables will shift the supply curve with 
St  =  Y  • AHf (4.12) 
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the kinked point (H) pegging at GPi level. 
Finally, because the domestic market is competitive, a market equilibrium con­
dition is needed to determine the domestic price and close the system. 
St + k-\ - Qt^ = D f  + + r>f + h  (4.13) 
The left-hand side denotes the total supply available to the domestic market. The 
right-hand side is the aggregate domestic demand {D^). 
So far, the complete U.S. wheat model is already constructed and all equations 
are theoretically embodied. The exchange rate variable appears at the international 
price linkages. The interest rate enters the domestic demand and the wheat com­
mercial ending stock equations, (4.5), (4.6), and (4.10). As mentioned earlier, these 
two rates have to be endogenized for the assessment of impacts of monetary policy. 
Therefore, the next ongoing step is to formulate the exchange rate and interest 
rate determination equations, and thereby the monetary policy, in terras of money 
supply {M^)i is incorporated into the model. 
4.2 U.S. Financial Market 
The financial market consists of the foreign exchange market and money mar­
ket. In general, the exchange rate is determined in the foreign exchange market, 
where the money market determines the domestic interest rate. 
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4.2.1 Portfolio equilibrium model - the exchange rate and interest rate 
determination 
The portfolio equilibrium model (Branson et al., 1977; Kouri, 1976, 1980) is 
adopted by this study to determine the exchange and interest rates. The advantage 
of using this model is that it can simultaneously determine these two rates and can 
be easily applied to evaluate the effects of monetary policy. 
Assume that there are three assets (money, bonds, and foreign assets) and that 
all assets but money are not perfect substitutes, the portfolio equilibrium model 
can be presented as 
^  = Hi ,  y) ,  L i  =  ^ <OLy =  ^ >0 (4.14) 
= f > 0, D,. = < 0(4,15) 
p À Fi F Fi F 
— = +.)•-, = =5^ >0(4.16) 
A M^ + B^-[-eF^  _  
p = p (4.17) 
where is supply of money, is supply of domestic-currency-denominated 
bonds, F^ is supply of foreign assets, y is domestic real income, P is domestic 
price deflator, e is exchange rate evaluated as units of domestic currency per unit 
of foreign currency, i* is foreign nominal interest rate, tt is the expected rate of 
depreciation of the domestic currency, A is value of marketable wealth in domestic 
currency, £(•) is demand for money, %)(') is proportion of total demand for domestic 
assets, and F(') is proportion of total demand for foreign assets. The equation 
(4.14) is the conventional domestic money market equilibrium, where the demand for 
money function is assumed the standard "liquidity preference" form. The equations 
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(4.15) and (4.16) are the equilibrium condition for domestic assets (money and 
bonds) and foreign assets, respectively. The private sector in the portfolio choice at 
each point in time must satisfy the wealth constraint (4.17). 
Theoretically, the exchange rate is freely determined by the foreign exchange 
market. Therefore, assuming no intervention in the foreign exchange market, the 
central bank can change the supply of money discretely at any time through inter­
vention in the domestic bond market, that is, the open market operation (OMO). 
= Mo + (B^^ - Sf) (4.18) 
where Mq  is stock of money at the initial moment, and (B^^ — is the central 
bank's purchase of domestic bonds. The net supply of domestic bonds to be held by 
the private sector is equal to the total stock of government securities minus holdings 
of the central bank. 
= B^ - (4.19) 
where B"^ is the total stock of government debt. The supply of foreign assets is 
equal to the total stock of foreign assets acquired through past surpluses in the 
current account. 
(4.20) 
where is the cumulative sum of past current account surpluses or deficits. 
Now, the wealth constraint for the private sector and for the central bank 
together implies the Walras' law for financial markets. 
(mD-MS)  ^ ^ g 
There are thus only two independent equilibrium conditions sufficient to determine 
the exchange rate and the interest rate in the model. Suppose the money market 
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and the foreign exchange market are in equilibrium to determine these two rates, 
the domestic bond market will therefore be in equilibrium according to the Walras' 
law. 
4.2.1.1 Money market equilibrium By employing the purchasing power 
parity (PPP) condition, 
P = eP* 
where P* is the foreign price, the money market equilibrium condition can be 
rewritten as 
= eP*L{i ,  y )  (4.22) 
Total differential, equation (4.22) can be rewritten as 
This equilibrium condition can be graphically presented as the positively sloped 
MM schedule in Figure 4.2 {dM^ — dy = dP* = 0 in equilibrium). 
di  L  
de  eLi  
> 0 (4.24) 
Thus, an increase in the price of foreign currency {de  > 0) increases the domestic 
price level and therefore the demand for money, this requires an offsetting increase 
in the domestic interest rate {di > 0). Prom equation (4.23), it is apparent that an 
increase in money supply or decrease in real income and/or foreign price will shift 
MM curve down and lower the domestic interest rate. 
4.2.1.2 Foreign exchange market equilibrium It follows from the Wal­
ras' law, (4.21), that when the foreign exchange market is in equilibrium, the total 
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demand for domestic assets equals the total supply of domestic assets, equation 
(4.15). Therefore, the equilibrium condition for the foreign exchange market can be 
written in the form 
W = bS + i- I ij = /C' 
and 
Assuming that tt is a regressive around the expected long-run equilibrium value of 
the exchange rate(ë) 
QQ QÙ 
TT = #(e, ë), = ^ < 0, ôg = 0^ > 0 (4.26) 
then, by total differential the equilibrium condition (4.25) can be written as, 
1 ^ de  = —^ [ f id i  +  f i  *d i  +  /^  *  B^de  -  ed{-^)]  (4.27) 
This equilibrium condition can be graphically presented as the negatively sloped 
FF schedule in Figure 4.2 {di* = dë = d(F^/D^) = 0 in equilibrium). 
(4.28) 
de  f i  
Thus, an increase in the price of foreign currency {de  > 0) reduces the expected 
rate of depreciation (<i7r < 0) and therefore the demand for foreign asset (df < 0), 
this requires an offsetting decrease in the domestic interest rate (di < 0) to keep 
the market in equilibrium. 
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Figure 4.2: Simultaneous determination of the exchange rate and the interest rate 
4.2.1.3 Determination of exchange rate and interest rate The port­
folio equilibrium model, therefore, can solve the exchange rate and interest rate 
determination simultaneously by the two equilibrium conditions (4.23) and (4.27). 
Graphically, the equilibrium values of the interest rate (z'q) and exchange rate (eg) 
are determined by the intersection of the FF and MM schedules at Aq in Figure 
4.2. 
The reduced forms of the determination of these two rates also can be mathe­
matically obtained by solving the two equilibrium conditions, (4.23) and (4.27). 
(4.29) 
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i?S  
where E — -  fi  *  9e  >  0 .  
This model can be applied to evaluate the effects of change in money supply 
on the exchange rate and the interest rate. Under the pure flexible exchange rate 
regime, the central bank can change money supply by traditional open market 
operation. The effects of an increase in the money supply can be seen from Figure 
4.2. The MM schedule will shift down with no change in the. location of the FF 
schedule. The domestic interest rate declines from ig to while the domestic 
currency depreciates from eg to ^1- Such impacts can also be seen from the reduced 
forms (4.29) and (4.30). Changes in the exchange rate and the interest rate due to 
change in money supply, therefore, can pass through to domestic market and trade. 
This provides a pertinent way to evaluate the impacts of monetary policy on the 
commodity market. 
4.3 U.S. Wheat Model and Impacts of Monetary Policy 
To connect the U.S. wheat model with the financial market, the graphical 
equilibrium structural model of this study can be shown as Figure 4.3 for crop year 
t. The foreign demand panel shows that the United States acts as a duopolist in the 
world wheat market and prices its wheat export according to the demand facing it 
{Q^^). The production panel presents the kinked U.S. supply schedule. Production 
{Sf) for crop year t is determined by the expected market price (EMPi) if this price 
is higher than the government support price (GPt). Total supply is the summation 
of production and beginning stocks (5^-1- If—l) is fixed for the current crop 
C 
financial market 
EMPt 
St+/(-J - or 
i 
foidga demand 
Si  + 4-1 Q 
production domestic demand 
Figure 4.3; U.S. wheat model and price determination 
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year t .  The domestic demand panel shows the competitive domestic wheat market, 
where the domestic price {PP) is determined by the equilibrium of domestic demand 
{D^) and supply available to the domestic market (>S'f + //_i — Note that 
the domestic demand schedule (DD) in this panel is the summation of all domestic 
demands and ending stocks. The financial market panel presents the determination 
of exchange rate and domestic interest rate. 
Because the market characteristics of the world wheat market and the U.S. 
domestic wheat market are different, the price determination processes in these two 
markets are different. Therefore, it is clear from Figure 4.3 that the U.S. export 
price is not necessarily equal to the domestic market price The U.S. 
export prices were evidenced historically higher than its domestic prices. 
4.3.1 Impacts on U.S. wheat trade and domestic market 
Various exogenous impacts on the U.S. wheat sector can be evaluated by using 
Figure 4.3. The domestic monetary policy impacts are shown in Figure 4.4, while 
Figure 4.5 shows the exogenous external impacts. The impacts on the U.S. wheat 
sector in the real world might be the combination of these two. 
From Figure 4.4, an increase in the domestic money supply will shift down the 
MM schedule in the financial market panel. This will result in decline in domestic 
interest rate and dollar depreciation. Then, through the external impact channel the 
dollar devaluation will rotate the demand for U.S. wheat schedule {Q^^) upward 
due to impact on aggregate world import demand (Q^)- Also, because of the 
change of the duopolists' relative export price resulting from the devaluation effect 
on schedule will shift outward or inward. The upward rotation will raise 
H H 
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5 
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Figure 4.4: Impacts of monetary policy on U.S. wheat trade and domestic market 
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export price {P^^) because of the profit-maximization decision; whereas, change 
in wheat export (increase or decrease) depends upon the shift (outward or inward) 
of schedule. The empirical results of this study evidenced small increase in 
export, that is, an outward but small shift on schedule. Change in export and 
export price will have backward effects on the domestic market. 
Through the internal impact channel, the lower interest rate will induce in­
creases in domestic demands and commercial ending stocks. The interest rate effects 
coupled with changes in export and export price due to the exchange rate effects on 
trade will result in an upward shift in the domestic demand (DD) schedule and a 
leftward shift (if export increases) in the supply to domestic market. The domestic 
price (P/^) ultimately will be pulled up. Apparently, both export and domestic 
prices go up due to the money supply increase. However, the magnitude of price in­
creases depends upon the elasticities of demand schedules, the exchange rate effect 
on trade, and interest rate effect on the domestic market. Change in wheat export 
is theoretically ambiguous dependent upon the relative price change of duopolists 
in response to the dollar devaluation. 
Figure 4.5 shows the impacts on the U.S. wheat sector resulting from an exoge­
nous external increase in world import demand. This is presented by an outward 
shift in the foreign demand panel. U.S. exports increase and export prices rise. The 
increase in exports reduces the current supply available to the domestic market, 
and thereafter rises the domestic price and decreases the total domestic demand in 
the domestic demand panel. The increase in export and export price depends upon 
the amount the foreign demand schedule shifts and its elasticity. The decrease in 
domestic demand and rise in domestic price depend upon the elasticity of domestic 
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Figure 4.5: Exogenous external impacts on U.S. wheat trade and domestic market 
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demand schedule and the amount the exports increased. 
4.4 Features of the Model 
In contrast to the conventional competitive model, this model in the part of 
U.S. foreign demand is imperfectly competitive. Some features of this model are as 
follows. 
First, determination of wheat export and export price. Under the competitive 
framework, the country's export is defined as the excess supply of domestic market. 
In other worlds, it is treated as to sell the domestic wheat surplus. The world price 
is determined by the equilibrium of world (excess) demand and (excess) supply. 
The United States, therefore, in a sense is inferred as a world price taker. Instead 
of such treatment, the U.S. wheat export in this model depends upon the world 
demand facing it and its export pricing. As a duopolist in the world wheat market, 
the United States can price its wheat export to maximize profit. It is not trying to 
sell its domestic wheat surplus but to make profit from the world market. Rather, 
by exerting its market power, the United States can influence the world wheat price. 
Second, the component to clear market. Since export is treated as a residual 
of domestic market under the competitive framework, it must absorb all domestic 
surplus and clear the world market. However, this might not be realistic. For 
example, if all importing countries do not want to import any more wheat even if 
the world price is sufficiently low, where can the domestic surplus go? Instead of 
export, the domestic government demand is taken as the component to absorb all 
domestic surplus in the model. As specified in equation (4.9), if a depressed market 
wheat producers tend to sell to the government. In addition, government agents 
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tend to store inventory for price stabilization. Such specification and treatment 
appears more plausible. 
Third, failure of the law of one price (LOP). As mentioned before, most of 
previous competitive models assumed the LOP; however, it was evidenced to fail 
in the real world. Although few studies within the competitive framework treated 
the export price and domestic price as unequal, determination of these two prices 
is quite unclear and implausible. This is because they have to obey the equilibrium 
condition, the only condition for price determination, of aggregate demand equals 
aggregate supply. In this model, it is very clear that the U.S. export price 
is not necessarily equal to the domestic price (P^)- The export price is deter­
mined by export pricing equation (4.4), while the domestic price is determined by 
the equilibrium condition of aggregate domestic demand equal to supply available 
to domestic market, that is, the market clearing condition (4.13). All reasons of 
imperfect competition world market, barriers to trade, and product differentiations 
to break the LOP are incorporated into the model. 
Fourth, the interrelationship between trade and domestic market. This model 
can fully embody the general issue, especially for the 1980s, that the depressed 
domestic price is resulted from the depressed foreign demand for U.S. wheat. This 
is quite clear from the market clearing condition (4.13) and the graphical analysis. 
Figures (4.4) or (4.5). Obviously, a decrease in foreign demand will increase 
wheat supply available to the domestic market, hence depress domestic price. Con­
versely, if a boom in the world market occurs, domestic price should be bid up 
because more wheat are sold to the world market. 
Fifth, different market characteristics and the associated different price deter­
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mination processes. This model contains the competitive domestic market and trade 
in the duopoly world market in a model. The different determination processes of 
export and domestic price associated with different market characteristics are also 
explicitly presented. 
Sixth, the linkage between wheat model and financial market. As reviewed 
in Chapter 2, the linkage between agricultural market and financial market are so 
far not well constructed. This model connects the wheat model with the financial 
market via the most important linkages of exchange rate and interest rate deter­
mination. These two rates are pertinently embodied in the model. Furthermore, 
for the purpose to evaluate the impacts of monetary policy on the wheat sector, 
these two rates are endogenized. The portfolio equilibrium model is employed to 
simultaneously determine these two rates. It provides the theoretical basis. 
100 
5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND MODEL EXAMINATION 
This chapter provides the empirical estimation results of the theoretical model 
developed in the previous chapters, and the interpretation of results. Also, valida­
tion and stability of this model are examined. 
5.1 Estimation 
Since the relative prices in equations, and identities and possible autocorre-
lated error terms can lead the model to be nonlinear, the nonlinear three-stage 
least squares (3SLS) was used for the final estimation of the model. The principal 
component technique was applied in estimation because the number of exogenous 
variables exceeds the number of observations. Seventeen principal components were 
calculated from all exogenous variables and then used as the instrument variables 
in estimation. The computer program used for the estimation was SYSNLIN of 
SAS/ETS (SAS, 1984). Table 5.1 presents the final form of the estimated model. 
As described in the theoretical model, the empirical model consists of three 
parts: foreign demands for U.S. wheat, U.S. domestic wheat market, and the finan­
cial market. In part 1, the theoretical foreign demand was extended to include six 
regions: EC, Japan, India, USSR, China, and the rest of the world (ROW). This is 
because (1) these importing countries were relatively big in the world wheat market, 
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(2) these countries exerted different and various domestic and trade policies that 
resulted in different impacts on their wheat import demands, and (3) the theoretical 
specifications on the import demands are different because the USSR and China are 
the centrally planned economies and the others are free economies. 
For each importing country, the total wheat import demand equation and im­
port demand for U.S. wheat equation were estimated. The total import demand 
equation is originated from the definition of domestic excess demand in which the 
trade and domestic agricultural policy are important. The import demand for U.S. 
wheat equation stresses the country's action in the duopolistic international wheat 
market, especially the demand for U.S. wheat in response to the duopolists' relative 
price. The international price linkage was introduced into the model if the import­
ing country's tariff is fixed. However, if the tariff is variable it is evaluated instead 
of the price linkage. In both the international price linkage and the evaluation of 
variable tariff, price in the importing country was connected to the U.S. export 
price, that is, the U.S. export price was referred to the world price. Such treatment 
is because the United States was the biggest world wheat supplier. The U.S. ex­
port pricing equation was estimated to present its determination. In addition, the 
Canadian wheat export pricing equation was estimated and included in the model. 
To include the Canadian export price in the model was important because Canada 
was the price leader. Any change in Canadian price in response to, e.g., the dollar 
devaluation would result in change in the U.S. export price (the price follower). 
Moreover, the excellent estimation results in Canadian export pricing can evidence 
the theoretical behavioral assumption of price leadership. 
Part 2 is the U.S. domestic market, which is basically that developed in Chapter 
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4. Part 3 is the financial market containing the interest rate and exchange rate 
determination equations. These two equations are actually the theoretical reduced 
forms (4.29) and (4.30). Since in the foreign demand part there are six separated 
regions, this implies that six exchange rates should be included and estimated in the 
model to capture the exchange rate effects in different regions. However, to include 
all exchange rates tends to complicate the model and estimation. For simplicity, 
assume that the world monetary system is efficient, international arbitrages equate 
the exchange rate of a currency against the U.S. dollar (e.g., US $/Yen) to the 
product of this currency against SDR and the SDR against the U.S. dollar (US 
$/Yen = (SDR/Yen)(US $/SDR). Therefore, only the exchange rate of the U.S. 
dollar against SDR was estimated and the exchange rates of other currencies against 
SDR are assumed exogenously determined. 
An empirical problem was encountered in estimating the exchange rate and 
interest rate determination equations. Since the theoretical determination of these 
two rates as specified in Chapter 4 is suitable only for the period of flexible exchange 
rate regime, one should not be able to estimate the reduced forms (4.29) and (4.30) 
if data period used includes the fixed exchange rate regime. Techniques to solve 
this problem will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Only the final form of the model estimated is reported in Table 5.1. This model 
consists of 36 equations, including 21 behavior equations and 15 identities. For 
each equation, the estimated coefficients, /-statistics (parentheses), and elasticities 
of major variables (brackets) are reported. 
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5.1.1 The data base 
Annual data for the period 1965-85 were used for estimation. Table 5.2 shows 
the complete list of variable names, descriptions, and data sources. However, since 
the foreign demands were separated into six regions, numerous problems were en­
countered in obtaining the appropriate data for each region. For example, according 
to the neoclassical demand theory, demand for wheat should be specified as a func­
tion of all prices and income. However, the detailed commodity prices (indices) are 
not always available. Even the wheat price data it is not available in the CPE. 
In a few cases, because of the unavailabiltiy of data, appropriate proxy variables 
were used in estimation. For example, the region of the rest of the world (ROW) 
in estimation was treated as the developing countries as a whole. This is because 
most of the wheat importing countries in the ROW region are developing countries 
according to the United Nation's classification. Since there was no series available 
for tariffs for countries in the ROW region, the producer, or wholesale wheat prices 
in Morocco, South Africa, Tunisia, Austria, Brazil, and Pakistan were used to 
calculate the average tariff for the region. These countries were relatively bigger 
wheat importers in the ROW region. 
In the estimation of exchange rate and interest rate determination, the ex­
change rate of the U.S. dollar against SDR was used because no other consistent 
exchange rate series is available for the study period 1965-85. Since there is no 
single series available for the world interest rate, an average of the interest rates of 
West Germany, Japan, Canada, United Kingdom, France, and Italy (see Table 5.2) 
was used as proxy of world interest rate excluding the United States. For the world 
price index, the consumer price index of the industrial countries was used. Since the 
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data for the theoretical definition of the U.S. accumulative sum of current account 
surplus was not available, holding of the foreign assets in the commercial banks was 
used instead. However, this will change the sign for the i;oefficient because this data 
means a demand for rather than a supply of foreign assets. 
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Table 5.1: The estimated structural model 
Part 1. Foreign demands for U.S. Wheat 
EC total wheat import demand 
WHIMTEC = 14125.90 - 5.11 * WHPTHEC + 0.033 * WHEXTEC 
(-2.19) (0.75) 
[-0.21] 
- 2026.13 * WHYAEC + 1096.71 * D68 -t- 2429.39 
(-9.55) (4.12) (8.77) 
* D70 -1304.69 * D76 (5.1) 
(-4.49) 
B? = 0.95, DW = 2.12 
EC import demand for U.S. wheat 
WHIM1EC= E * WHIMTEC (5.2) 
EC import variable levy 
TAFEC = [WHPTHEC/(WHEXPUS + FRUSEC) 
* ERSDREC/ERSDR] -1 (5.3) 
Japan total wheat import demand 
WHIMTJA = - 17009.12 - 0.01 * WHSPJA - 0.044 * WHRSPJA 
(-4.56) (-6.19) 
[-0.23] [-0.40] 
+ 236.22 * POPJA - 332.03 * WHYAJA 
(16.02) (-3.61) 
+ 551.60 * SHIFT75 - 250.10 * D70 + 448.26 
(5.33) (-2.50) (4.22) 
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Table 5.1 (Continued) 
* D80 -350.34 * D85 (5.4) 
(-3.03) 
B? = 0.96, DW = 2.37 
Japan import demand for U.S. wheat 
WHIMIJA = 214.38 - 1165.99 * (WHEXPUS -I- FRUSJA)/ 
(-3.42) 
[-0.35] 
(WHEXP1GA+ FRCAJA) + 0.81 * WHIMTJA 
(28.63) 
- 0.50 * WHIMOJA - 334.40 * D71 (5.5) 
(-7.81) (-7,43) 
W = 0.95, DW = 2.76 
Japan import tariff (quota equivalent) 
TAFJA = [WHRSPJA/(WHEXPUS + FRUSJA) 
* ERSDRJAl/ERSDR] - 1 (5.6) 
India total wheat import demand 
WHIMTIN = 8036.80 + 6.29 * WHPFMIN -i- 4.15 * RIPWHIN 
(10.68) (1.21) 
[2.42] [0.24] 
- 8391.78 * WHYAIN - 0.21 * LAG(WHCOTIN) 
(-18.22) (-6.46) 
* 1000 1762.38 * D7780 4- 3503.42 * D65 
(-5.78) (11.89) 
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Table 5.1 (Continued) 
- 2034.47 * D80 + 1904.17 * D82 (5.7) 
(-5.15) (5.46) 
= 0.97, DW = 2.17 
India import demand for U.S. wheat 
WHIMIIN = 2579.45 - 3072.28 + (WHEXPUS + FRUSIN)/ 
(-2.69) 
[-1.27] 
(WHEXPICA + FRCAIN) + 0.90 * WHIMTIN 
(37.38) 
- 0.84 * WHIMOIN (5.8) 
(-8.99) 
= 0.97, DW = 2.47 
India wheat import tariff/subsidy 
TAFIN = [WHPFMIN/(WHEXPUS + FRUSIN) 
* ERSDRINl/ERSDR] - 1 (5.9) 
USSR total wheat import demand 
WHIMTSR = 11866.46 - 0.26 * (WHPODSR + LAG 
(-19.23) 
(WHESTSR)) + 83.26 * NANPDSR - 89.43 
(21.68) (-9.59) 
* CHTAXSR - 10524.21 * SHIFT73 - 6175.91 
(-12.90) (-9.02) 
Table 5.1 (Continued) 
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* D70 -7039.57 * D71 - 6315.23 * D85 (5.10) 
(-9.70) (-6.58) 
B? = 0.98, DW = 1.55 
USSR import demand for U.S. wheat 
WHIMISR = -30.67 - 196.09 * DSR *(WHEXPUS/ 
(-1.07) 
WHEXPICA) + 0.75 * DSR * WHIMTSR 
(52.70) 
- 1.03 * DSR * WHIMOSR + 1651.32 
(-39.31) (11.28) 
* D79 - 1548.25 * D82 (5.11) 
(-9.40) 
B? = 0.99, DW = 2.78 
USSR percentage change in wheat import price 
CHTAXSR = -[WHEXPUS/LAG(WHEXPUS) + ERSDRSRl/ 
LAG(ERSDRSRl) - ERSDR/LAG(ERSDR)-1] 
* 100 (5.12) 
China total wheat import demand 
WHIMTCH = -21416.00 - 0.28 * WHPODCH + 20.99 * POPCH 
(-12.66) (5.25) 
+72.56 * GPPCH + 3582.81 * SHIFT77 + 2812.93 
(11.34) (6.15) (-4.39) 
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Table 5.1 (Continued) 
* D65 - 2986.13 * D71 -2805.88 * D85 (5.13) 
(-5.53) (-3.88) 
= 0.94 DW = 2.73 
China import demand for U.S. wheat 
WHIMICH = 34.27 - 900.79 * DCH * (WHEXPUS/ 
(-2.91) 
WHEXPICA) + 0.87 * DCH * WHIMTCH -1.35 
(35.41) (-24.34) 
* DCH * WHIMOCH - 2833.81 * D72 (5.14) 
(-11.48) 
= 0.98 DW = 1.97 
ROW total wheat import demand 
WHIMTRW = 22527.28 - 60.51 * WHIMPRW 4- 13.87 
(-2.08) (2.73) 
[-0.19] [0.11] 
* RIIMPRW + 831.70 * GDPINDGC - 0.50 
(11.03) (-6.95) 
[1.58] 
* WHPODRW -f 3616.16 * SHIFT79 
(2.58) 
-f 8823.31 * D84 (5.15) 
(7.53) 
R^ = 0.96 DW = 2.61 
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Table 5.1 (Continued) 
ROW import demand for U.S. wheat 
WHIMIRW = 532.44 + 638.03 * (LAG(WHEST) + WHPOD) 
(3.35) 
* 0.0272155/(LAG(WHCOTCA) + WHPODCA/ 
1000) + 0.73 * WHIMTRW - 0.76 * WHIMORW (5.16) 
(45.33) (-24.19) 
B? = 0.99 DW = 1.89 
ROW international price linkage 
WHIMPRW = (WHEXPUS/ERSDR) * (1 + TAFRW) (5.17) 
Aggregate world wheat import demand 
WHIMTWL = WHIMTEC + WHIMTJA + WHIMTIN 
+WHIMTSR + WHIMTCH + WHIMTRW (5.18) 
Total import demand for U.S. wheat 
WHEXT2 = WHIMIEC + WHIMIJA + WHIMIIN 
+ WHIMISR + WHIMICH + WHIMIRW (5.19) 
Canada wheat export pricing 
WHEXP2CA = -24.22 + 7.53 * FRUS - 6.17 * FRCA 
(6.67) (-4.36) 
-h 0.0013 * WHIMTWL + 59.26 * SHIPT73 
(9.54) (11.13) 
•H- 38.43 * D85 (5.20) 
(5.29) 
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Table 5.1 (Continued) 
= 0.98 DW = 1.41 
Canada wheat export price in terms of the U.S. dollar 
WHEXPICA = WHEXP2CA * ERSDRCAl * ERSDR (5.21) 
U.S. wheat export pricing 
WHEXPUS = 2.71 + 0.71 * WHEXPICA - 1.83 * FRUS 
(36.53) (-4.53) 
[0.85] 
+ 2.90 * FRCA + 0.00068 * WHIMTWL 
(5.86) (9.35) 
- 0.0015 * WHIMOWL (5.22) 
(-9.56) 
= 0.99 DW = 1.95 
Part 2. U.S. domestic wheat market 
Wheat area planted for next season 
USWHEAPF = 10.01 + 16.59 * WHFPFOC + 5.27 * WHSPFOC 
(7.21) (4.44) 
[0.62] [0.20] 
- 28.56 * OAFOCP - 0.18 * WHSAAFOC -{- 0.65 
(-4.02) (-2.74) (6.57) 
[-0.46] 
* WHALTFOC -t- 35.90 * X7185 - 2.91 * D73 (5.23) 
(6.57) (-1.39) 
R^ = 0.96 DW = 1.68 
Table 5.1 (Continued) 
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Wheat area harvested 
WHAH = H * LAG(USWHEAPF) (5.24) 
Wheat production 
WHPOD = WHYA * WHAH (5.25) 
Expected wheat export price (3-year moving average) 
WHEXPFCl = [WHEXPUS + LAG(WHEXPUS) 
+ LAG(LAG(WHEXPUS))] * 0.0272155/3 (5.26) 
Expected farm price (3-year moving average) 
WHFPFOC = [WHFP + LAG(WHFP) 
+ LAG(LAG(WHFP))]/3 (5.27) 
Food use demand 
WHFOU = 568.57 - 1542.00 * (WHFP/USPWJM) 
(-5.55) 
[-0.04] 
+ 274.17 * (PIBACE/USPWJM) - 426.72 
(11.13) (-10.30) 
[0.46] [-0.67] 
* (PIDP/USPWJM) + 0.088 * USCE 
(9.57) 
[0.27] 
- 1.52 * IRl (5.28) 
(-2.60) 
[-0.02] 
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Table 5.1 (Continued) 
W = 0.98 DW = 2.13 
Feed use demand 
WHFP = [-0.04 -0.0000052 * WHFEU + 1.39 
(-3.81) (17.92) 
* (COFP/USPWJM) + 0.0000075 * USCE 
(6.27) 
+ 0.028 * (PIMP/USPWJM)] * USPWJM (5.29) 
(7.31) 
R' = 0.95 DW = 2.32 
Seed use demand 
WHSEU = -846.66 + 1.33 * USWHEAPF + 0.42 * TREND (5.30) 
(68.89) (9.01) 
= 0.99 DW = 1.36 
Commercial (free) ending stocks 
WgFRSl = 325.41 - 88.33 * (WHEXPUS * 0.0272155) 
(-5.24) 
[-0.91] 
- 55.27 * WHTPl + 152.60 * WHEXPFCl 
(-2.80) (9.16) 
[-0.58] [1.53] 
- 0.29 * WHGVSl -H 0.62 * MAXFRSl 
(-8.72) (9.34) 
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Table 5.1 (Continued) 
- 25.63 * IRl (5.31) 
(-6.02) 
[-0.59] 
É? = 0.94 DW = 1.71 
Government ending stocks 
WHGVSl = 51.20 + 526.13 * WHLR - 199.54 * WHFP 
(12.94) (-6.27) 
+ 0.56 * WHPOD - 0.036 * WHEXT2 + 506.31 
(6.37) (-8.58) (7.18) 
* D73 - 489.55 * D76 (5.32) 
(-6.47) 
= 0.92 DW = 1.56 
Total ending stocks 
WHEST = WHFRSl + WHGVSl (5.33) 
Domestic market clearing condition 
WHPOD + LAG(WHEST) - WHEXT2 
= WHFOU + WHFEU + WHSEU + WHEST (5.34) 
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Table 5.1 (Continued) 
Part 3. U.S. flnancial market 
Interest rate determination 
IRl = -13.24 - 0.046 * Ml + 0.95 * (NI/GNPDF) 
(-7.23) (8.99) 
+ 0.14 *1)1* CPIIDC + 0.25 * (1 - DI) 
(5.70) (13.79) 
* CPIUS + 0.58 * DI * IRWOL - 2.89 
(8.67) (-8.12) 
* D76 - 3.32 * D77 (5.35) 
(-9.17) 
B? = 0.97 DW = 2.13 
Exchange rate determination 
ERSDR = 1.01 - 0.21 * X 4- 0.0017 * X * Ml 
(-5.51) (11.75) 
- 0.0079 * X * CPIIDC + 0.18 * X * LAG(ERSDR) 
(-12.79) (6.39) 
+ 0.75 * X * ASRATO (5.36) 
(9.73) 
S? = 0.94 DW = 1.93 
116 
Table 5.2: Description, unit, and data source of variables 
Variable Description Unit Source 
Endogenous 
CHTAXSR USSR, change in wheat import Percent 
price 
Calculated 
E EC, proportion of wheat 
imports from U.S. 
ERSDR U.S., exchange rate, end 
of year 
IRl U.S., interest rate, treasury 
bill rate 
TAFEC EC, wheat import variable levy 
TA FIN India, wheat import 
tariff/subsidy 
TAFJA Japan, wheat import tariff 
(quota equivalent) 
USWHEAPF U.S., wheat area planted, 
next year 
Percent Calculated 
US $/SDR 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
IMF, IFS" 
IMF,IFS 
Calculated 
Calculated 
Percent Calculated 
WHAH U.S., wheat area harvested 
Million 
acres 
Million 
bushels 
USDA,» 
ASCS 
USDA, 
ASCS 
"International Monetary Fund. Various issues. International Financial 
Statistics. 
^United States Department of Agriculture. Sept. 1988. Supply and 
Use Typing Data. ASCS. 
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Table 5.2 (Continued) 
Variable Description Unit Source 
WHEST U.S., wheat ending stocks 
WHEXPFCl U.S., expected wheat export 
price (3-year moving average) 
Million 
bushels 
USDA, 
ASCS 
US $/bu Calculated 
WHEXPUS U.S., wheat export price, no. 2, US $/mt IWC, WWS° 
Hard Winter, fob, Gulf Port 
WHEXPlCA Canada, wheat export price, 
no. 1, in store, CWRS, 
St. Lawrence 
WHEXP2CA Canada, wheat export price, 
no. 1, in store, CWRS, 
St. Lawrence 
WHEXT2 U.S., wheat export 
US S/mt IWC, WWS 
CA S/mt IWC, WWS 
1000 mt Wheat Sit.^ 
& Outlook 
WHFEU U.S., wheat feed use Million 
bushels 
USDA, 
ASCS 
WHFOU U.S., wheat food use Million 
bushels 
USDA, 
ASCS 
WHFP U.S., wheat domestic farm price US $/bu USDA, 
ASCS 
"International Wheat Council. Various issues. World Wheat Statistics. 
''United States Department of Agriculture. Various issues. Wheat 
Situation and Outlook. 
Table 5.2 (Continued) 
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Variable Description Unit Source 
WHFPFOC U.S., expected wheat farm price 
(3-year moving average) 
US $/bu Calculated 
WHFRSl U.S., commercial (free) ending 
stocks (= WHEST-WHGVSl) 
Million 
bushels 
Calculated 
WHGVSl U.S., government ending stock 
(CGC, FOR, 9-month Loan) 
Million 
bushels 
CARD," 
wheat model 
WHIMTCH China, total wheat imports 1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHIMTEC EC, total wheat imports 1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHIMTIN India, total wheat imports 1000 mt IWC. WWS 
WHIMTJA Japan, total wheat imports 1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHIMTRW ROW, total wheat imports 1000 mt Calculated 
WHIMTSR USSR, total wheat imports 1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHIMTWL World, total wheat imports 1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHIMPRW ROW, domestic wheat price SDR/mt Calculated 
WHIMICH China, wheat import from U.S. 1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHIMIEC EC, wheat imports from U.S. 1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHIMIIN India, wheat imports from U.S. 1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHIMIJA Japan, wheat imports from U.S. 1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHIMIRW ROW, wheat imports from U.S. 1000 mt IWC, WWS 
®Devadoss et al. 1987a. 
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Table 5.2 (Continued) 
Variable Description Unit Source 
WHIMISR USSR, wheat imports from U.S. 
WHPOD U.S., wheat production 
1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHSEU 
Exogenous 
ASRATO 
COFP 
U.S., wheat seed use 
U.S., ratio of foreign assets 
in commercial banks and 
total government debt 
U.S., corn farm price 
Million 
bushels 
Million 
bushels 
Percent 
US $/bu 
USDA, 
ASCS 
USDA, 
ASCS 
IMF, IPS 
USDA, 
ASCS 
CPIIDC Industrial countries. Consumer Index 
Price Index 1980=100 
CPIUS U.S., Consumer Price Index Index 
1980=100 
DCH China, dummy variable for (1965-71)=0 
years no wheat imports (1975-76)=0 
from U.S. else=l 
DI U.S., dummy variable for years (1965-70)=0 
of fixed exchange rate regime else=l 
DSR USSR, dummy variable for (1965-71)=0 
years no wheat imports else=l 
from U.S. 
IMF. IPS 
IMF. IPS 
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Table 5.2 (Continued) 
Variable Description Unit Source 
D7780 India, dummy variable to 
reflect wheat import decrease 
(1977-80)=0 
eise=l 
ERSDRCAl Canada exchange rate, 
end of year 
SDR/CA $ IMF, IFS 
ERSDRECl EC, exchange rate, end of 
year[=($/SDR)/($/ECU)] 
ECU/SDR Calculated 
ERSDRINl India, exchange rate, 
end of year 
Rupees/SDR IMF, IFS 
ERSDRJAl Japan, exchange rate, 
end of year 
Yen/SDR IMF, IFS 
ERSDRSRl USSR, exchange rate, end of 
year[=($/SDR)/($/Rouble)] 
Rouble/SDR Calculated 
FRCA Canada, average freight rate US $/mt Calculated 
FRCAIN Canada, freight rate to India US $/mt IWC, WWS 
FRCAJA Canada, freight rate to Japan US $/mt IWC, WWS 
FRUS U.S., average freight rate US $/mt Calculated 
FRUSEC U.S., freight rate to 
EC (Rotterdam and UK) 
US $/mt IWC, WWS 
FRUSIN U.S., freight rate to India US $/mt IWC, WWS 
FRUSJA U.S., freight rate to Japan US $/mt IWC, WWS 
GDPDF U.S., GDP deflator Index IWC, WWS 
1980=100 
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Table 5.2 (Continued) 
Variable Description Unit Source 
Yuan/mt USDA, Agnc/ 
Stat. of PRC 
GDPINDGC Developing Countries, real Index IMF, IFS 
GDP Index 1980=100 
GPPCH China, grain procurement 
price 
H U.S., proportion of wheat percent Calculated 
area harvested to area 
planted 
IRWOL World, average of interest rates Percent IMF, IFS 
in West Germany (money 
market rates), UK (treasury 
bill rate), Canada(treasury 
bill rate), Japan (money 
market rate), France (money 
market rate), and Italy 
(government bond yield rate) 
MAXFRSl U.S., maximum capacity of Million 
free ending stocks = bushels 
max(WHFRSlt_i, i=l...) 
Ml U.S., nominal money supply Billion IMF, IFS 
(Ml) dollars 
NANPDSR USSR, nominal net material Billion UN, MBS" 
products roubles 
NI U.S., nominal national income Billion IMF, IFS 
dollar 
•'United States Department of Agriculture. 1987. 
"United Nations. Various issues. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. 
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Variable Description Unit Source 
OAFOCP U.S., oat forecast price 
(3-year moving average) 
US $/bu USDA, 
ASCS 
PIBACE U.S., price index of bakery and 
cereal products, retail cost 
Index 
1967=100 
USDA,'' 
Agric. Stat. 
PIDP U.S., price index of dairy 
products, retail cost 
Index 
1967=100 
ASDA, 
Agric. Stat, 
PIMP U.S., price index of meat 
products, retail cost 
Index 
1967=100 
USDA, 
Agric. Stat. 
POPCH China, population Million IMF. IFS 
POPJA Japan, population Million IMF, IFS 
RIIMPRW ROW, world rice price 
(Thailand export price) 
SDR/mt CARD, 
Rice model 
RIPWHIN India, rice wholesale 
price 
Rupees/mt CARD, 
wheat model 
SHIFT72 Dummy variable (1972-85)=1 
else=0 
SHIFT73 Dummy variable (1973-85)=1 
else=0 
SHIFT75 Dummy variable (1975-85)=1 
else=0 
SHIFT77 Dummy variable (1977-85)=1 
else=0 
''United States Department of Agriculture. Various issues. 
Agricultural Statistics. 
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Table 5.2 (Continued) 
Variable Description Unit Source 
SHIFT97 
TAFRW 
TREND 
USCE 
Dummy variable (1979-85)=! 
else=0 
ROW, wheat import tariff Percent 
Trend variable Year 
U.S., real personal 
consumption expenditures 
S 
USPWJM U.S., Producer Price Index 
WHALTFOC U.S., wheat area 
allotment, next season 
WHCOTCA Canada, wheat ending 
stocks 
WHCOTIN India, wliCat endipg 
stocks 
WHESTSR USSR, wheat ending 
stocks 
WHEXTEC EC, total wheat export 
WHIM U.S., wheat import 
WHIMOCH China, wheat imports from 
other exporters 
WHIMOEC EC, wheat imports from 
other exporters 
Billion 
dollar 
Index 
1967=100 
Million 
acres 
Million mt 
Million mt 
1000 mt 
Million 
bushels 
1000 mt 
1000 mt 
Calculated 
Econ. Kepoft" 
of President 
CARD, 
wheat model 
USDA, 
ASCS 
CARD, 
wheat model 
CARD, 
wheat model 
CARD, 
wheat model 
1000 mt IWC, WWS 
USDA, 
ASCS 
IWC, WWS 
IWC, WWS 
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Variable Description Unit Source 
WHIMOIN India, wheat imports from 
other exporters 
1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHIMOJA Japan, wheat imports from 
other exporters 
1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHIMORW ROW, wheat imports from 
other exporters 
1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHIMOSR USSR, wheat imports from 
other exporters 
1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHIMOWL World, wheat imports from 
other exporters 
1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHLR U.S., wheat production 
loan rate 
US $/bu USDA, 
ASCS 
WHPFMIN India, wheat farm price Rupees/mt CARD, 
wheat model 
WHPODCA Canada, wheat production 1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHPODCH China wheat production 1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHPODRW ROW, wheat production 1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHPODSR USSR, wheat production 1000 mt IWC, WWS 
WHPTHEC EC, wheat import 
threshold price 
ECU/mt CARD, 
wheat model 
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Table 5.2 (Continued) 
Variable Description Unit Source 
WHRSPJA Japan, domestic wheat 
resale price 
WHSAAFOC U.S., wheat set-aside 
areas 
WHSPFOC 
WHSPJA 
WHTPl 
WHYA 
WHYAEC 
WHYAIN 
WHYAJA 
X 
X7186 
U.S., government support 
price[=max( WHTPl, 
WHLR)] 
Japan, government wheat 
purchase price 
U.S., wheat target price 
U.S., wheat yield per acre 
EC, wheat yield per hectare 
India, wheat yield per hectare 
Japan, wheat yield per hectare 
Grafted polynomial variable 
to connect the fixed 
and flexible exchange 
rate system 
U.S., dummy variable to 
reflect the government program 
participation from mandatory 
to voluntary 
Yen/mt 
Million 
acres 
US $/bu 
Yen/mt 
US $/bu 
Bushel/ac 
mt/hec 
mt/hec 
mt/hec 
(1965-71)=0 
1972=1 
1973=2 
(1974-85)=3 
(1971-86)=1 
else=0 
Japan, 
ASAFF' 
USDA, 
ASCS 
USDA, 
ASCS 
Japan, 
ASAFF 
USDA, 
ASCS 
USDA, 
ASCS 
IWC, WWS 
IWC. WWS 
IWC. WWS 
'Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries. Various issues 
Abstract of Stat, on Agric., Forestry, and Fisheries. 
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5.2 The Model 
5.2.1 Part 1. Foreign import demands and U.S. export pricing 
5.2.1.1 The European Communities (EC) wheat imports The prin­
cipal agricultural policies in the EC are via the setting of a target price, an inter­
vention price, and a threshold price. The target price reflects the desired price for 
farm outputs, the intervention price represents a minimum (or guaranteed) price 
for farmers, and the threshold price is the minimum price at which products are 
allowed to be imported into the EC. The actual domestic price will vary between 
the target price and the intervention price. In general, the intervention price is 
about 90 % of the target price, and these three policy prices moved at the same 
steps. Figure 5.1 shows these three prices for wheat, as well as the world (U.S.) 
wheat price from 1965 to 1985. 
For wheat imports, the threshold price maintains a high and relatively stable 
level of price for domestic consumers and producers. Since the world price vary, 
this price is supported by the operation of a variable levy on imports. When world 
price rises (falls), the tariff increases (decreases). The operation of variable levy, 
therefore, insulated domestic price from changes in the world price (Enders and 
Lapan 1987; Sampson and Snape, 1980). 
According to the definition that import demand is the excess demand of do­
mestic market, effect of the threshold price can be presented as Figure 5.2, where 
is the threshold price and is fixed, and P^ are world price (EC import 
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Figure 5.2: Effect of threshold price on wheat irr lort in EC 
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price, c.i.f.), D and S represent the demand and supply schedules in the domestic 
market, and ED is the excess demand schedule. Once the is set and fixed, 
the quantity to import is equal to AB in the domestic market panel, which is equal 
to OC in the import demand panel. Changes in the world price or P^ ) 
would not change the quantity imported. An import tariff is imposed to raise P^^, 
or to lower P^ (import subsidy) to P^^ • The variable levy can be calculated 
equal to {P^^ — P^)/Pj^ as an ad valorem tariff. The domestic price hence is 
completely insulated from the world price. Such price insulation is evidenced by 
the price movements in Figure 5.1 in which the domestic prices moved together and 
are relatively more stable than the movement of world price. 
The EC total wheat import demand, therefore, depends upon the location of 
D and S schedules and the threshold price. The domestic wheat production is 
determined by the government support price and yield. However, since the target 
price and the intervention price moved at the same steps as the movement of the 
threshold price (Figure 5.1), the threshold price alone can reflect the price effect 
on production. This price can also represent the domestic market price movement 
because the actual price will be between the target and the intervention prices. 
Thus, the EC total wheat import demand, (5.1), was specified as a function of the 
threshold price, yield, and exports. All signs are correct as expected. The threshold 
price elasticity of EC import demand is -0.21. The negative effect of the threshold 
price reflects its negative effect on import and also negative effect on domestic 
demand and positive effect on production. The yield might reflect the technology 
progress over time and the harvest situation. Wheat export was included because 
EC is also a major exporter in the world market. Dummy variables for 1969, 1970, 
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and 1976 reflect the extreme drop and rise of import demand in these years. The 
equation (5.3) is the calculated variable levy. 
Turing to the purchase of wheat in the world market, the cost of import for 
wheat importers is exactly the threshold price, no matter where wheat is bought. 
The only effect is the distribution of this import cost between exporters and the EC 
governments. If a higher world price, the importers would pay more to the exporters 
and less to the EC government. Thus, countries of imports are determined by other 
nonprice factors, e.g., quality of wheat, risk, etc. The import demand for U.S. 
wheat, (5.2), is expressed as a proportion of the total import demand, where the 
proportion was assumed exogenously determined. 
5.2.1.2 Japan wheat imports Japan agricultural policy for wheat con­
tains the domestic price policy and the import policy. The domestic government 
prices include the purchase price for wheat producers and the wheat selling price for 
demanders in the domestic market. The import policy is the well known "quota" 
system^. The government policy devices are aimed to stabilize domestic price and 
guarantee the farm income. Under the government control, the domestic price is 
insulated from the price fluctuations in the world market. Figure 5.3 shows the 
movements of the purchase price, selling price, and the world (U.S.) price. 
The policy effects on the wheat import demand are shown as Figure 5.4, where 
is the purchase price, is the selling price, D and S are domestic demand 
and supply schedules, respectively, and ED is the excess demand schedule. If there 
^The Japan government policy for wheat can be found in Japan Economic 
Yearbook and Abstract of Statistics on Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries pub­
lished by the government of Japan. 
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is no purchase price, the government sets both the selling price and import 
quota AC (= OD in the import demand schedule) to make the domestic market in 
equilibrium. However, the Japan program also sets the purchase price P^, which 
results in an overproduction AB. The actual import quota needed for the market 
equilibrium at P^^i therefore, is reduced to BC, which is equal to OE in the excess 
demand schedule. A vertical line EE represents the actual import quota. So the 
actual import quota can be decided by government at the same time the desired 
purchase and selling prices are being set, given S and D schedules. The higher these 
two prices, the less the import quota will be. The world price {P^) has no impact 
on either import quota or domestic price because both are set by government. 
Japan wheat import demand, the import quota, was estimated as equation 
(5.4). Both the purchase price (WHSPJA) and selling price (WHRSPJA) effects 
were very significant, the estimated elasticities are -0.23 and -0.40, respectivity. 
The purchase price had less effect than the selling price because of the land limit. 
Because domestic price was set by government and stable, population (POPJA) 
appeared an important factor to shift the domestic demand schedule, hence the 
import demand. Similarly, wheat yield had significant negative effect. The SHIFT75 
variable reflected the Japan policy change in imports. After the high world price in 
the early 1970s, the increasing import quota turned to keep constant. The increased 
excess demands for wheat in large part were supplied by domestic production. This 
can be evidenced by the sharp increased in the purchase price and by the self-
sufficiency ratio, which was about 5% in 1970s and about 12% since the late 1970s. 
Unlike the EC by setting the threshold price on imports so that the private 
importers are indifferent about countries of origin of buyings, wheat imports are 
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undertaken by the government Food Agency (FA) in Japan and by setting the 
domestic selling price rather than the import price so that the cost of imports is 
important. Therefore, under the product differentiation assumption Japan in the 
duopoly world wheat market would buy wheat with the choice on price and quality. 
Since the substitution elasticity of wheat is high, if the import price (c.i.f.) from 
the United States is higher relative to the import price from Canada, more wheat 
will be imported from Canada. Conversely, more wheat will be imported from the 
United States if the relative import price is lower. The Japan import demand for 
U.S. wheat , therefore, was estimated as a function of the relative import price from 
U.S. and Canada, total import demand, and import from other smaller exporters, 
equation (5.5). This equation indeed is the theoretical equation (4.3). All signs are 
correct and all estimates are very significant. The Japan import demand for U.S. 
wheat is less elastic (-0.35) with respect ot the relative import price from U.S. and 
Canada. 
The approximate import tariff (quota equivalent) was calculated by using the 
domestic selling price in equation (5.6). However, such a calculated import tar­
iff might be underestimated or overestimated because the selling prices were not 
the actual market prices. This implies that the Japan government subsidized the 
domestic consumption, if it is underestimated. 
5.2.1.3 India wheat imports The main feature of the Indian grain mar­
ket is its segmentation into concessional and commercial markets - a dual market. 
For the concessional market, the government buys grain from producers, monop­
olizes imports, and together with stocks to sell to the low-income consumers at a 
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Figure 5.5: India domestic wheat price and the world (U.S.) price 
subsidized price. On the supply side, the government handled about 10 percent of 
total grain available for consumption since the late 1970s. This system provided 
an average of about 29 percent of wheat consumption on the demand side dur­
ing the period 1961 to 1978. The two government policy prices, therefore, are the 
procurement (purchase) price and the resale price (Mahama, 1985). 
For wheat, imports were the main source for the concessional sales. However, 
the Indian Green Revolution program between 1967 and 1972 enabled government 
to procure enough domestic wheat, increase stocks, and hence eliminate imports as 
the msdn source. Since the concessional market is relative smziU and the dependence 
on imports is diminishing, the Indian agricultural policy seems to be focusing on 
the stabilization of domestic price. This can be evidenced from the movement of 
farm price in Figure 5.5. The farm prices can be separated into two segments at 
1974. Prices were relativlye stable in each segment except in a few years. Compared 
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Figure 5.6: India total wheat imports 
to the relatively unstable world price, it turns out that the domestic prices were 
stabilized and insulated from the world price changes. 
The wheat import demand, therefore, can be fully specified by the Indian 
agricultural programs. The Green Revelation program resulted in almost sufficient 
production for domestic consumption, and thereafter the secular declines of wheat 
imports since 1967. The occasional sharp increases in wheat imports were occurred 
because of domestic price inflation. Government tended to import enough wheat 
from the world market to stabilize domestic price inflation. This is evidenced by 
the concurrent rise in domestic farm price and import demands in 1967, 1974-75, 
and 1981-82 (Figures 5.5 and 5.6). 
India total wheat import demand was estimated as equation (5.7). The positive 
and very significant coefficient for domestic farm price (WHPFMIN) consists with 
the price stabilization policy. The estimated farm-price elasticity of import demand 
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is 2.42, which is very elastic. Rice (RIPWHIN) was an important substitute for 
wheat in consumption, the cross-price elasticity is 0.24. Wheat yield had negative 
effect on imports as expected. The beginning stock was also an important factor 
in determining imports from abroad. Note that the government purchase price for 
the concessional market was not significant and was ruled out. This implies that 
the government purchase system had little significance. Farmers did not face a dual 
market as consumers did. 
Most India wheat imports were from the United States. However, in the 
duopoly world wheat market India did significantly respond to the relative import 
price of the United States and Canada. The equation (5.8) presents import demands 
for U.S. wheat. The negative coefficient for the relative price of two duopolists is 
very significant and elastic (-1.27). This implies that the cost of import is matter 
to India in choosing the wheat supplier in the world market. 
The equation (5.9) calculates the India wheat import tariffs or subsidies. The 
U.S. export price was used as the world price for this purpose. From Figure 5.5, 
it is clear that India government taxed wheat imports until 1972, and thereafter 
subsidized the imports most of the time to stabilize the domestic price. 
5.2.1.4 The Soviet Union (USSR) wheat imports As specified in 
Chapter 3 for the centrally planned economies, the USSR total wheat import de­
mand (WHIMTSR), (5.10), was estimated as a function of total domestic supply 
(production plus beginning stocks), income, and changes in import cost. Since the 
domestic price of food grains were always under the government control through 
the distribution system, internal price may be meaningless in the CPE. However, 
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external price can be important (Chambers and Just, 1981). The import price is 
thus included in specification. Because of lack of domestic price data, the percent­
age changes in import cost (CHTAXSR) was calculated to reflect the price effect 
on import demand. The equation (5.12) presents the formula, which was derived 
from the international price linkage. Similarly, U.S. export price was used as the 
world price for the calculation. Since food consumption in the CPE is mostly ar­
ranged and controlled by government for food security, the domestic wheat price 
was assumed constant in the calculation. 
The import demand for U.S. wheat (WHIMISR) was estimated as equation 
(5.11). All signs are correct as expected. However, the relative export price of 
the United States and Canada was not very significant for the USSR. This implies 
that in choosing the exporter in the duopoly world market other nonprice factors, 
(e.g., political factors) were important (Chambers and Just, 1981). For example, 
the USSR did not import wheat from the United States until 1971. This might be 
based on nonprice factors consideration in decision. A dummy variable (DSR) was 
set to reflect the zero import from U.S. and to restrict the estimation. 
5.2.1.5 China wheat imports The total wheat imports, (5.13), was esti­
mated as a function of domestic production, population, and the government grain 
procurement price index. Since income per capita in China was stable and low until 
the 1980s, income effect was insignificant. The government flour price is constant 
at 0.326 Yuan/kg over time, so is meaningless. Both income and domestic con­
sumption price were thus ruled out in specification. Instead, population appeared 
an important demand shifter for wheat consumption. This is realistic because food 
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consumption is under government control by the ration system. However, change 
in the world price had no effect on the total import demand either, so was ruled 
out. A positive and very significant coefficient was obtained for the domestic grain 
procurement price index. This is an aggregate grain price index. A rise in this price 
might imply a supply shortage; therefore, more wheat was imported from the world 
market to secure the domestic supply and stabilize the potential price inflation. 
The SHIFT77 variable was included to reflect the structural changes due to the 
economic reform in China. 
In the duopoly world wheat market, equation (5.14) shows that import demand 
for U.S. wheat did significantly respond to the relative export price of the United 
States and Canada. Since China did not import wheat from the United States 
until 1971 and in 1975 and 1976, a dummy variable DCH was set to restrict the 
estimation. 
5.2.1.6 The rest of the world (ROW) wheat imports All other wheat 
importing countries were aggregated as the ROW region in this study. Total wheat 
import, (5.15), was specified as a function of wheat price (WHIMPRW) in the ROW, 
rice price (RIIMPRW) in the ROW, income, and wheat production (WHPODRW). 
The estimated coefficients are consistent with theoretical expectations and are sta­
tistically significant. The wheat price elasticity of import was estimated at -0.19, 
which is inelastic. Rice appeared as an important substitute of wheat in the world 
market, the cross-price elasticity is 0.11. Since most of countries in this region are 
developing countries, increase in income tended to result in more wheat consump­
tion, hence more wheat imports from the world market. The income elasticity was 
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estimated at 1.58 for the ROW region. Wheat production in the ROW was also an 
important determinant of imports. 
Import demand for U.S. wheat, (5.16), in the duopoly world market, however, 
did not respond to the relative price of the United States and Canada. Instead, 
the relative supply of the United States and Canada was more important. This 
is because the United States is the biggest wheat producer in the world, to secure 
supply for imports most countries bought wheat from the United States. A positive 
and significant coefficient was obtained for the relative supply ratio. Since each 
country in the region is small in imports, fixed tariff trade policy was assumed. The 
equation (5.17) links the wheat price in the ROW with the world price, where the 
U.S. export price was taken as the world price. 
5.2.1.7 Total import demand for U.S. wheat and U.S. export pricing 
The aggregate world wheat import demand, (5.18), is the summation of total wheat 
imports of all regions. Similarly, total import demand for U.S. wheat is the sum of 
all import demands for U.S. wheat, (5.19). The equations (5.20) and (5.22) present 
the export pricing decision of Canada and the United States, respectively. All 
estimated coefficients for the pricing equations have correct signs as expected and 
are very significant. These evidence the duopoly world wheat market cha,racteristics 
and the Canada price leadership assumption. 
In the pricing decision, Canada acts as a monopolist, even the action of other 
smaller exporters had no influence on its pricing decision. The United States acts as 
the price follower and also significantly responds to the action of smaller exporters in 
the world market. As discussed in Chapter 3, this is because the United States tries 
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to maintain its market share in the world market; whereas, Canada concerned more 
with the domestic supply conditions (Gilmour and Fawcett, 1986). The estimated 
elasticity of U.S. export price with respect to Canadian export price is 0.85. The 
freight rates would fluctuate the import prices of the importers, therefore, in the 
backward had significant influence on the duopolists' pricing decision. They are in 
some respects like export taxes to offset the effects of changes in export price or 
exchange rates (Johnson et al., 1977). 
5.2.2 Part 2. U.S. domestic wheat market 
5.2.2.1 U.S. wheat production The U.S. wheat production expressed by 
equations (5.23), (5.24), and (5.25). Since wheat area harvested was not exactly 
equal to the area planted, the area planted was estimated, and then area harvested 
was expressed as a proportion of the area planted, (5.24). As defined in previous 
chapters, wheat production, (5.25), is the product of yield and area harvested. 
Wheat area planted (USWHEAPF) was estimated for the next season, (5.23), 
and was specified as a function of the expected price received by farmers, the govern­
ment announced support price for next season, expected price received by farmers 
for the competing oat crop, the set-aside area of wheat, the allotment area for 
the next season, and a structural change variable. All estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant and have correct signs as the theoretical expectation. The 
expected price received by farmers (WHFPFOC) turned out to be the most im­
portant factor for the area planting decision, with elasticity 0.62. Oat appeared as 
the most important competing crop for wheat. The estimated cross-price elasticity 
is -0.46. This is consistent with Langley's (1983) findings in testing the acreage 
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responses to government programs in different wheat production regions. The gov­
ernment programs, support price (WHSPFOC), set-aside program (WHSAAFOC), 
and allotment (WHALTFOC), had significant impacts on the area planting deci­
sion, where the support price elasticity of area planted is 0.20. The mandatory 
allotment program was accounted for in the planting decision until 1970. Then, the 
program participation became voluntary. The WHALTFOC variable, therefore, was 
restricted equal to zero since 1971, and a structural change variable X7185 was in­
cluded to reflect the change in program participation (Garst and Miller, 1975). The 
area harvested for the current crop year was expressed as a proportion the one-year 
lag value of the area planted for next season, (5.24). 
5.2.2.2 The expected wheat market prices The equations (5.26) and 
(5.27) express the expectations of wheat market prices. Since U.S. wheat production 
was almost equally absorbed by domestic market and world market, both the ex­
pected export price (WHEXPFCl) and the expected farm price (WHFPFOC) were 
formulated. For simplicity, the expected prices were formulated as a simple 3-year 
moving average.^ Such formulation, however, was satisfactory in the estimation of 
this model. 
5.2.2.3 Domestic demands for wheat Three domestic demands were 
estimated as equations (5.28), (5.29), and (5.30). Domestic food use demand for 
^In the literature there have been six major approaches to the measurement of 
the expected price: naive expectations, weighted expectations, extrapolative ex­
pectations, adaptive expectations, rational expectations, and future market price. 
However, no firm conclusions as to the best technique has been determined for 
agricultural prices (Langley, 1983). 
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wheat, (5.28), was specified as a function of real domestic wheat price, real price in­
dex of bakery and cereal products, real price index of dairy price, real consumption 
expenditure, and the interest rate. The domestic wheat price elasticity of food use 
demand is as expected inelastic at -0.04. Since demand for wheat is a derived de­
mand, increase in the real price of bakery and cereal products (PIBACE/USPWJM) 
would derive more demand for wheat; however, the estimated elasticity is inelas­
tic (0.46). The dairy products turned out to be complements of the final wheat 
products. A negative coefficient was obtained and the cross-price elasticity is -0.67. 
The standard positive income effect was also obtained and the estimated income 
elasticity is 0.27. As the price of capital investment in the industry of final wheat 
product, the interest rate had negative effect (interest rate effect) on the industry, 
hence on the demand for primary wheat. However, even the estimated coefficient 
is statistically significant the estimated interest rate elasticity is very low at -0.02. 
The equation (5.29) expresses the feed use demand for wheatCorn was an 
important substitute of wheat in the livestock industry. A positive coefficient was 
obtained for the real price index of meat products (PIMP/USPWJM). This is con­
sistent with the theoretical specification of derived demand for wheat. Income effect 
was positive as prior expectation. However, the interest rate effect was insignificant, 
so was ruled out in the equation. 
Seed use demand for wheat, (5.30), depended upon the wheat area planted for 
the next season (USWHEAPF). A positive and statistically significant coefficient for 
®Since the SAS program requires each endogenous variable appears only once 
on the left hand side of the equation system, the feed use demand equation was 
estimated with the domestic price (WHFP) as the dependent variable, so was it 
simulated in the model examination and policy analysis. 
142 
the time trend variable (TREND) might imply a progess in the seeding technology 
or more domestic wheat used as seed in planting over time. 
5.2.2.4 Domestic ending stocks In light of past historical difHculty in 
estimating stocks equations, the statistical properties of equations (5.31)and (5.32) 
are excellent. As the theoretical specification in Chapter 4, the commercial (free) 
stocks (WHFRSl) were held for speculative motivation, especially boom and bust 
in the world market. A rise in the current export price (WHEXPUS) or a depressed 
expected export price (WHEXPFCl) would deplete the commercial stock holding. 
In respone to the domestic market condition, a higher target price (WHTPl) would 
lower the holding because farmers can receive more subsidy from government. Sales 
to government stocks holding because of the borrowing of production loan can 
reduce the level of commercial stock holding. The capacity of the silo system for 
holding stocks was significant in restricting the holding. The opportunity cost 
(interest rate effect) appeared very significant and important in the commercial 
stocks holding decision. The estimated interest rate elasticity is -0.59. 
The government stock holding was commonly treated as an exogenous compo­
nent in the past; however, the successful estimation of equation (5.32) implies that 
it indeed was like the barometer of the market. The government loan rate (WHLR) 
had a positive effect on government stocks because of the borrowing of production 
loan with wheat as collateral. Besides, the government stocks level refiected the pro­
duction and market demand situation. Strong demand in domestic market (rise in 
WHFP) and/or in world market (increase in WHEXT2) would absorb more wheat 
production, hence reduce the government stocks. However, if depressing demands 
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in both markets and high production, more wheat were sold to government and 
stacked the government stocks. The government stock, therefore, was actually a 
component to absorb the market surplus. Total ending stocks, (5.33), were simply 
the sum of commercial stocks and government stocks. 
5.2.3 Part 3. U.S. financial market 
5.2.3.1 The interest rate determination The estimated results of the 
interest rate determination are presented in equation (5.35). This equation is ac­
tually the reduced form of interest rate determination equation (4.29) in Chapter 
4. However, the theoretical determination equation is derived under the flexible 
exchange rate system, so is appropriate only for the periods since 1973. 
Under the fixed exchange rate regime, the interest rate determination could be 
derived from the domestic money market equilibrium condition (4.14), keeping the 
assumption of exogenous real domestic income, as 
d i  =  -  P L y  d y - L  d P ) ,  for 1965 to 1972 (5.37) 
Since the data used in this study (1965 to 1985) include both fixed and flexible 
exchange rate regimes, the approximate interest rate estimation equation for the 
whole period, therefore, can be formulated by connecting (5.37) and (4.29). Note 
that the domestic money supply (M^) and real income (y) are the determinants of 
interest rates in both fixed and flexible exchange rage regimes, other determinants 
appear only once in each regime. A dummy variable (DI), therefore, was defined to 
restrict other determinants in estimation. 
The estimation results are satisfactory. All estimated coefficients are statis­
tically significant and all signs are correct as prior expectation. However, the ex­
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planatory variable the ratio of foreign assets and total government debt (ASRATO) 
was insignificant and ruled out in this equation. 
5.2.3.2 The exchange rate determination Similarly, the theoretical re­
duced form (4.30) of exchange rate determination equation was estimated. This 
equation, however, is appropriate only for the flexible exchange rate regime. The 
explanatory variables had no effect on the exchange rate under the fixed exchange 
rate system. 
To solve this problem and estimate the exchange rate determination equation 
for the whole period (1965 to 1985), the grafted polynomial technique developed 
by Fuller (1976) was used to connect the fixed and flexible regimes in estimation. 
This technique had been used by Denbaly (1984), Devadoss (1985), Devadoss et al. 
(1987b), and Liu et al. (1986). 
To illustrate the use of grafted polynomial in the estimation, the exchange rate 
time series was divided into three segments: (1) fixed exchange rate (1965-71), (2) 
transition period (1971-73), and (3) flexible exchange rates (1973-85). The exchange 
rate (US $/SDR) was fixed under the fixed regime. In the transition period, even 
though the flexible regime was officially adopted in 1973, many countries started to 
revalue their currencies against the U.S. dollar, thereby breaking away from the fixed 
exchange rate system. The U.S. dollar, therefore, depreciated against SDR. Under 
the flexible exchange rate regime since 1973, the exchange rates are determined by 
the determinants as equation (4.30). 
A grafted polynomial variable (X), therefore, is deflned as below to join these 
three segments together. 
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X = 0 year < 1970 
= year - 1970 1971 < year < 1972 
= 3 year > 1973 
By multiplying this variable to all explanatory variables, the exchange rate equation 
(4.30) became a single, continuous, and estimable equation for the whole period 
including fixed and flexible exchange rate system. This variable was also includes 
as a separate regressor to capture the exchange rate movements in the transition 
period. 
The estimated results of the exchange rate equation is presented in equation 
(5.36). Because of the autocorrelation problem, a one-year lag exchange rate was 
included as explanatory variable. The estimated dependent variable, the current 
year exchange rate, therefore, is more appropriate specified as a predicted value. 
However, the theoretical explanatory variables based on the portfolio equilibrium 
model are also important exchange rate determinants except the foreign interest 
rate variable. All estimated coefficients are very significant and have the anticipated 
signs. 
To summarize these econometric results, the estimated coefficients in all equa­
tions conform to the theoretical expectations and the real world evidence. The im­
pact channels of monetary policy are also captured well (refer to Figure 2.2). The 
exchange rate effects through the international price linkage (the external chan­
nel) is well explained in the USSR and the ROW regions, see equations (5.12) and 
(5.17). In all other regions, the exchange rate has no impact on their import de­
mands because of domestic and trade policies implemented by these regions. The 
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interest rate effects (the internal channel) on the domestic food use demand and 
the commercial ending stock holdings are very significant, see equations (5.28) and 
(5.31). Since wheat is primarily for food use and the commercial stock holding re­
flects commodity speculation on the wheat market, it is very important to account 
for interest rate effects in the model. 
The duopoly world wheat market is evidenced by the model. Except for the 
EC, import demands for U.S. wheat in all other regions do significantly respond to 
the relative price of the United States and Canada, or the relative wheat supply of 
these two duopolists. The Canada and U.S. wheat export pricing equations strongly 
support the duopoly market characteristics and behavioral assumptions, especially 
the Canada price leadership assumption. Once the duopolists' prices are decided, 
the import demands for U.S. wheat are determined by the import demands facing 
the United States. Such a determination process is fully captured by this model. 
The equation (5.19) sums all import demands for U.S. wheat. It is equivalent to 
total U.S. wheat exports. 
In the interest rate and exchange rate equations (5.35) and (5.36), the U.S. 
money supply (Ml) has very significant influence on the determination of these two 
rates. The portfolio equilibrium model provides the theoretical basis for these two 
equations, and the excellent estimated results enable this model to precisely assess 
the impacts of the U.S. monetary policy on wheat trade and domestic market. 
Finally, this empirical model appears to be the first one to present the different 
market characteristics of world market and U.S. domestic market, and then the 
different determination processes of the export price and domestic price, (5.22) and 
(5.29). The interaction of these two markets is also captured. The domestic market 
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clearing condition, (5.34), fully expresses the external impact (WHEXT2) on the 
domestic wheat supply, hence on the domestic price. Export price is also linked to 
domestic market to reflect its effect on domestic market. A strong foreign demand, 
therefore, can raise both the export price and domestic price. Figures (4.3) - (4.5) in 
the preceding chapter graphically show the different price determination processes 
and the interaction of these two markets due to exogenous shocks. 
5.3 Validation and Stability of the Model 
Since the model is to be used for dynamic simulation analysis of the effects 
of monetary policy, the validation and the stability of the model must be first 
examined. Validation of the model is its overall ability to reproduce the actual 
data of the endogenous variables, while stability of the model is its response to an 
exogenous shock over time. The estimated structural equations and identities were 
used for the examinations. 
5.3.1 Validation of the model 
In order to measure this model's ability to reproduce the actual data, the struc­
tural form of the model was simulated over the entire period (1965 to 1985). The 
simulation results are then compared with the actual data. A dynamic simulation 
procedure - the solved values rather than the actual values are used for lagged val­
ues of endogenous variables - was run because it allows the researcher to study the 
evolutionary character of the model over time. Since the model is nonlinear, the 
nonlinear simulation procedure was used for the solution. The computer program 
used for the purpose is SIMNLIN (DYNAMIC) of SAS/ETS (SAS, 1984). 
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The statistics to measure the model's simulation performance include root mean 
square error (RMSE), root mean square percentage error (RMSPE), and Theil's 
forecast statistics. The RMSE is a measure of the deviation of the simulated value 
from the actual value. The RMSPE expresses RMSE in terms of percentage. Theil's 
statistics are also often used to measure simulation performance of a model. There 
are three different components decomposed from the mean square error (MSE): 
bias error (UM), regression error (UR), and disturbance error (UD). The UM is an 
indication of systematic error, since it measures the extent to which the average 
values of the simulated and actual series deviate from each other. The UR indicates 
the ability of the model to replicate the degree of variability in the variable of 
interest. The UD measures the error remaining after deviations from average values 
and average variabilities have been accounted for. The perfect correlation of the 
simulated values with actual values would imply the ideal distribution of MSE over 
these three sources as UM = UR = 0 and UD = 0 (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981) 
Table 5.3 presents the overall goodness of fit of the model from dynamic si­
multaneous simulation run. In general, for a large model an RMSPE of less than 
25 percent is considered to be good. Most endogenous variables of this model have 
very low RMSPE. Out of 21 estimated endogenous variables 14 variables have RM­
SPE less than 20 percent. Variables with high RMSPE are WHIMTIN, WHIM UN, 
WHIMTSR, WHIMISR, WHIMICH, WHFEU, WHFRSl, and WHGVSl. The 
reason of high RMSPE for these variables is because in some years their actual val­
ues are equal to or close to zero. For example, WHIMISR equals zero from 1965 to 
1971, and WHIMICH equals zero from 1965 to 1971 and from 1975 to 1976. Thus, 
any small error of prediction creates a high proportion of error when error is com­
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pared to the small actual values, especially the zero actual values. In addition to 
the reason of small magnitude, the high RMSPE of domestic feed use (WHFEU) is 
because this variable was estimated and simulated by moving it to the left-hand side 
of market clearing condition (5.34). Therefore, simulation errors from all foreign 
demands and domestic demands accumulate and are transferred to this variable. In 
general, the model performs very well in tracking the observed values. Figures 5.7 
to 5.15 plot the predicted versus actual values of 9 key endogenous variables. 
Theil's forecast error statistics of the dynamic simulation are presented in Table 
5.4. As described above, for a good fit of the model the values of UM and UR should 
be close to zero and UD should be close to one. For UM, all variables have zero 
values UM. This indicates that for all variables there is no systematic error, the 
actual and the simulated series on average fitted very well. The regression error 
(UR) is also almost perfect except for variables WHIMISR and WHFEU. This 
implies that these two variables were not specified well, and a revision might be 
necessary. However, since the unavailability of data for the USSR and the fact 
that the USSR had no import from the United States for 1965 to 1971 because of 
nonprice factors, estimation for WHIMISR was restricted. The reason for WHFEU 
has high simulation regression error, as mentioned earlier, is because of the small 
magnitude in years and the accumulation of errors from all foreign and domestic 
demands. In general, Theil's forecast errors of most simulation variables are from 
disturbance terms (UD) rather than others. This model performs satisfactorily. 
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Table 5.3: Root mean square error (RMSE) and root mean square 
percentage error (RMSPE) from the dynamic simulation 
(N=21) 
Variable RMSE RMSPE 
EC total wheat import (WHIMTEC) 423.989 11.73 
EC wheat imports from U.S. (WHIMIEC) 170.65 11.72 
Japan total wheat imports (WHIMTJA) 143.36 2.84 
Japan wheat import from U.S. (WHIMIJA) 118.30 4.09 
India total wheat imports (WHIMTIN) 566.39 726.84 
India wheat imports from U.S. (WHIMIIN) 502.60 1356.73 
USSR total wheat imports (WHIMTSR) 2804.28 400.20 
USSR wheat imports from U.S. (WHIMISR) 1706.57 55990149.00 
China total wheat imports (WHIMTCH) 813.15 20.04 
China wheat imports from U.S. (WHIMICH) 386.38 70935749.00 
ROW total wheat imports (WHIMTRW) 2158.76 5.74 
ROW wheat import from U.S. (WHIMIRW) 1513.72 10.24 
ROW domestic wheat price (WHIMPRW) 12.72 11.63 
World total wheat imports (WHIMTWL) 3597.69 5.71 
U.S. wheat export (WHEXT2) 2242.68 8.57 
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Table 5.3 (Continued) 
Variable RMSE RMSPE 
Canada wheat export price (WHEXP2CA) 10.76 9.34 
U.S. wheat export price (WHEXPUS) 9.84 11.99 
U.S. wheat area planted, next year (USWHEAPF) 3.47 4.74 
U.S. wheat production (WHPOD) 98.42 4.47 
U.S. wheat food use (WHFOU) 6.80 1.18 
U.S. wheat feed use (WHFEU) 134.48 125.84 
U.S. wheat seed use (WHSEU) 4.71 5.31 
U.S. free ending stocks (WHFRSl) 67.55 37.59 
U.S. government ending stocks (WHGVSl) 177.57 115.65 
U.S. total ending stocks (WHEST) 135.69 19.51 
U.S. wheat domestic farm price (WHFP) 0.24 9.28 
U.S. domestic interest rate (IRl) 0.49 7.62 
U.S. exchange rate (ERSDR) 0.03 2.73 
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Table 5.4: Theil forecast error statistics (N=21) 
Variable MSE 
MSE decomposition 
Bias Reg. Dist. Accuracy 
UM UR UD U1 
WHIMTEC 179683.00 
WHIMIEC 
WHIMTJA 
WHIMIJA 
WHIMTIN 
WHIMIIN 
WHIMICH 
WHIMPRW 
29121.48 
20550.77 
13995.41 
320794.00 
252602.00 
WHIMTSR 7863972.00 
WHIMISR 2912383.00 
WHIMTCH 661206.00 
149291.00 
WHIMTRW 4660264.00 
WHIMIRW 2291355.00 
161.67 
WHIMTWL 12943404.00 
WHEXT2 5029631.00 
0.00 0.00 1.00 
0.01 0.05 0.94 
0.00 0.01 0.99 
0.00 0.00 1.00 
0.00 0.04 0.96 
0.00 0.02 0.98 
0.00 0.21 0.79 
0.02 0.60 0.38 
0.00 0.01 0.99 
0.03 0.00 0.97 
0.00 0.02 0.98 
0.00 0.04 0.96 
0.01 0.17 0.82 
0.00 0.04 0.96 
0.00 0.00 1.00 
0.07 
0.08 
0.03 
0.04 
0.15 
0.17 
0.23 
0.47 
0.11 
0.13 
0.05 
0.08 
0.10 
0.05 
0.07 
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Table 5.4 (Continued) 
MSE decomposition 
Variable MSE 
Bias 
UM 
Reg. 
UR 
Dist. 
UD 
Accuracy 
U1 
WHEXP2CA 115.69 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.06 
WHEXPUS 96.77 0.01 0.01 0.98 0.08 
USWHEAPF 12.03 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.05 
WHPOD 9685.88 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.05 
WHPOU 46.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.01 
WHFEU 18084.86 0.00 0.55 0.45 0.71 
WHSEU 22.22 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.05 
WHFRSl 4563.04 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.19 
WHGVSl 31532.04 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.23 
WHEST 18410.77 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.13 
WHFP 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.08 
IRl 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.06 
ERSDR 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.03 
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Another important examination on the validation of the model is the model's 
ability to duplicate turning points or rapid changes in the actual data. As Figures 
5.7 to 5.15 illustrate, the simulated series do seem to reproduce the general long-run 
behavior of the actual series, although a few short-run fluctuations in the actual 
series are not reproduced very well. 
For the aggregate world wheat imports (Figure 5.7), even it accumulates the im­
port demands of all regions, there are only 3 turning point errors out of 21 simulated 
years, and the sharp increase in 1972 and the sharp decrease in 1985 were predicted 
very well. Similarly, the U.S. wheat export (Figure 5.8) is the accumulative sum of 
all import demands for U.S. wheat, but has only 3 turning point errors. All sharp 
rises and falls were also predicted well. The sharp fluctuations in U.S. export price 
(Figure 5.9) and domestic price (Figure 5.10) after the commodity booms in the 
early 1970s were simulated very close to the actual data. Turning to the financial 
market, both the interest rate (Figure 5.14) and exchange rate (Figure 5.15) were 
predicated accurately. There are only 2 turning point errors for the interest rate 
and 1 for the exchange rate. By such comparison of predicated and actual values, 
this model shows a good ability to trace upward and downward movements in the 
data. 
5.3.2 Stability of the model 
The stability of the model is examined by its response to a one-period exogenous 
shock. If changes in endogenous variables in response to the shock are decreasing as 
time passes, and simulation values with shock move back to base values (simulation 
values without shock), the model is stable. The faster the adjustment back toward 
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the base values, the more stable the model. 
In this study, the money supply growth rate in 1973 was exogenously increased 
by 3 percent to test the stability of the model. The year 1973 was chosen because 
the flexible exchange rate regime officially started in that year. Given this shock, 
the expected immediate effects are the U.S. dollar depreciation and a decrease in the 
domestic interest rate. Then, through the external channel the exchange rate via the 
international price linkage would have impacts on foreign wheat import demands. 
Through the internal channel, the lower interest rate would increase the domestic 
food use demand for wheat and the commercial (free) ending stocks, Also, change 
in foreign demands for U.S. wheat would have impact on the domestic market. 
Eventually, U.S. wheat exports, export price, domestic demands, and domestic price 
would change (refer to Figure 2.2, Figure 4.4, and the structural model in Table 
5.1). The consequent changes in all endogenous variables in the following years 
depend upon the lagged endogenous variables and the price expectations. However, 
they are expected to diminish as time passes. 
Table 5.5 reports the dynamic simulation results for the key endogenous vari­
ables: the base values, changes from the base values caused by money supply growth 
in 1973, and the percentage changes. As the theoretical expectation, the percentage 
change of all variables decreases as time passes, and all simulated results eventually 
approach the base values. For the immediate effects, a 3 % increase in money supply 
caused a 3.29 % depreciation in the U.S. dollar and a 5.77 % decrease in the interest 
rate in 1973. Because of the one-year lag autocorrelation, the exchange rates in the 
following years steadily decreased and back toward the base value from 1973 to 
1984. However, the domestic interest rate moved back to its base values quickly in 
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1974. Impacts of the money supply shock were spread out via the exchange rate 
changes on the world market and via the interest rate decrease on the domestic mar­
ket. However, the exchange rate effect was zero on the total wheat imports of the 
EC, Japan India, and China because of the domestic and trade policies exercised in 
these regions. On the domestic side, the current year (1973) wheat production was 
unchanged because wheat was planted in the last crop year. A detailed analysis of 
those changes will be discussed in the next chapter. The important point here, as 
shown in Table 5.5, is that all changes in endogenous variables in response to the 
money supply shock decreased over time. Since all variables moved back to their 
base values after the shock, this model can be judged stable. 
According to the above examinations, this model's performance is satisfactory 
and the model is stable. They suggest that the model developed in this study 
provides a good foundation for further empirical analysis. 
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Table 5.5: Dynamic impacts of an increase in the U.S. 
money supply growth rate by 3 percent in 1973 
Variable Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
WHIMTEC 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
6056 
0.00 
0.00 
5360 
0.00 
0.00 
6016 
0.00 
0.00 
4711 
0.00 
0.00 
5522 
0.00 
0.00 
WHIMIEC 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
2766 
0.00 
0.00 
2218 
0.00 
0.00 
3373 
0.00 
0.00 
1342 
0.00 
0.00 
2215 
0.00 
0.00 
WHIMTJA 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
5091 
0.00 
0.00 
5214 
0.00 
0.00 
5746 
0.00 
0.00 
5781 
0.00 
0.00 
5483 
0.00 
0.00 
WHIMIJA 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
3067 
5.33 
0.17 
2992 
1.82 
0.06 
3347 
1.53 
0.05 
3391 
0.67 
0.02 
3073 
0.48 
0.02 
WHIMTIN 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
2533 
0.00 
0.00 
6773 
0.00 
0.00 
5434 
0.00 
0.00 
3027 
0.00 
0.00 
573 
0.00 
0.00 
WHIMIIN 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
678 
14.31 
2.11 
4948 
5.14 
0.10 
3803 
4.09 
0.11 
1664 
1.77 
0.11 
311 
1.22 
0.39 
WHIMTSR 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
2494 
103.03 
4.13 
1440 
40.76 
2.83 
9807 
-1.53 
-0.02 
6743 
11.62 
0.17 
9027 
-0.48 
-0.01 
WHIMISR 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
1611 
78.34 
4.86 
-689 
30.92 
-4.49 
4052 
-0.91 
-0.02 
4362 
8.62 
0.20 
5177 
-0.48 
-0.01 
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Table 5.5 (Continued) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
4532 4871 4247 4377 3578 3693 1575 2798 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2206 2489 2140 2495 1494 1459 610 907 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5554 5626 6073 5776 5754 5774 5901 5543 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3136 3164 3666 3385 3370 3394 3493 3262 
0.22 0.17 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
123 127 19 3830 4470 1690 668 235 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
-10 -69 -147 2563 3900 1021 644 376 
0.55 0.35 0.18 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00 
-5.30 -0.51 -0.12 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3165 11029 12294 18606 19832 23185 27590 17213 
2.98 -1.64 0.61 -0.07 0,22 0.10 0.00 0.05 
0.12 -0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2022 • 3595 1375 5553 2701 6485 5713 749 
2.98 -1.64 0.61 -0.07 0.22 0.09 0.00 0.05 
0.15 -0.05 0.04 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
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Table 5.5 (Continued) 
Variable Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
WHIMTCH 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
5782 
0.00 
0.00 
4406 
0.00 
0.00 
3653 
0.00 
0.00 
2580 
0.00 
0.00 
9126 
0.00 
0.00 
WHIMICH 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
2560 
3.54 
0.14 
933 
1.05 
0.11 
34 
0.00 
0.00 
34 
0.00 
0.00 
458 
0.34 
0.07 
WHIMTRW 
(1000 mt) 
BASE 
Change 
% change 
39101 
21.73 
0.06 
37556 
7.62 
0.02 
39892 
10.36 
0.03 
36390 
4.46 
0.01 
44977 
4.31 
0.01 
WHIMIRW 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
19853 
15.84 
0.08 
15566 
6.60 
0.04 
19945 
10.58 
0.05 
14844 
9.01 
0.06 
21394 
6.20 
0.03 
WHIMTWL 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
61057 
124.76 
0.20 
60748 
48.39 
0.08 
70549 
8.83 
0.01 
59232 
15.77 
0.03 
74708 
3.57 
0.00 
WHEXT2 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
30534 
117.36 
0.38 
25969 
45.53 
0.18 
34554 
15.29 
0.04 
25637 
20.07 
0.08 
32628 
7.76 
0.02 
WHEXP2CA 
(CA $/mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
205.34 
0.16 
0.08 
187.48 
0.06 
0.03 
172.34 
0.01 
0.01 
150.89 
0.02 
0.01 
174.90 
0.00 
0.00 
WHEXPUS 
(US $/mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
178.11 
5.16 
2.90 
155.86 
2.52 
1.62 
147.02 
1.23 
0.83 
126.90 
0.62 
0.49 
135.35 
0.33 
0.25 
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Table 5.5 (Continued) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
6287 
0.00 
0.00 
1684 
0.12 
0.01 
46072 
1.06 
0.00 
19115 
1.95 
0.01 
65733 
4.99 
0.01 
28153 
5.81 
0.02 
186.94 
0.01 
0.00 
127.35 
0.17 
0.13 
8929 
0.00 
0.00 
1393 
0.12 
0.01 
55823 
1.48 
0.00 
25924 
0.86 
0.00 
86405 
-0.74 
-0.00 
36497 
-0.13 
-0.00 
230.38 
-0.00 
-0.00 
167.34 
0.10 
0.06 
13467 
0.00 
0.00 
7988 
0.04 
0.00 
53518 
0.48 
0.00 
22353 
-0.02 
-0.00 
89618 
1.28 
0.00 
37374 
0.87 
0.00 
270.87 
0.00 
0.00 
182.19 
0.07 
0.04 
14033 
0.00 
0.00 
8450 
0.04 
0.00 
56785 
0.48 
0.00 
26406 
0.03 
0.00 
103408 
0.38 
0.00 
48851 
0.47 
0.00 
246.30 
0.00 
0.00 
177.11 
0.04 
0.02 
12625 
0.00 
0.00 
4113 
0.02 
0.00 
52436 
0.20 
0.00 
26538 
0.36 
0.00 
98695 
0.49 
0.00 
42117 
0.68 
0.00 
225.90 
0.00 
0.00 
156.11 
0.02 
0.01 
9194 
0.00 
0.00 
3487 
0.01 
0.00 
53781 
0.06 
0.00 
22224 
0.25 
0.00 
97317 
0.18 
0.00 
38070 
0.38 
0.00 
224.20 
0.00 
0.00 
152.90 
0.01 
0.01 
7766 
0.00 
0.00 
3094 
0.00 
0.00 
60235 
0.04 
0.00 
26084 
0.10 
0.00 
103735 
0.04 
0.00 
39638 
0.13 
0.00 
233.52 
0.00 
0.00 
144.04 
0.01 
0.00 
7272 
0.00 
0.00 
801 
0.00 
0.00 
52805 
0.00 
0.00 
22358 
-0.05 
-0.00 
85867 
0.07 
0.00 
28454 
0.01 
0.00 
247.36 
0.00 
0.00 
137.34 
0.00 
0.00 
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Table 5.5 (Continued) 
Variable Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
USWHEAPF 
(mil. ace) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
71.59 
0.02 
0.03 
80.69 
0.04 
0.05 
82.89 
0.07 
0.08 
75.24 
0.02 
0.02 
71.03 
-0.01 
-0.02 
WHPOD 
(niil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
1721 
0.00 
0.00 
1800 
0.59 
0.03 
2291 
1.14 
0.05 
2215 
1.76 
0.08 
2043 
0.51 
0.02 
WHFOU 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
534.69 
0.53 
0.10 
554.87 
-0.03 
-0.01 
592.36 
-0.04 
-0.01 
577.83 
0.03 
0.01 
590.91 
0.02 
0.00 
WHFEU 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
-165.43 
-5.69 
3.44 
109.78 
-3.52 
-3.21 
137.67 
-5.03 
-3.65 
175.47 
4.41 
2.51 
32.31 
2.92 
9.04 
WHSEU 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
86.56 
0.03 
0.04 
99.06 
0.05 
0.05 
102.40 
0.09 
0.09 
92.68 
0.02 
0.03 
87.51 
-0.02 
-0.02 
WHFRSl 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
158.23 
5.84 
3.69 
464.33 
5.12 
1.10 
578.21 
9.62 
1.66 
617.83 
4.23 
0.68 
530.45 
2.03 
0.38 
WHGVSl 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
260.32 
-5.02 
-1.93 
40.11 
-1.89 
-4.72 
117.72 
-0.83 
-0.71 
507.74 
1.11 
0.02 
730.88 
0.61 
0.08 
WHEST 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
418.54 
0.82 
0.19 
504.43 
3.23 
0.64 
695.93 
8.79 
1.26 
1125.57 
5.34 
0.47 
1261.33 
2.64 
0.21 
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Table 5.5 (Continued) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
70.72 
-0.05 
-0.07 
80.76 
-0.02 
-0.03 
83.31 
0.00 
0.00 
78.15 
0.01 
0.01 
74.05 
0.01 
0.01 
78.44 
-0.00 
-0.00 
81.24 
-0.00 
-0.01 
77.43 
-0.00 
-0.00 
1909 
-0.40 
-0.02 
2117 
-1.41 
-0.07 
2381 
-0.62 
-0.03 
2624 
0.01 
0.00 
2507 
0.39 
0.01 
2345 
0.17 
0.01 
2571 
-0.04 
-0.00 
2607 
-0.13 
-0.01 
597.17 595.89 598.82 610.37 621.72 635.94 656.34 672.77 
0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
299.65 314.32 139.72 75.05 -7.02 217.35 369.70 415.88 
1.07 -0.34 -0.59 -0.24 0.15 0.24 0.10 -0.05 
0.36 -0.11 -0.42 -0.31 -2.08 0.10 0.03 -0.01 
87.52 101.27 105.08 98.66 93.64 99.89 104.03 99.40 
-0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
-0.07 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
391.86 374.65 268.39 296.71 
1.20 0.85 0.47 0.23 
0.31 0.23 0.17 0.08 
761.95 545.78 818.40 837.39 
-0.18 -0.86 -0.54 -0.08 
-0.02 -0.16 -0.07 -0.01 
1153.81 920.43 1086.79 1134.10 
1.01 -0.02 -0.08 0.15 
0.09 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 
299.94 302.84 235.50 136.52 
0.07 0.02 0.03 0.05 
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 
1093.15 1086.92 1147.99 1636.41 
0.18 0.16 0.00 -0.10 
0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
1393.09 1389.77 1383.45 1772.93 
0.26 0.18 0.04 -0.04 
0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.00 
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Table 5.5 (Continued) 
Variable Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
WHFP Base 4.13 4.05 3.50 2.79 2.40 
(US $/mt) Change 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
% change 0.10 0.07 0.13 -0.15 -0.13 
IRl Base 6.51 8.10 6.74 4.84 4.69 
(%) Change -0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
% change -5.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ERSDR Base 1.24 1.26 1.21 1.18 1.17 
(US $/SDR) Change 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 
% change 3.29 1.73 0.89 0.54 0.29 
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Table 5.5 (Continued) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
2.93 3.50 4.03 3.09 3.61 4.18 3.30 2.95 
-0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
-0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 
8.35 9.93 11.60 13.05 10.85 8.98 9.78 7.67 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1.24 1.26 1.23 1.14 1.10 1.10 0.98 1.11 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.15 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
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Figure 5.7: Predicted versus actual values of aggregate world wheat import 
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Figure 5.8: Predicted versus actual values of U.S. wheat exports 
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Figure 5.9: Predicted versus actual values of U.S. wheat export price 
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' Figure 5.10: Predicted versus actual values of U.S. wheat farm price 
I 
i 
! 
I 
I 
v 
a 2 3 0 0 -
m 2200-
2 1 OO -
^  2 0 0 0 -
\/ 3  1  g o o  -
Ô  1  a o o  -
1 600 -
1  5 0 0  
1  3 0 0  
1  9 6 5  1  9 8 0  1  9 8 5  
YEAR 
TRT —*—*- Aotual # » Pr«dlet«4 
Figure 5-11: Predicted versus actual values of U.S. wheat production 
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Figure 5.12: Predicted versus actual values of U.S. food use demand for wheat 
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Figure 5.13: Predicted versus actual values of U.S. wheat ending stocks 
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Figure 5.14: Predicted versus actual values of U.S. interest rate 
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Figure 5.15: Predicted versus actual values of U.S. exchange rate 
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6 DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OP MONETARY POLICY IMPACTS 
For the main objective of this study, to assessment of the impacts of mon­
etary policy on U.S. wheat trade and domestic market, this chapter investigates 
the impacts of different monetary policies using dynamic simulation of the model 
developed in the preceding chapter. 
Two monetary policy scenarios are analyzed for the period 1973 to 1985: first, 
an expansionary policy of a sustained increase in the money supply growth rate by 
3 percent; and second, a contractionary policy of a sustained decrease in the growth 
rate, also by 3 percent. The period 1973 to 1985 was chosen because the monetary 
policy had no direct influence on the exchange rate determination under the fixed 
exchange rate regime prior to 1973. A sustained increase or decrease in money 
supply growth rate was assumed and undertaken because it did not seem reasonable 
that the monetary authority would alter money supply growth in only one year. 
Moreover, which year could be chosen for the money supply to grow is a question if 
only one year growth was assumed. The money supply level corresponding to the 
increase (decrease) in the growth rate, therefore, was incorporated into the model 
to analyze the impacts. By comparing the dynamic simulation results with and 
without the shock, it turns out the impacts of monetary policy on wheat trade and 
domestic market. 
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Note that because the money supply growth rate is sustainedly increased (de­
creased) every year since 1973, the consequent changes in the endogenous variables 
in any period include the dynamic effects of money supply changes of all previous 
periods. That is, the effects on endogenous variables from the dynamic simulation 
are compound effects. The later the year, the more the compound effects. 
6.1 Impacts of Expansionary Monetary Policy 
The theoretical immediate impacts of expansionary monetary policy, as de­
scribed in Chapter 4 and graphically explained in Figure 4.4, are the U.S. dollar 
depreciation and lower domestic interest rate in the financial market. Then, through 
the external channel the exchange rate change would have impacts on foreign wheat 
import demands, and through the internal channel the lower interest rate would af­
fect the domestic market (refer to Figure 2.2 for impact channels). The final net 
effects of the expansionary monetary policy would also include the interactions of 
world market and domestic market. These effects are compounded when the money 
supply increases are sustained. 
Table 6.1 reports the dynamic simulation results of sustained money supply 
increases from 1973 to 1985 for 27 important endogenous variables. In the financial 
market, the value of exchange rate (US $/SDR) depreciated continuously from 3.29 
% in 1973 to 16.90 % in 1985, while the interest rate (IRl) declined by -5.77 % 
in 1973 to -11.52 % in 1985. In the world market, changes in the exchange rate, 
however, had no impact on the total wheat import demand of the EC, Japan, India, 
and China as expected because these domestic markets were isolated. The total 
wheat import demand of the USSR (WHIMTSR) and ROW (WHIMTRW) had 
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responses to the exchange rate changes. However, the final results indicated that 
changes in the USSR total import demand were various from year to year and smal-. 
except in 1973 and 1974, and changes in the ROW total import demand were less 
responsive. The aggregate world wheat demand (WHIMTWL) increased by only 
0.20 % in 1973 to 0.16 % in 1985. The small increases in world demand, therefore, 
resulted in Canada (the price leader) to raising its export price (WHEXP2CA) by 
only 0.08 % in 1973 to 0.07 % in 1985 in terms of Canadian currency. However, 
in terms of the U.S. dollar, the dollar depreciation raised the U.S. export price 
(WHEXPUS) from 2.90 % in 1973 to 16.17 % in 1985. Changes in two duopolists' 
relative price coupled with changes in the world import demand resulted in increases 
in U.S. wheat export (WHEXT2) to the duopoly world market. However, these 
increases in export were small, by 0.38 % in 1973 to 0.62 % in 1985. 
In the domestic market, wheat production (WHPOD) had no change in 1973 
as expected because wheat was planted in the last season, and could not be changed. 
Production increased after 1974, but only by 0.03 % in 1974 to 0.22 % in 1985. For 
domestic demands, food use demand (WHFOU) increased by 0.10 % in 1973 to 
0.19 % in 1985. Note that increases in food use demands were caused by the net 
effect of interest rate effect (to increase due to lower interest rates) and domestic 
price effect (to decrease due to higher prices). Also, since wheat products are staple 
food in consumption, food use demand was inelastic with respect to changes in both 
interest rate and price (the estimated elasticities are -0.02 and -0.04, respectively). 
Domestic feed use demand (WHFEU) appeared more sensitive to the price changes, 
and decreased over the simulation periods. Since wheat area planted increased 
(USWHEAPF), domestic seed use demand (WHSEU) also increased over time. For 
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ending stocks, commercial stocks (WHFRSl) dramatically increased in response to 
the increasing export prices (so do to the increasing expected export prices) and 
the decreasing interest rates; whereas, government stocks (WHGVSl) were depleted 
over time. Total ending stocks (WHEST) increased from 0.19 % in 1973 to 3.08 % 
in 1985, which were mainly resulted from the increases in commercial ending stocks. 
Since the exchange rate effects caused only small increases in the foreign demand 
for U.S. wheat and the interest rate effects on the domestic demands were also small 
in aggregate, the domestic price (WHFP) increased by only 0.10 % in 1973 to 0.52 
% in 1985. 
6.2 Impacts of Contractionary Monetary Policy 
In contrast to the expansionay monetary policy, impacts of a contractionary 
monetary policy were examined. The dynamic simulation results of this policy are 
reported in Table 6.2. All effects on the world market and domestic market are the 
same as the expansionary monetary policy but in an inverse direction. 
In the financial market, decreases in money supply appreciated the U.S. dollar 
against SDR (ERSDR) from -3.29 % in 1973 to -16.91 % in 1985, and raised the 
domestic interest rate (IRl) from 5.77 % in 1973 to 11.52 % in 1985. Similarly, the 
monetary policy impacts were spread out via the exchange rate on the world market 
and via the interest rate on the domestic market. As a result, the U.S. wheat export 
price (WHEXPUS) declined from -2.89 % in 1973 to -16.19 % in 1985 and wheat 
export (WHEXT2) reduced from -0.39 % in 1973 to -0.82 % in 1985. The export 
prices were more responsive than the quantity exported. Changes in the exchange 
rate had no impact on total import demands of EC, Japan, India, and China. 
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Table 6.1; Dynamic impacts of a sustained increase in the U.S. 
money supply growth rate by 3 percent from 1973 to 
1985 
Variable Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
WHIMTEC 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
6056 
0.00 
0.00 
5360 
0.00 
0.00 
6016 
0.00 
0.00 
4711 
0.00 
0.00 
5522 
0.00 
0.00 
WHIMIEC 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
2766 
0.00 
0.00 
2218 
0.00 
0.00 
3373 
0.00 
0.00 
1342 
0.00 
0.00 
2215 
0.00 
0.00 
WHIMTJA 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
5091 
0.00 
0.00 
5214 
0.00 
0.00 
5746 
0.00 
0.00 
5781 
0.00 
0.00 
. 5483 
0.00 
0.00 
WHIMIJA 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
3067 
5.33 
0.17 
2992 
5.58 
0.19 
3347 
9.91 
0.30 
3391 
9.44 
0.28 
3073 
13.03 
0.42 
WHIMTIN 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
2533 
0.00 
0.00 
6773 
0.00 
0.00 
5434 
0.00 
0.00 
3027 
0.00 
0.00 
573 
0.00 
0.00 
WHIM UN 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
678 
14.31 
2.11 
4948 
15.62 
0.32 
3803 
26.50 
0.70 
1664 
24.99 
1.50 
311 
33.49 
10.76 
WHIMTSR 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
2494 
103.03 
4.13 
1440 
-29.35 
-2.04 
9807 
-41.15 
-0.42 
6743 
-4.26 
-0.06 
9027 
-24.06 
-0.27 
WHIM 1 sa 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
1611 
78.35 
4.86 
-689 
-21.37 
3.10 
4052 
-29.41 
-0.73 
4362 
-1.74 
-0.04 
5177 
-16.08 
-0.31 
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Table 6.1 (Continued) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
4532 
0.00 
0.00 
2206 
0.00 
0.00 
5554 
0.00 
0.00 
3136 
12.64 
0.40 
123 
0.00 
0.00 
-10 
32.32 
-311.89 
3165 
16.88 
0.53 
2022 
14.28 
0.71 
4871 
0.00 
0.00 
2489 
0.00 
0.00 
5626 
0.00 
0.00 
3164 
18.77 
0.59 
127 
0.00 
0.00 
-69 
38.30 
-55.85 
11029 
-70.36 
-0.64 
3595 
-50.07 
-1.39 
4247 
0.00 
0.00 
2140 
0.00 
0.00 
6073 
0.00 
0.00 
3666 
14.39 
0.39 
19 
0.00 
0,00 
-147 
40.47 
-27.45 
12294 
69.26 
0.56 
1375 
53.90 
3.92 
4377 
0.00 
0.00 
2495 
0.00 
0.00 
5776 
0.00 
0.00 
3385 
20.30 
0.60 
3830 
0.00 
0.00 
2563 
57.32 
2.24 
18606 
-76.35 
-0.41 
5553 
-54.01 
-0.97 
3578 
0.00 
0.00 
1494 
0.00 
0.00 
5754 
0.00 
0.00 
3370 
22.56 
0.67 
4470 
0.00 
0.00 
3900 
53.86 
1.38 
19832 
4.41 
0.02 
2701 
6.48 
0.24 
3693 
0.00 
0.00 
1459 
0.00 
0.00 
5774 
0.00 
0.00 
3394 
17.68 
0.52 
1690 
0.00 
0.00 
1021 
37.52 
3.68 
23185 
48.14 
0.21 
6485 
38.31 
0.59 
1575 
0.00 
0.00 
610 
0.00 
0.00 
5901 
0.00 
0.00 
3493 
21.62 
0.62 
668 
0.00 
0.00 
644 
44.37 
6.89 
27590 
-13.35 
-0.05 
5713 
-7.61 
-0.13 
2798 
0.00 
0.00 
907 
0.00 
0.00 
5543 
0.00 
0.00 
3262 
14.56 
0.45 
235 
0.00 
0.00 
376 
27.41 
7.28 
17213 
80.36 
0.47 
749 
61.54 
8.21 
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Table 6.1 (Continued) 
Variable Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
WHIMTCH 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
5782 
0.00 
0.00 
4406 
0.00 
0.00 
3653 
0.00 
0.00 
2580 
0.00 
0.00 
9126 
0.00 
0.00 
WHIMICH 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
2560 
3.54 
0.14 
933 
3.33 
0.36 
34 
0.00 
0.00 
34 
0.00 
0.00 
458 
9.33 
2.04 
WHIMTRW 
(1000 mt) 
BASE 
Change 
% change 
39101 
21.73 
0.06 
37556 
31.46 
0.08 
39892 
68.52 
0.17 
36390 
75.53 
0.21 
44977 
117.90 
0.26 
WHIMIRW 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
19853 
15.85 
0.08 
15566 
23.99 
0.15 
19945 
57.02 
0.29 
14844 
66.07 
0.45 
21394 
99.09 
0.46 
WHIMTWL 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
61057 
124.76 
0.20 
60748 
2.12 
0.00 
70549 
27.37 
0.04 
59232 
71.27 
0.12 
74708 
93.84 
0.13 
WHEXT2 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
30534 
117.36 
0.38 
25969 
27.15 
0.10 
34554 
64.02 
0.19 
25637 
98.76 
0.39 
32628 
138.86 
0.43 
WHEXP2CA 
(CA $/mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
205.34 
0.16 
0.08 
187.48 
0.00 
0.00 
172.34 
0.04 
0.02 
150.89 
0.09 
0.06 
174.90 
0.12 
0.07 
WHEXPUS 
(US $/mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
178.11 
5.16 
2.90 
155.86 
7.18 
4.61 
147.02 
8.20 
5.58 
126.90 
8.56 
6.74 
135.35 
9.82 
7.26 
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Table 6.1 (Continued) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
6287 
0.00 
0.00 
1684 
7.23 
,0.43 
46072 
76.39 
0.17 
19115 
68.96 
0.36 
65733 
93.27 
0.14 
28153 
135.42 
0.48 
186.94 
0.12 
0.07 
127.35 
9.96 
7.82 
8929 
0.00 
0.00 
1393 
13.34 
0.96 
55823 
150.12 
0.27 
25924 
124.54 
0.48 
86405 
79.77 
0.09 
36497 
144.87 
0.40 
230.38 
0.11 
0.05 
167.34 
12.71 
7.60 
13467 
0.00 
0.00 
7988 
8.06 
0.10 
53518 
114.89 
0.21 
22353 
99.81 
0.45 
89618 
184.15 
0.21 
37374 
216.62 
0.58 
270.87 
0.24 
0.09 
182.19 
16.71 
9.17 
14033 
0.00 
0.00 
8450 
15.98 
0.19 
56785 
209.30 
0.37 
26406 
166.70 
0.63 
103408 
132.95 
0.13 
48851 
206.30 
0.42 
246.30 
0.18 
0.07 
177.11 
17.27 
9.75 
12625 
0.00 
0.00 
4113 
14.53 
0.35 
52436 
197.39 
0.38 
26538 
162.07 
0.61 
98695 
201.79 
0.20 
42117 
259.51 
0.62 
225.90 
0.27 
0.12 
156.11 
17.69 
11.33 
9194 
0.00 
0.00 
3487 
9.49 
0.27 
53781 
123.95 
0.23 
22224 
113.13 
0.51 
97317 
172.09 
0.18 
38070 
216.13 
0.57 
224.20 
0.23 
0.10 
152.90 
20.04 
13.10 
7766 
0.00 
0.00 
3094 
11.22 
0.36 
60235 
136.27 
0.23 
26084 
129.32 
0.50 
103735 
122.93 
0.12 
39638 
198.93 
0.50 
233.52 
0.16 
0.07 
144.04 
22.51 
15.65 
7272 
0.00 
0.00 
801 
4.76 
0.59 
52805 
55.46 
0.11 
22358 
69.29 
0.31 
85867 
135.82 
0.16 
28454 
177.56 
0.62 
247.36 
0.18 
0.07 
137.34 
22.20 
16.17 
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Table 6.1 (Continued) 
Variable Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
USWHEAPF 
(mil. ace) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
71.59 
0.02 
0.03 
80.69 
0.06 
0.08 
82.89 
0.11 
0.14 
75.24 
0.12 
0.16 
71.03 
0.10 
0.14 
WHPOD 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
1721 
0.00 
0.00 
1800 
0.59 
0.03 
2291 
1.82 
0.08 
2215 
3.06 
0.14 
2043 
3.34 
0.16 
WHFOU 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
534.69 
0.53 
0.10 
554.87 
0.53 
0.10 
592.36 
0.55 
0.09 
577.83 
0.62 
0.11 
590.91 
0.69 
0.12 
WHFEU 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
-165.43 
-5.69 
3.44 
109.78 
-8.58 
-7.81 
137.67 
-9.93 
-7.21 
175.47 
-5.99 
-3.41 
32.31 
-3.51 
-10.87 
WHSEU 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
86.56 
0.03 
0.04 
99.06 
0.09 
0.09 
102.40 
0.15 
0.15 
92.68 
0.16 
0.18 
87.51 
0.14 
0.16 
WHFRSl 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
158.23 
5.84 
3.69 
464.33 
10.47 
2.26 
578.21 
20.16 
3.49 
617.83 
24.68 
3.99 
530.45 
26.44 
4.98 
WHGVSl 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
260.32 
-5.02 
-1.93 
40.11 
-2.10 
-5.24 
117.72 
-3.08 
-2.62 
507.74 
-2.97 
-0.58 
730.88 
-3.81 
-0.52 
WHEST 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
418.54 
0.82 
0.19 
504.43 
8.37 
1.66 
695.93 
17.07 
2.45 
1125.57 
21.71 
1.93 
1261.33 
22.63 
1.79 
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Table 6.1 (Continued) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
70.72 
0.09 
0.12 
80.76 
0.08 
0.10 
83.31 
0.10 
0.12 
78.15 
0.18 
0.23 
74.05 
0.26 
0.35 
78.44 
0.27 
0.34 
81.24 
0.18 
0.22 
77.43 
0.16 
0.21 
1909 
2.75 
0.14 
2117 
2.62 
0.12 
2381 
2.39 
0.10 
2624 
3.21 
0.12 
2507 
5.87 
0.23 
2345 
8.31 
0.35 
2571 
8.76 
0.34 
2607 
5.80 
0.22 
597.13 
0.74 
0.12 
595.89 
0.80 
0.13 
598.82 
0.85 
0.14 
610.37 
0.84 
0.14 
621.72 
0.93 
0.15 
635.94 
1.09 
0.17 
656.34 
1.17 
0.18 
672.77 
1.27 
0.19 
299.65 
-5.66 
-1.89 
314.32 
-3.59 
-1.14 
139.72 
-5.15 
-3.69 
75.05 
-13.85 
-18.46 
-7.02 
-12.24 
174.19 
217.35 
-5.26 
-2.42 
369.70 
-3.41 
-0.92 
415.88 
-9.69 
-2.33 
87.52 
0.12 
0.13 
101.27 
0.11 
0.11 
105.08 
0.14 
0.13 
98.66 
0.24 
0.25 
93.64 
0.35 
0.37 
99.89 
0.35 
0.35 
104.03 
0.24 
0.23 
99.40 
0.21 
0.21 
391.86 
29.78 
7.60 
374.65 
29.80 
7.95 
268.39 
31.63 
11.79 
296.71 
41.94 
14.13 
299.94 
49.21 
16.41 
302.84 
48.37 
15.97 
235.50 
50.39 
21.40 
136.52 
60.71 
44.47 
761.95 545.78 818.40 837.39 1093.15 1086.92 1147.99 1636.41 
-4.57 -4.62 -7.86 -9.77 -9.75 -4.73 -3.29 -6.13 
-0.60 -0.85 -0.96 -1.17 -0.89 -0.43 -0.29 -0.37 
1153.81 
25.21 
2.19 
920.43 
25.18 
2.74 
1086.79 
23.78 
2.19 
1134.10 
32.17 
2.84 
1393.09 
39.46 
2.83 
1389.77 
43.65 
3.14 
1383.45 
47.09 
3.40 
1772.93 
54.58 
3.08 
Table 6.1 (Continued) 
Variable Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
WHFP Base 4.13 4.05 3.50 2.79 2.40 
(US $/mt) Change 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
% change 0.10 0.18 0.26 0.21 0.15 
IRl Base 6.51 8.10 6.74 4.84 4.69 
(%) Change -0.38 -0.39 -0.41 -0.44 -0.47 
% change -5.77 -4.84 -6.08 -9.06 -10.11 
ERSDR Base 1.24 1.26 1.21 1.18 1.17 
(US $/SDR) Change 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.10 
% change 3.29 5.10 6.57 7.66 8.51 
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Table 6.1 (Continued) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
2.93 3.50 4.03 3.09 3.61 4.18 3.30 2.95 
0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 
0.22 0.13 0.18 0.68 0.52 0.20 0.16 0.52 
8.35 9.93 11.60 13.05 10.85 8.98 9.78 7.67 
-0.51 -0.55 -0.58 -0.62 -0.68 -0.74 -0.79 -0.88 
-6.15 -5.51 -5.04 -4.77 -6.24 -8.26 -8.04 -11.52 
1.24 1.26 1.23 1.14 1.10 1.10 0.98 1.11 
0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.19 
8.82 9.37 10.29 11.93 13.34 14.50 17.38 16.90 
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Table 6.2; Dynamic impacts of a sustained decrease in the U.S. 
money supply growth rate by 3 percent from 1973 to 
1985 
Variable Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
WHIMTEC Base 6056 5360 6016 4711 5522 
(1000 mt) Change 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
, 
% change 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WHIMIEC Base 2766 2218 3373 1342 2215 
(1000 mt) Change 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
% change 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WHIMTJA Base 5091 5214 5746 5781 5483 
(1000 mt) Change 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
% change 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WHIMIJA Base 3067 2992 3347 3391 3073 
(1000 mt) Change -5.65 -6.01 -11.18 -10.82 -15.18 
% change -0.18 -0.20 -0.33 -0.32 -0.49 
WHIMTIN Base 2533 6773 5434 3027 573 
(1000 mt) Change 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
% change 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WHIMIIN Base 678 4948 3803 1664 311 
(1000 mt) Change -15.11 -17.02 -29.73 -28.44 -38.71 
% change -2.23 -0.34 -0.78 -1.71 -12.44 
WHIMTSR Base 2494 1440 9807 6743 9027 
(1000 mt) Change -102.53 32.15 46.26 6.65 28.63 
% change -4.11 2.23 0.47 0.10 0.32 
WHIMISR 
(1000 mt) 
Base 1611 -689 
Change -78.02 23.40 
% change -4.84 -3.40 
4052 
33.04 
0.82 
4362 5177 
3.30 19.16 
0.08 0.37 
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Table 6.2 (Continued) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983' 1984 1985 
4532 
0.00 
0.00 
2206 
0.00 
0.00 
5554 
0.00 
0.00 
3136 
-14.75 
-0.47 
123 
0.00 
0.00 
-10 
-37.36 
360.57 
3165 
-18.69 
-0.59 
2022 
-15.94 
-0.79 
4871 
0.00 
0.00 
2489 
0.00 
0.00 
5626 
0.00 
0.00 
3164 
-22.03 
-0.70 
127 
0.00 
0.00 
-69 
-44.18 
64.42 
11029 
83.39 
0.76 
3595 
59.30 
1.65 
4247 
0.00 
0.00 
2140 
0.00 
0.00 
6073 
0.00 
0.00 
3666 
-17.17 
-0.47 
19 
0.00 
0.00 
-147 
-47.64 
32.32 
12294 
-77.76 
-0.63 
1375 
-60.69 
-4.41 
4377 
0.00 
0.00 
2495 
0.00 
0.00 
5776 
0.00 
0.00 
3385 
-24.98 
-0.74 
3830 
0.00 
0.00 
2563 
-69.68 
-2.72 
18606 
94.64 
0.51 
5553 
66.85 
1.20 
3578 
0.00 
0.00 
1494 
0.00 
0.00 
5754 
0.00 
0.00 
3370 
-28.64 
-0.85 
4470 
0.00 
0.00 
3900 
-67.51 
-1.73 
19832 
0.09 
0.00 
2701 
-4.03 
-0.15 
3693 
0.00 
0.00 
1459 
0.00 
0.00 
5774 
0.00 
0.00 
3394 
-22.92 
-0.68 
1690 
0.00 
0.00 
1021 
-47.85 
-4.69 
23185 
-55.33 
-0.24 
6485 
-44.39 
-0.69 
1575 
0.00 
0.00 
610 
0.00 
0.00 
5901 
0.00 
0.00 
3493 
-29.50 
-0.84 
668 
0.00 
0.00 
644 
-59.49 
-9.24 
27590 
24.74 
0.09 
5713 
15.19 
0.27 
2798 
0.00 
0.00 
907 
0.00 
0.00 
5543 
0.00 
0.00 
3262 
-19.66 
-0.60 
235 
0.00 
0.00 
376 
-36.18 
-9.61 
17213 
-112.93 
-0.66 
749 
-86.45 
-11.54 
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Table 6.2 (Continued) 
Variable Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
WHIMTCH 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
5782 
0.00 
0.00 
4406 
0.00 
0.00 
3653 
0.00 
0.00 
2580 
0.00 
0.00 
9126 
0.00 
0.00 
WHIMICH 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
2560 
-3.78 
-0.15 
933 
-3.69 
-0.04 
34 
0.00 
0.00 
34 
0.00 
0.00 
458 
-11.02 
-2.41 
WHIMTRW 
(1000 mt) 
BASE 
Change 
% change 
39101 
-23.40 
-0.06 
37556 
-34.81 
-0.09 
39892 
-77.97 
-0.20 
36390 
-87.70 
-0.24 
44977 
-138.96 
-0.31 
WHIMIRW 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
19853 
-17.07 
-0.09 
15566 
-26.39 
-0.17 
19945 
-63.86 
-0.32 
14844 
-74.84 
-0.50 
21394 
-114.31 
-0.53 
WHIMTWL 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
61057 
-125.93 
-0.21 
60748 
-2.66 
-0.00 
70549 
-31.71 
-0.04 
59232 
-81.04 
-0.14 
74708 
-110.33 
-0.15 
WHEXT2 
(1000 mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
30534 
-5.15 
-0.39 
25969 
-7.18 
-0.11 
34554 
-8.20 
-0.21 
25637 
-8.56 
-0.43 
32628 
-9.83 
-0.49 
WHEXP2CA 
(CA $/mt) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
205.34 
-0.17 
-0.08 
187.48 
-0.00 
-0.00 
172.34 
-0.04 
-0.02 
150.89 
-0.11 
-0.07 
174.90 
-0.15 
-0.08 
WHEXPUS 
(US $/mt) 
Base 178.11 155.86 147.02 126.90 135.35 
Change -5.15 -7.18 -8.20 -8.56 -9.83 
% change -2.89 -4.61 -5.58 -6.75 -7.27 
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Table 6.2 (Continued) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
6287 
0.00 
0.00 
1684 
-8.57 
-0.51 
46072 
-90.49 
-0.20 
19115 
-79.01 
-0.41 
65733 
-109.18 
-0.17 
28153 
-9.97 
-0.55 
186.94 
-0.14 
-0.08 
127.35 
-9.97 
-7.83 
8929 
0.00 
0.00 
1393 
-16.05 
-1.15 
55823 
-180.42 
-0.32 
25924 
-146.47 
-0.56 
86405 
-97.02 
-0.11 
36497 
-12.73 
-0.46 
230.38 
-0.13 
-0.06 
167.34 
-12.73 
-7.61 
13467 
0.00 
0.00 
7988 
-9.82 
-0.12 
53518 
-140.06 
-0.26 
22353 
-117.99 
-0.53 
89618 
-217.82 
-0.24 
37374 
-16.73 
-0.68 
270.87 
-0.29 
-0.11 
182.19 
-16.73 
-9.18 
14033 
0.00 
0.00 
8450 
-20.22 
-0.24 
56785 
-264.22 
-0.47 
26406 
-206.49 
-0.78 
103408 
-169.58 
-0.16 
48851 
-17.30 
-0.52 
246.30 
-0.22 
-0.09 
177.11 
-17.30 
-9.77 
12625 
0.00 
0.00 
4113 
-18.84 
-0.46 
52436 
-255.59 
-0.49 
26538 
-204.20 
-0.77 
98695 
-255.50 
-0.26 
42117 
-17.72 
-0.77 
225.90 
-0.34 
-0.15 
156.11 
-17.72 
-11.35 
9194 
0.00 
0.00 
3487 
-12.55 
-0.36 
53781 
-164.05 
-0.31 
22224 
-141.98 
-0.64 
97317 
-219.39 
-0.23 
38070 
-20.06 
-0.71 
224.20 
-0.29 
-0.13 
152.90 
-20.06 
-13.12 
7766 
0.00 
0.00 
3094 
-15.78 
-0.51 
60235 
-191.64 
-0.32 
26084 
-169.58 
-0.65 
103735 
-166.90 
-0.16 
39638 
-22.54 
-0.65 
233.52 
-0.22 
-0.09 
144.04 
-22.54 
-15.65 
7272 
0.00 
0.00 
801 
-6.50 
-0.81 
52805 
-75.38 
-0.14 
22358 
-83.72 
-0.37 
85867 
-188.32 
-0.22 
28454 
-22.24 
-0.82 
247.36 
-0.25 
-0.10 
137.34 
-22.24 
-16.19 
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Table 6.2 (Continued) 
Variable Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
USWHEAPF 
(mil. ace) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
71.59 
-0.02 
-0.03 
80.69 
-0.06 
-0.08 
82.89 
-0.12 
-0.14 
75.24 
-0.13 
-0.17 
71.03 
-0.11 
-0.15 
WHPOD 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
1721 
0.00 
0.00 
1800 
-0.59 
-0.03 
2291 
-1.83 
-0.08 
2215 
-3.09 
-0.14 
2043 
-3.41 
-0.17 
WHFOU 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
534,69 
-0.53 
-0.10 
554.87 
-0.53 
-0.10 
592.36 
-0.55 
-0.09 
577.83 
-0.62 
-0.11 
590.91 
-0.69 
-0.12 
WHFEU 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
-165.43 
5.71 
-3.45 
109.78 
8.64 
7.87 
137.67 
10.07 
7.31 
175.47 
6.29 
3.58 
32.31 
3.98 
12.33 
WHSEU 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
86.56 
-0.03 
-0.04 
99.06 
-0.09 
-0.09 
102.40 
-0.15 
-0.15 
92.68 
-0.17 
-0.18 
87.51 
-0.14 
-0.16 
WHPRSl 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
158.23 
-5.87 
-3.71 
464.33 
-10.50 
-2.26 
578.21 
-20.23 
-3.50 
617.83 
-24.82 
-4.02 
530.45 
-26.68 
-5.03 
WHGVSl 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
260.32 
5.11 
1.96 
40.11 
2.21 
5.50 
117.72 
3.38 
2.87 
507.74 
3.44 
0.68 
730.88 
4.62 
0.63 
WHEST 
(mil. bu.) 
Base 
Change 
% change 
418.54 
-0.76 
-0.18 
504.43 
-8.29 
-1.64 
695.93 
-16.86 
-2.42 
1125.57 
-21.38 
-1.90 
1261.33 
-22.06 
-1.75 
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Table 6.2 (Continued) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
70.72 
-0.10 
-0.14 
1909 
-2.89 
-0.15 
597.17 
-0.73 
-0.12 
299.65 
6.30 
2.10 
87.52 
-0.13 
-0.15 
391.86 
-30.03 
-7.66 
761.95 
5.36 
0.70 
1153.81 
-24.67 
-2.14 
80.76 
-0.09 
-0.11 
2117 
-2.87 
-0.14 
595.89 
-0.80 
-0.13 
314.32 
4.18 
1.33 
101.27 
-0.12 
-0.12 
374.65 
-30.08 
-8.03 
545.78 
5.50 
1.01 
920.43 
-24.58 
-2.67 
83.31 
-0.12 
-0.14 
2381 
-2.71 
-0.11 
598.82 
-0.84 
-0.14 
139.72 
5.87 
4.20 
105.08 
-0.15 
-0.15 
268.39 
-32.04 
-11.94 
818.40 
9.19 
1.12 
1086.79 
-22.85 
-2.10 
78.15 
-0.20 
-0.26 
2624 
-3.65 
-0.14 
610.37 
-0.83 
-0.14 
75.05 
14.88 
19.83 
98.66 
-0.27 
-0.27 
296.71 
-42.48 
-14.32 
837.39 
11.55 
1.38 
1134.10 
-30.93 
-2.73 
74.05 
-0.29 
-0.39 
2507 
-6.47 
-0.26 
621.72 
-0.92 
-0.15 
-7.02 
13.61 
-193.73 
93.64 
-0.38 
-0.41 
299.94 
-49.93 
-16.65 
1093.15 
12.11 
1.11 
1393.09 
-37.82 
-2.72 
78.44 
-0.30 
-0.38 
2345 
-9.13 
-0.39 
635.94 
-1.08 
-0.17 
217.35 
6.77 
3.11 
99.89 
-0.40 
-0.40 
302.84 
-48.99 
-16.18 
1086.92 
6.65 
0.61 
1389.77 
-42.34 
-3.05 
81.24 
-0.22 
-0.27 
2571 
-9.86 
-0.38 
656.34 
-1.16 
-0.18 
369.70 
4.57 
1.24 
104.03 
-0.29 
-0.28 
235.50 
-51.00 
-21.66 
1147.99 
5.19 
0.45 
1383.45 
-45.80 
-3.31 
77.43 
-0.19 
-0.25 
2607 
-6.93 
-0.27 
672.77 
-1.26 
-0.19 
415.88 
10.77 
2.59 
99.40 
-0.26 
-0.26 
136.52 
-61.24 
-44.86 
1636.41 
7.80 
0.48 
1772.93 
-53.44 
-3.01 
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Table 6.2 (Continued) 
Variable Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
WHFP Base 4.13 4.05 3.50 2.79 2.40 
(US $/mt) Change -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
% change -0.10 -0.18 -0.26 -0.22 -0.17 
IRl Base 6.51 8.10 6.74 4.84 4.69 
(%) Change 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.44 0.47 
% change 5.77 4.84 6.08 9.06 10.11 
ERSDR Base 1.24 1.26 1.21 1.18 1.17 
(US $/SDR) Change -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 
% change -3.29 -5.10 -6.57 -7.66 -8.51 
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Table 6.2 (Continued) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
2.93 3.50 4.03 3.09 3.61 4.18 3.30 2.95 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
-0.24 -0.15 -0.21 -0.73 -0.58 -0.26 -0.22 -0.57 
8.35 9.93 11.60 13.05 10.85 8.98 9.78 7.67 
0.51 0.55 0.58 0.62 0.68 0.74 0.79 0.88 
6.15 5.51 5.04 4.77 6.24 8.26 8.04 11.52 
1.24 1.26 1.23 1.14 1.10 1.10 0.98 1.11 
-0.11 -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 -0.15 -0.16 -0.17 -0.19 
-8.82 -9.37 -10.29 -11.93 -13.34 -14.50 -17.38 -16.91 
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In the domestic market, production (WHPOD) was unchanged in 1973 and 
decreased from 1974 to 1985. Food use demand (WHFOU) for wheat decreased 
over time because of the higher interest rates. The decreasing wheat area planted 
(USWHEAPF) due to lower farm prices resulted in decreases in the seed use demand 
(WHSEU) over time. However, feed use demand (WHFEU) increased in response 
to the lower domestic prices. The decreasing export price coupled with the higher 
interest rate depleted the commercial stock holdings (WHFRSl); whereas, the gov­
ernment stocks (WHGVSl) were stacked up because farmers tended to sell more 
wheat to government agents rather than to the depressed markets. The domestic 
price reflected the contractionary monetary policy and decreased by -0.10 % in 1973 
to -0.57 % in 1985. 
6.3 Analysis of Impacts of Monetary Policy 
The impacts of monetary policy on U.S. wheat trade and domestic market, 
therefore, can be analyzed using above two dynamic simulation results. Table 6.3 
reports the calculated exchange rate effects on U.S. wheat trade and interest rate 
effect on the domestic price in terms of the long-run average elasticity. For wheat 
trade, the average elasticity of export and export price are 0.05 and 0.88, respec­
tively. Export price is more responsive than quantity; however, both are inelastic 
in response to exchange rate changes. Thus, in the duopoly world wheat market a 
1 % U.S. dollar devaluation would result in 0.88 % increase in export price, but the 
increase of quantity exported is limited at 0.05 %. 
The simulation results consist with the duopoly world market characteristics 
and the theoretical explanation of exchange rate effects. In Figure 4.4, the dollar 
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Table 6.3: Exchange rate effect on U.S. wheat exports and interest rate effect 
on domestic market 
Year 
exchange 
export 
rate elasticity" 
export price 
interest rate elasticity" 
domestic price 
1973 0.12 0.88 -0.03 
1974 0.02 0.90 -0.04 
1975 0.03 0.85 -0.04 
1976 0.05 0.88 -0.03 
1977 0.05 0.85 -0.02 
1978 0.05 0.89 -0.02 
1979 0.04 0.81 -0.01 
1980 0.06 0.89 -0.02 
1981 0.04 0.82 -0.06 
1982 0.05 0.85 -0.04 
1983 0.04 0.90 -0.01 
1984 0.03 0.90 -0.01 
1985 0.04 0.96 -0.03 
average 0.05 0.88 -0.03 
"Calculated as the percentage change of variable in interest divided by-
percentage change of exchange rate (interest rate) from base value. 
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devaluation would rotate the demand schedule facing the United States upward 
and result in a rise in export price, but change in quantity exported is quite small 
dependent upon the relative price change of two duopolists in response to the dollar 
devaluation. This is exactly as the simulation results. The inelastic export price 
with respect to the dollar devaluation is because most major importing countries 
(e.g., the EC, Japan, India, and China) isolated their domestic market so that 
the rotation of the world demand schedule and hence the demand schedule facing 
the United States in percentage are less than the devaluation. In addition to the 
isolation of domestic markets in the major importing countries, the quite small 
change in quantity exported is also because both duopolists in pricing their wheat 
exports tend to maximize profit. Effect of devaluation, therefore, is offset by increase 
in export prices. 
It is interesting to compare the exchange rate effects of those study with that 
obtained in previous studies within the competitive framework. A comparison of 
exchange rate elasticities for wheat is given below. 
export export price 
This study 0.05 0.88 
Vellianities-Fidas (1976) small (perhaps zero) 
Johnson et al. (1977) 0.69 
Chambers and Just (1981) 1.48 0.79 
For wheat export, Vellianitis-Fidas concluded that the long-run effect of exchange 
rate change on export is quite small and perhaps even zero. This is consistent with 
the simulated result of this study. Chambers and Just assumed the exchange rate 
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as an exogenous variable to study the effects on U.S. wheat, corn, and soybean 
markets. The exchange rate elasticity of wheat export obtained is elastic, with 
elasticity 1.48. Since the exchange rate elasticity had been proved must lie in the 
interval (0, -1) if all goods are net gross substitutes and all income elasticities are 
positive, in their interpretation for the elastic wheat export they attributed the 
plausibility to the negative income effects on corn and soybean as obtained in their 
empirical estimation. However, this implies that corn and soybean are inferior 
goods, but it is hardly true. 
The exchange rate elasticity of export price obtained in this study is close to 
two other results, all are inelastic. Johnson et al. simulated a 10 % devaluation 
of the U.S. dollar against all currency in 1973 and obtain a 6.9 % increase in U.S. 
wheat export price. This short-run elasticity is 0.19 lower than the 0.88 of this 
study. Chambers and Just's long-run elasticity 0.79 is closer to the elasticity of 
this study. The estimated elasticities in previous studies are lower because they 
assumed the export price is equal to the domestic price within the competitive 
framework. However, as shown in the simulation results in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, 
show the domestic price was less influenced by exchanges in exchange rate due to 
money supply changes. Thus, to assume the export price equal to domestic price 
would underestimate the exchange rate elasticity of export price. Since the market 
characteristics of domestic market and world market are different, the export price 
and domestic price should be separated, so is the exchange rate effect on these two 
prices. 
Since the exchange rate elasticity of wheat exports is small, changes in domestic 
market due to the money supply changes principally result from the interest rate 
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effects. Table 6.3 also reports the net effect of interest rate on the domestic price. 
The interest rate effect on food use demand and commercial ending stocks was 
not calculated because changes in domestic price also had backward impact on 
food use demand and the commercial ending stocks were also influenced by the 
export price changes. The approximate net interest rate effect on domestic price 
is quite small. Such less responsive domestic price is because (1) the final wheat 
products are staple food in consumption so that foods use demand for wheat would 
not change dramatically even though the interest rate effect is significant, and (2) 
the government stocks stabilize the domestic price fluctuation. The function of 
government stocks in price stabilization can be seen from the dynamic simulation 
results in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2. For example, when domestic prices decrease, 
farmers tend to sell wheat to government at loan rate. The government stocks, 
therefore, increase and prevent a further decrease in domestic price. 
Turning to the dynamic effects of monetary policy on wheat trade and do­
mestic market. Table 6.4 reports impacts and long-run elasticities with respect to 
money supply increases for the key variables. As analyzed earlier, the expansionary 
monetary policy will depreciate the U.S. dollar and lower the domestic interest rate, 
with long-run elasticities 4.80 and -2.33, respectively. The eventual effects on wheat 
export price, domestic feed use, and commercial stocks are elastic, with elasticities 
of 4.12, -1.15, and 6.37, respectively. As expected, wheat export is less responsive 
to the monetary policy. Domestic disappearance decreases in response to increase 
in money supply. The decrease in disappearance mainly results from the decrease in 
feed use demand, which is elastic in response to rise in domestic price. Total ending 
stock has almost unitary elasticity in response to the money supply change. In­
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crease in total ending stock is mainly from increase in the commercial stocks which 
overwhelms the decrease in government stocks. Since the increase in total ending 
stock is more than the decrease in domestic disappearance, the aggregate domestic 
demand increases. Domestic production also increases, but less than the increase 
in aggregate domestic demand. Consequently, domestic price is pulled up, but is 
inelastic (0.85) with respect to money supply change. 
Chambers and Just (1982) included only the exchange rate channel in analyz­
ing the effect of money supply changes on wheat, corn, and soybean markets. They 
estimated the long-run elasticities, with respect to money supply, of wheat export, 
price, domestic disappearance, and inventories at 2.03,1.76, -0.02, and -0.18, respec­
tively. Similarly, the elasticity of export was overestimated because in their result 
soybean is implied an inferior good with negative income effect. Their elasticity 
of export price (1.76) is between the elasticities of export price (4.12) and domes­
tic price (0.85) of this study. As mentioned earlier, this is because they assume 
the domestic price and export price are equal within the competitive framework, 
so that the elasticity of export price tends to be underestimated and elasticity of 
domestic price is overestimated. Elasticity of ending stock (-0.18) is very close to 
the elasticity of government stock (-0.20) of this study. They did not estimate the 
commercialending stock, so that the commodity speculation was not incorporated 
into their model. The elasticity of domestic disappearance (-0.21) of this study is 
higher than the elasticity (-0.02) they obtained. This is because in estimating the 
demand for wheat they ignored (1) prices of the final wheat product, (2) interest 
rate effects, and (3) cross-price effects. 
Chambers and Just (1982) argued that U.S. monetary policy has dramatic 
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Table 6.4: Dynamic effect of a sustained increase in the money supply 
growth rate by 3 percent 
Variable 
Average impacts" 
of money supply 
increase 
Long-run*" 
elasticity 
Exchange rate (US $/SDR) 0.16 4.80 
Domestic interest rate {%) -0.72 -2.33 
Export (1000 mt) 212.51 0.18 
Export price (US $/mt) 19.40 4.12 
Domestic price (US $/bu.) 0.09 0.85 
Domestic production (mil. bu.) 5.72 0.07 
Domestic disappearance (mil. bu.) -6.98 -0.24 
Food use (mil. bu.) 1.03 0.05 
Feed use (mil. bu.) -8.27 -1.15 
Seed use (mil. bu.) 0.26 0.09 
Total ending stocks (mil. bu.) 40.12 0.96 
Free stocks (mil. bu.) 47.04 6.37 
Government stocks (rail, bu.) -6.92 -0.20 
"Calculated as average changes of simulated values from the base values. 
The period 1980-85 is considered for the purpose of long-run analysis. 
^Calculated as the percentage change from mean (1980 to 1985) divided by 
percentage change (3 percent) of the money supply. 
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effects on U.S. exports and prices. They estimated the long-run elasticity of wheat 
export and export price with respect to money supply at 2.03 and 1.76, respectively. 
The wheat export is more elastic than export price. However, within the competitive 
framework as they used, dramatic effect on export price requires a price-inelastic 
export (excess) supply schedule. Therefore, even the exchange rate can be treated 
as a separate regressor to affect the export as they did and a dollar devaluation can 
shift the demand schedule facing the United States outward to result in an increase 
in export and rise in export price, the percentage change in export price should be 
larger than the percentage change in export (see Chapter 2). Then, with respect to 
a specific money supply growth rate the export price should be more elastic than 
the quantity exported, not the inverse case as they obtained. Moreover, since most 
major wheat importing countries isolated their domestic markets by domestic and 
trade policies as discussed earlier, the outward shift of the demand schedule facing 
the United States due to the dollar devaluation is limited as evidenced by this study 
and other studies reviewed in Chapter 2. Change in export, therefore, is hardly to 
be expected elastic or more elastic than the export price. Not only the competitive 
framework misspecified the world wheat market but also the unreasonable results 
let their empirical conclusions questionable. 
From the dynamic simulation results and above analysis, several findings were 
obtained about the impacts of monetary policy on U.S. wheat trade and domestic 
market. 
First, the monetary policy in the financial market does significantly influence 
the exchange rate and interest rate determination. An expansionary (contrac­
tionary) monetary policy would depreciate (appreciate) the value of the U.S. dollar 
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and lower (raise) the domestic interest rate. These two rates, therefore, spread the 
impacts of monetary policy on U.S. wheat trade and domestic market. 
Second, in the duopoly world wheat market, changes in the value of the U.S. 
dollar due to U.S. monetary policy change have significant effect on U.S. wheat 
export price. Since the domestic market in most major importing countries are 
isolated, changes in the U.S. export price in percentage is less than changes in the 
exchange rate. However, with respect to the money supply change the U.S. export 
price does positively and significantly change and is very elastic. For quantity 
exported, since the exchange rate elasticity of export is very small, the eflfect of 
monetary policy is insignificant. To increase U.S. wheat exports, accordingly, should 
depend upon other factors, not the monetary policy (refer to Figure 4.5). 
Third, in the U.S. domestic wheat market, the interest rate has significant effect 
on food use demand and commercial ending stocks. Since wheat products are staple 
foods in consumption, change in food use demand due to monetary policy is very 
small even through the interest rate eflFect is significant. In addition to the interest 
rate effect, the commercial ending stock is also influenced by the export (current 
and expected) price, which is significant in response to changes in the exchange 
rate. Thus, the holding of commercial stocks with speculative motivation does very 
elastically respond to the monetary policy. Feed use demand for wheat originated 
from the livestock sector appears more sensitive to wheat price rather the interest 
rate. The monetary policy, therefore, has no direct impact on feed use demand 
for wheat. In aggregate, an expansionary monetary policy tends to decrease the 
domestic disappearance and increase the total ending stocks. The net effect on 
aggregate domestic demand for wheat (disappearance plus total ending stocks) is 
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positive, but inelastic. 
Fourth, because of the government program, domestic wheat production does 
not directly respond to the monetary policy. Also, the property of wheat production 
of that wheat was planted in the last season in the time horizon would restrict pro­
duction in response to the current year monetary policy. Government programs and 
the expected price received by farmers, therefore, dominate the planting decision, 
hence production. Wheat production appears very inelastic with respect to mone­
tary policy. Under the competitive domestic market framework, the expansionary 
monetary policy eventually results in an increase in aggregate donlestic demand 
which, is more than an increase in production, so the domestic price is pulled up 
but less elastic. 
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7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Summary of the Study 
The two main objectives of this study are to develop a new U.S. wheat model 
that consists of wheat trade in the imperfect competition world market and com­
petitive domestic market, and to measure the impacts of monetary policy on wheat 
trade and domestic market. A model was theoretically constructed and empirical 
studies were performed to estimate the theoretical model and to measure the mon­
etary policy impacts. Both the theoretical development and empirical study for 
these two objectives are highly successful. 
The theoretical U.S. wheat model was constructed in Chapters 3 and 4. The 
duopoly market characteristic was adopted from previous studies and was judged 
suitable for the world wheat market. World import demand facing the United States 
and U.S. export pricing decision, therefore, were solved by the Stackelberg deter­
minate equilibrium solution. In the solution, Canadian wheat and U.S. wheat were 
assumed differentiated, Canada was taken as the price leader in the world market, 
and both duopolists tended to maximize profit (revenue) from wheat exports. The 
exchange rate variable was incorporated into the model via the international price 
linkage, whereas the law of one price (LOP) was not assumed. Incorporation of the 
duopoly characteristic for trade made this model different from the conventional 
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competitive framework. 
Structure of the competitive U.S. domestic market was similar to the con­
ventional model, including wheat production, domestic disappearance, and ending 
stocks. However, each structural equation of the conventional model was respecified 
to be theoretical embodied, or extended to be more realistic and avoid the left-out 
explanatory variables. In the more important ones, all government programs in 
different time segments were captured to specify wheat area planting decision, the 
interest rate effects were accounted for to determine demand for wheat and commer­
cial ending stocks, government ending stock was endogenized to present its function 
in price stabilization, and commercial ending stocks was endogenized and incorpo­
rated into the model to reflect the commodity speculation behavior. In addition, 
the separability of the utility function was assumed and thereby the two-stage bud­
geting procedure was performed to provide the theoretical basis for demand for final 
wheat products. Furthermore, the derived demand for primary wheat was obtained 
by the profit-maximization behavior of producers of final wheat products. 
The complete U.S. wheat model, therefore, was constructed by combining the 
imperfect competition trade and competitive domestic market structural equation 
together. This model bears some important features that are the weakness of the 
conventional competitive model. First, it contains the world market and domestic 
market with different market characteristics in a model. Second, the different deter­
mination processes of export price and domestic price associated with the different 
market characteristics are explicitly presented, and thus these two prices are not 
necessarily equivalent. Third, a very important feature in structure for the purpose 
of assessing the impacts of monetary policy, the financial market originated vari­
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ables exchange rate and interest rate are pertinently and distinctly embodied in the 
model. This model and its features provide a theoretical foundation for a precise 
measurement of impacts of monetary policy. 
For the second main objective of assessing the impacts of monetary policy on 
U.S. wheat trade and domestic market, the U.S. wheat model was connected with 
the financial market via the linkages of exchange rate and interest rate determina­
tion. These two rates were endogenized in this study and the portfolio equilibrium 
model was employed as the theoretical basis to simultaneously determine these two 
rates. Therefore, U.S. monetary policy, in terms of money supply, can influence the 
determination of exchange rate and interest rate, and thereby has impact on wheat 
trade and domestic market. Such impacts, as well as the impacts of external shock, 
were theoretically evaluated. 
The theoretical model was empirically estimated using annual data for the 1965 
- 85 period. The estimation technique utilized to derive the structural coefficients 
was nonlinear, three-stage least squares (3SLS) with principal components as in­
strument variables. Foreign import demand in empirical estimation was extended 
to include six regions: the EC, Japan, India, USSR, China, and the rest of the world 
(ROW). Each region contained total import demand and import demand for U.S. 
wheat. Domestic and trade policies in each region were specified to present their 
influence on import demand. The final estimated model contained 36 equations, 
including 21 estimated equations and 15 identities. Almost all estimated coeffi­
cient were highly significant and had correct signs as theoretical expectations. The 
validation and stability of the estimated model were examined through the entire 
estimation period. All statistics indicated that this model performed satisfactorily. 
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This model, therefore, was utilized to empirically analyze the impacts of monetary 
policy on U.S. wheat trade and domestic market for the period 1973 to 1985 using 
the approach of dynamic simulation and thereafter the dynamic multiplier analysis. 
7.2 Conclusions 
The empirical estimation of the U.S. wheat model and findings from the dy­
namic simulation for effects of U.S. monetary policy on wheat trade and domestic 
market can be summarized as follows. 
1. The U.S. wheat model developed in this study consists of imperfect competi­
tion trade and competitive domestic market, and then presents two different 
determination processes for export price and domestic price. The highly suc­
cessful estimation and model examinations provide evidence for the theoretical 
development. Although the evidence is not fully conclusive, the estimation 
results indicate that the U.S. wheat industry do face two almost equally im­
portant markets which have different market characteristics. Because none of 
producers and demanders has market power, the domestic price is determined 
by market equilibrium. However, by taking Canadian export price as a refer­
ence price and making adjustment with world demand and freight rates, the 
United States in the world market can price exports to make profit. 
2. The wheat model was connected with the financial market via the linkages of 
exchange rate and interest rate determination. These two rates were theoreti­
cally embodied in the structural equations as the impact channels of monetary 
policy. The highly significant estimated coefficients and the dynamic simula-
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tion results indicated that these two rates are very important to the U.S. wheat 
sector and such linkages are pertinent. Furthermore, the exchange rate and 
interest rate were endogenized and estimated using the portfolio equilibrium 
approach. The excellent estimation results on the determination equations of 
these two rates lend support to this approach. 
3. The simulation analysis indicated that in the duopoly world market the effects 
of monetary policy through the exchange rate channel on trade are dramat­
ically significant on export price, but on quantity exported are quite small. 
The real world evidence that most major wheat importing countries isolated 
their domestic markets supports this conclusion. The dramatic effect on ex­
port price implies that the two major exporting countries, the United States 
and Canada, in pricing wheat exports tend to maximize profit, then to com­
pensate export price for, e.g., the dollar devaluation. However, the simulation 
results also showed that the U.S. export price is not fully compensated for the 
dollar devaluation, that is, the export price with respect to exchange rate is 
inelastic. 
4. Effects of monetary policy on the domestic market are principally through 
the interest rate channel on domestic food use demand and commercial end­
ing stocks. In addition, the exchange rate effects on trade spill over to the 
domestic market by (1) change in export, hence change in supply to domestic 
market and in government ending stocks, and (2) change in export price, hence 
change in commercial ending stocks. The commercial ending stocks dramat­
ically respond to the monetary policy. However, since final wheat products 
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are staple foods in consumption and the function of government stocks for 
price stabilization, change in the aggregate domestic demand (disappearance 
plus ending stocks) in response to monetary policy is small. Change in supply 
available for the domestic market is also small because of the insignificant 
effect of monetary policy on export. Thus, as determined by domestic mar­
ket equilibrium, the eventual effect of monetary policy on domestic price is 
inelastic, with elasticity of 0.85. 
5. In terms of change in prices, the dramatic increase in export price and the rel­
ative smaller rise in domestic price due to a money supply increase imply that 
the domestic market is more stable than trade in response to monetary policy. 
Since the U.S. wheat sector is heavily dependent on exports, an expansionary 
monetary policy would tend to have a positive impact on the sector. 
7.3 Implications and Suggestions for Further Research 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the standard trade theory is conventionally based 
on the competitive framework. There is no general trade model of imperfect com­
petition. In the recent development, more studies are concerned about trade in the 
presence of imperfect competition because many international markets do not ap­
pear to follow the competitive market characteristics, for instance the wheat trade. 
The duopoly wheat trade model developed by this study, therefore, provides a good 
example in the new development and model construction. 
Moreover, U.S. wueat is sold about half to the domestic market and half to 
the foreign market. These two markets are almost equally important, but bear 
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different market characteristics. The associated price determination, therefore, is 
different. The complete U.S. wheat model developed in this study fully captures 
these differences in market characteristics and price determination and also the 
interaction of domestic and foreign markets. Any study on a particular commodity 
market like wheat, therefore, should be able to present and capture those difference 
in consideration for model building, and should not be based on the competitive 
framework. 
The exchange rate and interest rate variables were endogenized and estimated 
in this study using the portfolio equilibrium approach. There are only a few em­
pirical studies, not so explicit and complete as this study, that have been done to 
evidence this approach so far. The excellent estimation results on the reduced form 
determination equations of these two rates lend support to this approach. There­
fore, whenever both of these two rates have to be endogenized in a model and have 
to be related with the monetary policy to evaluate policy impacts, the portfolio 
equilibrium approach provides a good theoretical basis and the estimation results 
of this study can be a guide for empirical study. Furthermore, if the data used 
for empirical estimation includes both fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, the 
techniques of this study can be applied in estimating these two rates. 
This study concerns only the impacts of U.S. monetary policy on U.S. wheat 
trade and domestic market. However, the model developed can also be utilized 
for analyses of impacts of other policies or external shocks. For example, U.S. 
agricultural programs in setting target price, loan rate, and set-aside diversion pay­
ment, any importing country's trade and domestic policies, bad harvest due to bad 
weather, and so on. 
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Finally, the structural model of this study can be easily extended to become 
a nonspatial world trade model with imperfect competition. For such purpose, 
a detailed domestic market for each country should be constructed like the U.S. 
domestic market in this study. Import demand can be formulated by following 
the definition of excess demand of domestic market. Wheat trade in the duopoly 
world market is similar to the model of this study with Canada as the world price 
leader. .Other exporting countries can be taken as the duopolists' price followers. 
In comparing to the competitive nonspatial model, such a model with imperfect 
competition should be more realistic in modeling the world wheat trade and policy 
analysis. 
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